



# INDIA - PAKISTAN RELATIONS, 1977 - 1987

**ABSTRACT  
OF THE  
THESIS**  
SUBMITTED FOR THE AWARD OF THE DEGREE OF  
**Doctor of Philosophy**  
IN  
**POLITICAL SCIENCE**




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## A B S T R A C T



The objective of this thesis is an analysis of Indo-Pakistani relations during the period 1977-1992. More specifically, it aims at an exploration of the conditions of conflict and cooperation between the two countries.

The period selected for study is significant for many reasons. First, during the period under review no war took place between the two countries occasional border skirmishes notwithstanding. Yet many new bilateral issues cropped up and some new situations developed in this region which adversely affected bilateral relations. Moreover, external involvement during the period in this region continued as before. Secondly, the period selected is also significant for the formation of Janata government in New Delhi which veered to a liberal and accommodative approach to the normalization of Indo-Pak relations. Thirdly, the second Indira regime witnessed the signing of an agreement to set up a Joint Indo-Pak Commission to boost bilateral cooperation in economic and cultural fields.

In the past much work has been done in both the countries on Indo-Pakistani relations but nobody

has appreciated the significance of post-Simla Indo-Pak arms race and the ensuing cold war which led the two countries to the brink of a hot war (probably nuclear) during the later part of 1991. This study has, therefore, taken special notice of the strategic dimension. The subject has been studied in an independent, impartial and unbiased way free from nationalist bias and proclivities. In the course of this analysis I have given a balanced view of the approaches, viewpoints and policies of both the countries.

This dissertation is organized under three Parts. Part I (Chapters I - IV) deals with Indo-Pakistani relations in the historical perspective.

Chapter I deals with the initial phase of Indo-Pakistani relations. The major issues such as the question of minorities', evacuee properties, division of military stores, demarcation of borders, currency problems', and problems of refugees are explained in detail, and how these problems were by and large overcome by the two countries through talks and meetings.

But the princely states particularly Kashmir and Hyderabad became great problems for both countries. Eventually the latter two acceded to India. But

Pakistan disputed Kashmir's accession to India and Kashmir is still the stumbling block in the way of normalization of Indo-Pak relations.

Chapter II deals with the role of external factors in disrupting Indo-Pakistani relations. Pakistan was and still inferior to India in each and every field. So, Pakistan, in order to come on equal level with India, began to mature her contact with Islamic and Western countries for all kind of help. In the early fifties, Pakistan could look only to the United States for this kind of help. U.S.A., in turn was seeking allies in Asia to counter the growing influence of communists countries particularly of China and U.S.S.R. Pakistan, later on, received a lot of arms and military equipments. This acceptance of military aid of United States by Pakistan created two problems especially Pakistan had no her own policies and was controlled by the other powers because Pakistan became an American stooge and was moving according to the direction of U.S. Secondly, Pakistan's alliance with western countries disturbed the balance of power in this region and India became bound to have an alliance with some one for her own defence. Thus, India joined U.S.S.R. and a new wave of cold war again created in the region.



For further help in military and economic field, Pakistan joined some regional organisation such as South East Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) and Baghdad Pact (later named CENTO). After joining these Organisations, Pakistan got chance to raise bilateral issues particularly Kashmir issue in the above Organisations and received support on this issue. At this juncture, Pakistan also took much interest to solve the Kashmir issue through United Nation because most of the permanent members of Security Council were in favour of Pakistan. Thus, Pakistan raised Kashmir issue in U.N. many times but the efforts of U.N. as well as of super-powers ended with no result.

The Farakha barrage issue and the Indus water dispute were another two problems between India and Pakistan. Many meetings for resolving these issues were taken place between the two countries. Regarding Farakha Barrage, both the countries got success in ironing out some of the differences. But regarding Indus water disputes, both the countries, after the continuous eight years discussion and negotiations, reached at the conclusion of Indus waters Treaty through the mediation of World Bank. The treaty recognizes the need for fixing the delimitation in a spirit of good-

will and friendship, and defines the rights and obligations of the Government of India and of the Government of Pakistan concerning the use of water of the Indus river system. Till 1960, in the history of India-Pakistan relations, the Indus waters dispute was the only dispute where both the Governments had shown a positive spirit of cooperation.

The Chinese border invasion on several places of India abruptly complicated not only India-China relationship but India-Pakistan relationship also. In this conflict, India suffered much militarily and this brought a profound consequences for both Indian foreign policy and national security policy. India which was earlier believing and following only non-aligned policy, suddenly gave up her much vaunted non-aligned policy and dramatically expanded defence budget in order to strengthen defence system. This Indian programme of strengthening defence system against China was taken by Pakistan as her national threat. So, Pakistan came in close contact of China and a secret military pact between Pakistan and China was signed. Many economic aid was also provided by China to Pakistan. Thus, India realized the great need of military capability in order to hold off China and Pakistan simultaneously.

Chapter III deals with a long list of factors that had affected the situations in the region in different ways and finally India and Pakistan met with a war. This war of 1965 showed that Pakistan attacked on India by two reasons basically. One is that Pakistan thought that India had become very weak because of 1962 war with China and India is not in a position to win the war. Secondly, Pakistan believed that if she did not attack in a decisive manner, the State of Kashmir would be integrated into India and international interest for Pakistan's concerns would dwindle.

Whatever the impression, Pakistan was having about India before occurring the war proved completely wrong because both the countries suffered in this war and Pakistan also realized that Indian armed forces could not be easily routed and Indian forces had come a long way from the Chinese debacle of 1962. On the Indian side, the war provided a degree of comfort to the military whose prestige and morale had sunk to an all-time low in the aftermath of 1962 conflict.

A new hope of mutual cooperation between the two countries was seen when Tashkent Declaration was signed through the mediation of Soviet Union. But as for as permanent settlement of India-Pakistan problems

are concerned, it did nothing new at all. It brought a temporary respite to India-Pakistan hostilities. India and Pakistan remained suspicious and unyielding towards each other.

In Chapter IV the significance of ideological differences between the two wings of the United Pakistan has been explained. In the beginning before the outbreak of the war, the ideological differences created the internal crisis in Pakistan, and the East Pakistani peoples refused to accept a subservient role in Pakistan and demanded maximum autonomy. The autonomist demands were met with harsh measures by Pakistan. With this, the refugees started to proceed towards India. So, India thought that it was cheaper to go to war than to absorb the refugees into its already bloated population. Finally, these factors propelled India and Pakistan to war and subsequent creation of Bangladesh.

India, in this war of 1971, badly defeated Pakistan and unquestionably established her military superiority not only over Pakistan but even in South Asia region as a whole. With this superiority of India and the defeat of Pakistan, two new things emerged. One is that Pakistan, after recognising her inferiority in conventional war, felt the threat for her security

in the sub-continent. So, it made a sense for Pakistan to develop some nuclear capability in order to meet with India in future. Second, Pakistan's claim on Kashmir after the separation of Bangladesh, also eroded in a major way. The inability of the West Pakistan to convince their brethren in the East to remain in the same polity, made it exceedingly difficult for the Pakistani leadership to lay a claim on Kashmir on the basis of its religious composition. Naturally, India took advantage of the discrepancy between theory and practice.

This chapter also discusses the importance of the Simla Agreement of 1972 in normalizing Indo-Pakistan relations. The Simla Agreement played a very important role in the establishment of durable peace in the sub-continent and for the settlement of problems arising out of Bangladesh war. The greatest merit of the Simla Pact is that the two countries decided to renounce the use or threat of use of force against each other, to put an end to the era of conflict and confrontation; and commit themselves to standing cooperation and peaceful coexistence.

Part II covering chapters V - VII, deals with the period from 1977-1987 which had been prescribed for my doctoral work, but I have covered the events up to 1992.

In Chapter V the main emphasis is given on the coming of Janata Government in Power and on the re-orientation of Indian foreign policy. The Janata Government followed a foreign policy which was a fresh thrust to the promotion of the cause of peace and disarmament, to strengthen stability and cooperative spirit, to fortify independence and freedom from exploitation. With the formation of Janata Government in India, a new chapter in India-Pakistan relations was started. The Janata Government repeatedly emphasised "beneficial bilateralism" and "good neighbourliness". The main aim of Janata foreign policy was to promote and enrich India's relations with the neighbours in general and with Pakistan in particular as a means not only to solve inherited problems but also to create a climate of confidence and mutual goodwill so that more harmonious and beneficial relations in economic, political and cultural fields might be promoted in the true spirit of peaceful coexistence. The leaders of India and Pakistan during Janata Regime, exchanged a lot of visits from each other country. Through this exchange of visits, the leaders of both the countries got success in dispelling the apprehensions of fundamentalism of some of the Muslim and Hindu organizations from the minds of the people of both countries. With this, many out-

standing disputes between India and Pakistan were resolved and the areas of mutual cooperation in various fields were expanded.

The above hopes and spirit of cooperation received a jolt when Janata Government fell and mainly when the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan produced a crisis not simply for Afghan people but for the South Asian region as a whole. It mainly confronted the main regional actors- India and Pakistan with a new political and strategic situation to which they reacted in distinctive ways. India and Pakistan both took the consequences of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan not on the basis of the needs and aspirations of the Afghan people but they took into account their own interests. Their responses differed from each other. Pakistan pursue active opposition to the Soviet invasion and India made no public condemnation because of her close ties with Soviet Union. The massive arms and economic help to Pakistan by U.S. was vehemently criticised by India because India felt a threat for security in the region due to this supply of arms. Thus, the Soviet invasion brought the cold war to the region and escalated the differences between India and Pakistan.

Chapter VI deals with the impediments in the way of Indo-Pak cooperation. There is no doubt that some of the bilateral issues have been the major irritants between the two countries but in addition to these, external involvement has exacerbated the situation and intensified intra-regional rivalries.

Pakistan's purchase of arms from the U.S., China and other countries has always been directed against India. Pakistan has tried to exploit every situation which occurred in South Asia or outside to the detriment of India. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, it was Zia-ul Haq who made Pakistan very important to the United States overnight and Pakistan became a "frontline state" in U.S. perception. Through this tactics, Pakistan received a lot of arms and economic aid from United States and other countries and built up her defence system more strong. The aim of Pakistan for improving relations with China and also to bring China's role as a countervailing power in South Asia especially against India. With this massive supply of arms and economic aid, India felt a great danger to her security in the region. Thus, India was compelled to join some one for resisting this



danger. In this way, India opposed more to the supply of arms to Pakistan from United States and China than that of Soviet invasion. India with an alliance of Soviet Union had to face Pakistan + U.S. and China in this region. But from the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and finally with the disintegration of Soviet Union, the cold war in South Asia ended. Thus, Pakistan's usefulness to U.S. policy calculations was changed. U.S., which was believing blindly in Pakistan's nuclear programme during Afghan crisis, quickly changed her policy and suspended her military and economic assistance to Pakistan under the Presster Amendment. United States not only suspended her economic and military aid to Pakistan but also shifted her priorities towards India. Thus whatever the burden India was facing during Afghan crisis from the side of Pakistan helped by United States was reduced and this burden was shifted to Pakistan upto some extent. In this condition, Pakistan, in order to bring the balance of powers in her own favour, tried to improve her contact more and more with China, France and some other countries. Here one thing is to be noted that both India and Pakistan are suspecting about each other and both are trying to receive arms and other kind of help from external powers. Both the countries had

never stopped themselves from taking such help but according to their interest they have changed their track of receiving the outside help from time to time.

Further, the Kashmir, Punjab and Siachin glacier issues have been the major irritants between India and Pakistan relations. Kashmir has been the problem since partition. Before 1971, Pakistan tried to take Kashmir through military efforts but after the defeat in Bangladesh war of 1971, realised that no military action could separate Kashmir from India or could make Kashmir an independent State. Thus, Pakistan changed her strategy to one of creating a climate of unlawful activities, insurrection by giving support to extremists and militants of Kashmir as well of Punjab. This attitude of Pakistan has created tension between the two countries.

Chapter VII has analysed the framework of Indo-Pakistan Joint Commission and its constituent sub-commissions, and appreciated its potential role in promoting their bilateral cooperation between India and Pakistan. The Joint Commission was established between the two countries for mutual benefit in economic,

trade, industrial, educational, cultural, consular, tourism, travel, information, scientific and technological fields. The Commission also suggested for the exchange of academicians from each other country. Another important point is the division of commission into four sub-commissions each dealing with specified fields, which have provided opportunities to both Indian and Pakistani leaders to have a meeting for discussing some particular matters entrusted to a particular sub-commission. The neighbourly relation and promoting cooperation in the agreement were maintained with the exception of political and military questions. In this agreement, we have seen one thing that the normal function of the agreement was disturbed whenever India and Pakistan adopted rigid attitude against each other and whenever they gave more weightage to the trade with some other countries.

In addition to avenues of bilateral interaction there are also regional and international forums which provide an opportunity to both India and Pakistan to develop their political as well economic relations. In this way, the formation of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) of which India and

Pakistan are the two major partners, and the regional and international organisations held out some hope of not only multilateral cooperation but also bilateral improvement between India and Pakistan. India and Pakistan along with other members of the various organisation got opportunity to discuss and suppress terrorism in the region and to highlight the importance of human rights.

The final part of the study offers suggestions to avoid the hurdles which are coming in the way of mutual cooperation between India and Pakistan. At present both the countries are having nuclear capability and both are facing nuclear threat from each other. In bringing consensus between India and Pakistan, there is need for some reorientation of policies to take into account in the changed circumstances in Southern Asia. At present, it is difficult to visualise any meaningful process which could lead to a reversal and denuclearisation. So, early consultations to work for strategic stability in the post nuclearisation stage are necessary. Both India and Pakistan should move towards the stabilisation of the situation that lowers the dangers of use of nuclear weapons against each other because the existence or possession of nuclear weapons are not

dangerous but the most dangerous thing is their use against each other.

As far as Kashmir problem is concerned, both India and Pakistan should not do any thing through force or sentimental attitudes but through multidirectional approach such as political, economic, psychological and diplomatic. Both the countries should opt the tough measures against the terrorists and militants and should control them. Pakistan should not opt suicidal path about Kashmir again and again. Jammu and Kashmir can not be allowed to drift away from India because the separation of Kashmir from India will further escalate the tension between India and Pakistan.

In the economic and trade field, both the countries should give priorities to the items of each other rather than other countries and both should do maximum import and export between themselves. The economic expansion or trade relation between the two countries received a jolt whenever the bilateral disputes took place or whenever the external involvement was more in the region. Thus, India and Pakistan should normalise their political relations, and should avoid the external involvement in the region.

Finally Chapter IX sums up the main findings of the study. Our analysis leads to a somewhat pessimistic assessment of conflict resolution between India and Pakistan. Since Partition both India and Pakistan are trying to browbeat each other in each and every field particularly in improving their military strength and the nuclear capabilities. Both are struggling to strengthen themselves in their own way and both are having large forces and more sophisticated weapons than in the past. So if war does take place between the two countries, its cost will be substantially greater than the three previous wars.

Another point is that inspite of bilateral bickerings regional and international organisations have set the stage for normalization and improvement of Indo-Pak cooperation. The opportunities available cannot be grasped because of the lack of a consensus on politico-strategic issues and lack of moral courage to resolve the outstanding disputes.




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T4281



*Dedicated*

*to*

*My father, Late AFIUR RAHMAN,  
Who always prayed to God for  
my bright future and desired  
to see my career with  
flying colours*

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THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT MR ZUBAIR AHMAD HAS PREPARED  
HIS DOCTORAL THESIS ON "INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS, 1977-1987"  
UNDER MY SUPERVISION AND THAT THE WORK IS IN MY OPINION  
FIT FOR SUBMISSION FOR EVALUATION.

THE CANDIDATE HAS ALREADY OBTAINED THE DEGREE OF  
M. PHIL. AND HAS PUT IN THE NECESSARY ATTENDANCE.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Mohammed Mahmood".  
(MOHAMMED MAHMOOD)

SUPERVISOR

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## P R E F A C E

This dissertation on "India-Pakistan Relations, 1977-1987" aims at an analysis of the outstanding problems in Indo-Pakistani relations during the period 1977-1992 with a view to comprehending the conditions of durable peace and normal cooperation in the subcontinent. The period selected for study is significant for many reasons. Firstly, during this period no hot war was fought between the two countries occasional border skirmishes notwithstanding. Secondly, the period witnessed the genesis and intensification of insurgencies in Punjab, Jammu and Kashmir and the eruption of the dispute over Siachin glacier and the Indian campaign against the Pakistani nuclear programme. Thirdly, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979 led to the gigantic American aid-package for Pakistan being a bulwark against Soviet expansion. Fourthly, the period is marked by the formation of Janata Party government in New Delhi which reversed the erstwhile high-handed approach towards the neighbouring countries. Fifthly, a major breakthrough was achieved by the signing of an agreement in 1983 for establishment of a Joint Commission between India and Pakistan to boost bilateral cooperation in economic and cultural fields. Thus the period under study presents a vivid picture of cooperation and conflict in the sub-

continent. No other period in the history of Indo-Pak relations has such magnitude or intensity of diplomatic activity.

In the past much work in both countries has been done on Indo-Pakistani relations but none discusses the significance of Indo-Pakistani arms-race in the later period and the impact of the regional cold war on the prospects of their normal cooperation. This study pays special attention to this significant aspect of Indo-Pakistani relations.

#### Scope, sources and Method

The work concentrates on political, diplomatic, strategic and economic relations of India and Pakistan against the backdrop of the process of normalization set in motion by the Simla Accord of 1972. In this study I have used the historical descriptive method. I have also given facts and figures wherever I deemed necessary.

The work is based on both primary and secondary sources such as Lok Sabha Debates, Rajya Sabha Debates, Pakistani National Assembly Debates, Annual Reports of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Reports



of the Indian Ministry of Foreign Trade, the I.M.F. Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, the white papers of Indian and Pakistani governments on the Kashmir issue and on India-Pakistan trade relations and numerous other books, periodicals, and press material.

In this study I have tried to find out the conditions responsible for the deterioration of Indo-Pak relations. The continuing divergence of political and strategic perspectives and progressive escalation of tensions over the Kashmir problem were mainly responsible for the lack of further progress in the normalization of bilateral relations since 1972. The study then proceeds to explore the possibilities and prospects of peace and neighbourly cooperation in the subcontinent.

### The Significance of the Study

The work is organized under three parts. While Part I mainly sets the historical background of Indo-Pak relations, Parts II and III constitute the substantial parts of this dissertation.

Part I deals with Indo-Pakistani relations in an historical perspective and it is not claimed to be very original. It merely sets the stage to bring into focus the period under study, namely, 1977-1992.

The analysis of diverse data collected buttresses the main thesis of this work that future progress in normalization of relations and peaceful cooperation depends on a prior resolution of outstanding bilateral disputes and attainment of a political and strategic consensus.

#### Analytical Framework

Part I consists of four chapters.

Chapter I begins with the events surrounding partition of British India into India and Pakistan and the host of problems created in its wake such as the problems of refugees, minorities, currency and finance, division of assets, the Princely States and boundary disputes.

Chapter II deals with Pakistan's aim of improving contacts with the Islamic and Western countries and how these alliances of Pakistan affected India-Pakistan ties. Pakistan raised the Kashmir issue in the United

Nations again and again because of the massive support given by the major powers in the U.N. I have also made an explanation why India was compelled to tilt towards the U.S.S.R. In the later part of this chapter, I have explained how the 1962 conflict of India and China brought a qualitative change in foreign policies of India and Pakistan, and how India realized the need to strengthen her defence system.

Chapter III deals with a long list of factors that affected the situation in the region in different ways and finally led India and Pakistan to the war of 1965. The Tashkent Declaration of 1966 and its achievements in normalising subcontinental relations has been explored.

Chapter IV deals with the events surrounding the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 and the creation of Bangladesh and ends with the signing of the Simla Agreement in 1972.

Part II (Chapters V-VII) deals with the period prescribed for this study. In Chapter V, the new orientations of the Janata Party Government towards the neighbouring countries, particularly its approach towards Pakistan have been examined.

In Chapter VI, I have explored major impediments in the way of Indo-Pak cooperation. In the next chapter, the establishment of an India-Pakistan Joint Commission and its constituent sub-commissions is taken into account and its potential role in promoting bilateral cooperation has been appreciated.

Part III (covering Chapters VIII - IX) dwells on the present situation in the subcontinent. In Chapter VIII, I have suggested that both India and Pakistan should adopt such measures as may help in conflict-avoidance, resolution of the outstanding disputes and advancing mutually beneficial cooperation.

Finally, the main findings of the study have been summed up in the concluding chapter. In the rapidly changing international situation, both India and Pakistan are struggling for national survival and well-being individually and with other countries. It is but natural and normal that the two "distant" neighbours join together for developmental and wellfarist objectives. However, mutual distrust and suspicion continue to persist. Whenever bilateral cooperation gained momentum

it was soon enveloped by thick clouds of mistrust. These clouds of suspicion and mistrust cannot be removed until the two countries arrive at a basic understanding on their political and strategic objectives and regain mutual confidence.

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Aligarh:

March 15, 1993

  
( ZUBAIR AHMAD )

## **PART I**

### **HISTORICAL SETTING**

## C H A P T E R I

### INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS: THE INITIAL PHASE, 1947-54

The story of India-Pakistan relations has been a long series of discord and conflict. Both the countries are the most difficult and most important neighbour for each other. Dialogue is the most vital thing between the two countries. Their drift towards war begins when they cease to talk. Their relationship is a mixture of national prejudice, inflated psyche, injured ego and plain rivalry. This was rooted in the history of partition and the manner in which the subcontinent was divided into two separate countries, in which major roles were played by the imperialist policy of divide and rule, the conflict between the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League, and the two-nation theory propounded by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the growing awakening of the Muslim middle class and the fear of Muslim landlords of Hindu dominance, and the rise of Hindu chauvinism as symbolized by the Hindu Maha Sabha and Rashtriya Suwayam Sevak Sangh (R.S.S.).

The Indian subcontinent had evolved into one social, political and economic unit during 200 years of British rule. The division of this single unit into



India and Pakistan and the conflict and controversies between the two major parties (Indian National Congress and Muslim League) over partition, and the past experiences left a deep impact on the leaders of the two countries. These impacts ~~later~~ counted a lot in the formulation of the foreign policies of the two countries and coloured their world view. India and Pakistan have been caught up in one or the other problems. The problems faced by the two countries are discussed below.

#### 1. Dispute over Boundaries

The disagreement between India and Pakistan over the demarcation line of the partition had been one of the biggest problems. These border disputes emanated from the Boundary Commission which were set up for both Punjab and Bengal under the Chairmanship of Sir Cyril Radcliffe.<sup>1</sup> The Radcliffe Award was self-contradictory. Conscious of the defects Sir Cyril Radcliffe suggested that the final solutions was possible only in political arrangements. To remove the bottlenecks, a machinery for the settlement of disputes and for the prevention of untoward incidents was evolved through the Inter-

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1 S.P. Shukla, India and Pakistan: The Origins of Armed Conflict, (New Delhi, Deep and Deep Publications), 1984), p. 6.

2

Dominion Agreement of May 1948. In December, 1948 a joint review of the working of May 1948 Agreement was made with justice A. Bagge (Sweden) as Chairman of new tribunal. Discussions were held from time to time at Inter-Governmental Conferences. In September 1953, an Eastern Zone Conference of Officials met to discuss the Bagge Award of February 1950. Among other things, it discussed the question of exchange of some enclaves in Cooch Bihar and East Pakistan as also the demarcation of the Eastern Boundary between India and Pakistan.<sup>3</sup> Maps were signed and exchanged in January 1954. In 1955, part of Eastern border (in Patharia Hills) was demarcated in accordance with the Bagge Award. The Joint Steering set up in July 1953, discussed the problems of demarcating the western border in March 1955. In May 1955, the Home Minister of India and Pakistan agreed to give high priority to the work of demarcation and hoped to complete the work within three months. No doubt, Pakistan later on proposed for some amendment in the Agreement but by and large the border disputes between the two countries was solved.

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2 S.L. Poplai, ed., Select Documents on Asian Affairs: India 1947-50 (London, 1959), Vol. II, pp. 200-204.

3 Shukla, op.cit., p. 6.

## 2. The Refugees and Evacuee Properties

The rehabilitation of refugees and the settlement of their properties was the difficult problems before India and Pakistan in 1947 when the refugees crossed the new international border in search of a new home land. They left all their urban and agricultural properties and carried only such movable belongings which the circumstances had permitted.

-Relating to the problems of immovable property, the negotiations, on August 29, 1947 started at a meeting of the Joint Defence Councils of India and Pakistan. As the stalemate continued, India decided to utilise the available evacuee property in India for the benefit of displaced persons. On October 9, 1954, The Displaced Persons (compensation and Rehabilitation) Bill<sup>4</sup> was passed by the Parliament. Earlier, India and Pakistan had made strenuous efforts through Inter-Dominion Conference to come to a settlement but the issue was practically closed when Pakistan in February 1955, issued an ordinance to allot evacuee property to<sup>5</sup> compensate the refugees.

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4 J.B. Das Gupta, Indo-Pakistan Relations 1947-1955 (Amsterdam; Djambatan, 1958), p. 204.

5 M.A. Chaudhri, "Evacuee Property in India and Pakistan" Pakistan Harizan, Vol. 10 (June 1957), p. 108.

The movable was not the matter of great problems because agreements related to the deposits in post offices, safe deposits in Banks<sup>1</sup>, pensions and provident funds, the bills of contractors were reached at the first Inter-Dominion Conference (held from December 18 to 20, 1947). Many conferences and talks were called between the two countries for solving the problems of movable properties. In June 1950, Indo-Pakistan Movable Property Agreement<sup>6</sup> was signed on the basis of Karachi Agreement. With this agreement, some problems were solved with a measure of success.

### 3. The Problem of Minorities

The treatment of minorities in both the countries particularly in Pakistan created serious problems between India and Pakistan. The en-moss migration from both the countries to each other in 1947 resulted in an ascending curve of communalism which worsened the already charged atmosphere. For the treatment of minorities in both the countries Nehru-Liaqat Pact was signed on April 8, 1950.<sup>7</sup>

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6 Shukla, op.cit., p. 227.

7 The Indian Commission of Jurists, "Recurrent Exodus of Minorities from East Pakistan and Disturbances in India". A Report, (New Delhi 1965), Appendix 7-A, pp. 321-324.

Both the governments tried to protect the minorities but they were not always able to control the aroused feelings of majority towards minorities in the initial stages of the partition. The first war was also occurred between the two countries after partition due to savage communal violence and the fighting in Kashmir. Each government accused the other of failing to protect the minorities and of instigating communal animosities, though they also issued joint appeals for peace and joint declarations designed to calm and protect the minorities. As the time passed, the people of both the countries forgot the very communal scene of partition and the feelings of sympathetic attitudes in the minds of the majority of both the countries towards minorities were developed. Minorities were given facilities and protection in both the countries in spite of some communal feelings propagated by some fundamentalist parties and organizations. Minorities in India enjoy safeguards under the Indian Constitution. The Muslim in India are moving towards the national mainstream and in Pakistan the Hindu minority is free to exercise the right granted to it through the Constitution. The minorities in Pakistan received a set back when Islamic provisions of<sup>8</sup> the first Constituent Assembly dissolved in October 1954.

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<sup>8</sup> The Report, 1956, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, p. 16.

#### 4. Currency and Trade Relations

Another crisis arose between India and Pakistan when British Government in late 1949 devalued the pound by 30.5 percent.<sup>9</sup> Most of the countries whose currencies were linked to pound sterling followed the suit. India also followed in devalueing her currency but Pakistan decided not to follow. This stand of Pakistan had direct repercussions on India. India refused to trade with Pakistan at the official exchange rate. The wheat and cotton of West Pakistan, the raw jute of East Pakistan and the manufactured goods of India no longer moved in trade. Business between the two countries stopped and they started searching for new markets for their raw materials. This trade war between Islamabad and New Delhi spoiled their chances of comming close to each other.

#### 5. Financial Issues

The controversy over the financial issues, which dragged on for years, also served to widen the gulf between India and Pakistan. The problems came particularly over the division of cash balance of undivided

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9 W.J. Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. 56.

India. The cash balance of undivided India before partition was 4,000 million rupees. Pakistan demanded 1,000 million rupees, but India did not agree. The matter, therefore, was referred to the Arbitration Tribunal, which had been set up to decide such cases of differences. In December 1947, however, the two governments arrived at a financial agreement under which Pakistan's share was fixed at 750 million rupees. Earlier as an interim measure,<sup>10</sup> 200 million rupees had been awarded to Pakistan. But at a subsequent stage, the payment of cash balance to Pakistan got linked with the Kashmir issue, which led to a further deterioration in relations. Finally at Gandhiji's intervention, the dispute was settled and India agree to pay Pakistan her cash balance after deducting 50 million rupees as advance adjustment of certain claims<sup>11</sup> against Pakistan.

## 6. Military Stores

During the partition, there was a bitter controversy between India and Pakistan regarding the distribution of military stores and equipments of the British India. To

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10 G.W. Choudhury, Pakistan's Relations with India 1947-66 (Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1977), p. 26.

11 Ibid., p. 28.

resolve this dispute a joint defence council under the Chairmanship of Lord Mountbatten was set up to supervise the division of armed forces and military stores and equipments. Military stores were divided 3:2 with India<sup>12</sup> gaining Rs. 6 crores in lieu of the ordinance factories.

No doubt, this division of military stores did not satisfy both the countries fully but had got much success in normalizing the relations between them. Today, there is no such dispute. Both have their own autonomous institutions to build up their army and bureaucracy. If there could be sound understanding between them regarding their security, they could limit the unnecessary military budget and usefully employ it in some other constructive activity. Both the countries should initiate a joint administrative institutions to have a sound understanding of the similar problems.

## 7. Princely States

The princely states arose as a hurdle between India and Pakistan. They created the problems between the two countries in different ways at different times. Indian leaders thought that the existence of the princely states

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12 Shukla, op.cit., p. 3.



would be dangerous for Indian unity, disruptive of the economy and an efforts to all nationalists. So, they thought not to recognize those princely states as an independent state. On the other hand, Jinnah was aware that he could not hope to entice the Hindu Princes to join Pakistan, but if they choose independence it would weaken India and indirectly strengthen Pakistan.<sup>13</sup>

India and Pakistan were able to integrate most of the princely states with a minimum of disruption but problems occurred in only three of the princely states particularly and they prove as a bane for India-Pakistan relations.

(a) Junagarh: The first and least important problem of the three disputes concerned Junagarh which was having link with Pakistan by sea. This princely state was having 80 percent Hindu population at the time of partition but its ruler was a Muslim who on September 15, 1947 signed an instrument of accession to Pakistan. Resistance to the local government developed quickly and a rival government was set up. Early in November 1947, Indian troops marched in, taking the state over in the name of

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13 Barnds, op.cit., p. 36.

the people. Pakistan took the issue to the United Nations but received no satisfaction. India held a plebiscite in February 1948 and the people voted in favour of accession to India.<sup>14</sup> For all practical purpose that ended the issue but created a rift between India and Pakistan.

(b) Hyderabad: This was the second largest princely state. After the British departure, tensions and communal violence were continue till early 1948. India asked Nizam of Hyderabad to curb violence and liberalise his government but Nizam infuriated India by lending money to Pakistan rather than curbing the violence. India invaded and quickly won control over the princely state and Nizam was made as nominal ruler under a new government responsive to New Delhi. This act of India was criticised by western countries and Pakistan. Pakistan enjoyed seeing the India's embarrassment before the world.

(c) Jammu & Kashmir: Despite long and protracted verbal attacks between India and Pakistan, Junagarh and Hyderabad disputes were resolved. But the Kashmir dispute has been the focus of the threat for both the countries and due to this Kashmir dispute, many time border Skirmishes and undeclared war had taken place. The Kashmir issue is still

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14 Ibid., p. 37.

a problem between India and Pakistan since partition.

The Jammu and Kashmir was dominated by Muslim majority but it was ruled by a Hindu Maharaja Hari Singh. After the departure of the British, Maharaja had the right to decide whether his state should be acceded to India or Pakistan.

Pakistan put up pressures on Kashmiri by interrupting the flow of essential commodities to Kashmir. The Kashmir government protested on several occasions but to no avail. The economic blockage, however, failed to ensure Kashmir's accession to Pakistan. Against this backdrop on October 22, 1947, several hundred frontier tribesmen attacked the western borders of Kashmir and proceeded along the Jhelum Valley road towards Srinagar (the capital of Kashmir).. Maharaja fled to Jammu and called for military help from India but Indian Government said that forces would be sent only if Maharaja acceded to India. Left with no choice, he did so on October 27, 1947.<sup>15</sup> India immediately sent troops which landed at the airport in Srinagar to prevent the tribesmen from taking the city. Gradually, the Indian troops pushed the tribesmen out of the valley and began advancing on other areas.

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15 V.P. Menon, The Story of the Integration of the Indian States (Madras: Orient Longmans, 1961), p. 383.

This was the stage for the first war between India and Pakistan.

The Maharaja's accession to India was criticised by Pakistani leaders. Jinnah said that the accession of Maharaja through the suggestions of Mountbatten and the subsequent dispatch of Indian troops to Kashmir was as a part of well-planned conspiracy.<sup>16</sup> Liaquat Ali also emphatically stated that the Maharaja's accession to India was a fraudulent in as much as it was achieved by deliberately creating certain conditions, with the object of finding an excuse to stage the accession.

Pakistan further pointed out that Maharaja had no authority left to execute the instrument of accession because his subjects had overthrown his government by a successful revolt and forced him to flee from the capital.<sup>17</sup>

India ultimately on 1st January 1948 decided to refer the matter to the United Nations and filed a formal complaint against Pakistan in the Security Council. The Security Council asked both India and Pakistan not to

16 Barnds, Op.cit., p. 41.

17 S.M.Burke, Pakistan's Foreign Policy: An Historical Analysis (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 27.

aggravate the situation but to do everything in their power to improve it, and established a mediatory commission known as United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan.<sup>18</sup>

On September 29, 1948, Sheikh Abdullah was released and later on installed as the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. But Pakistan were against Sheikh Abdullah's instalation and Jinnah demanded an impartial administration in the Valley. Nehru's reply was that Sheikh's administration was pure and impartial.<sup>19</sup>

In 1952, an agreement was concluded between the Indian government and Sheikh Abdullah at New Delhi, regarding centre-state relations and Abdullah fully assured the Indian Government regarding Kashmir's accession to the Indian Union. But gradually a shift appeared in his policy and in his several statements, he limited that Kashmir might yet remain separate from both India and Pakistan. The culmination of this policy was that in his own party, the National Conference, deep tension arised and his cabinet colleagues, Girdharilal Dogra, Bakshi Gulam Mohammad and Shamlal Saraf were against his leadership.<sup>20</sup>

18 Ibid., p. 29.

19 Ibid., p. 30.

20 Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, White Paper on the Jammu and Kashmir, 1977 (Islamabad: Printing Corporation of Pakistan Press, 1977), p. 1.

Later on, Sheikh Abdullah was dismissed and Bakshi Gulam Mohammad was installed as the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir on August 9, 1953. Finally Kashmir was regarded as an integral part of India. All these things were criticised by Pakistani. In the introduction of the White Paper published by the Government of Pakistan in January 1977, it was mentioned that the issue of Jammu and Kashmir is the outstanding international dispute in South Asia. As long as it is not justly settled; instability and discord will haunt the region. The two state Pakistan and India will be unable to establish their mutual relations as good neighbours.

From the above discussion, it becomes clear that the first Kashmir war was fought not for mere possession of territory not for strategic value alone. There was a strong ideological component to the motives of the two states. For Pakistan the possession of Kashmir was crucial to her ideology, namely that religious ideology could serve as the cornerstone of a state. To India, Kashmir, quite apart from its strategic significance, represented two fundamentally important issues. First its integration with India showed that even a Muslim majority province could thrive within a predominantly Hindu state, thus

validating the concept of the secular, democratic state. Additionally its integration had always considerable psychological import for key members of Indian elite, many of whom feared setting a precedent that might lead to the eventual "Balkanization" of India.

The origin of the Kashmir war can be traced to four major sources:

- i) the existence of two competing ideological forces on the sub-continent,
- ii) irredentism on the part of the Pakistani leadership,
- iii) the strategic location of Kashmir and finally,
- iv) the lack of sufficient institutional arrangements by the British to ensure an orderly transfer of power.

## 8. Indus Waters Dispute

It was another source of friction between India and Pakistan. The origins of the dispute goes as far back as the partition. The differences arose in respect of the use of water. India and Pakistan recognised two things:

- i) First, the need for an agreement to regulate the supply of water and,

- ii) Secondly, the absence of an existing legal right entitling Pakistan to any supply without an agreement.

On December 18, 1947, Stand Still Agreement was signed. But later on supply of waters was discontinued by India when Stand Still Agreement was terminated. On April 24, 1948, the Prime Minister of Pakistan proposed an Inter-Dominion Conference for the settlement of the problem. Thereafter, the water supply was resumed. Regarding water dispute, a series of meetings were held between the two countries. But no permanent solution came out. In December 1950, Pakistan terminated the Agreement unilaterally but India refused to accept the notice of termination, and informed the U.N. Secretariat of the same. Pakistan also threatened<sup>21</sup> to take the water dispute to the Security Council. These irritant views, showed by both the countries against each other, further brought the relations at standstill.

The World Bank President, Black, was asked to offer the mediation for solving the dispute. A series of Conferences took place between the two countries under

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21 K.F. Kurunakaran, India in World Affairs 1950-1953 (London, 1958), P. 185.



the supervision of World Bank headed by Black. Some proposals were acceptable to one country sometime and someone to another sometime. Later in June 1955, an agreement was signed which provided for adhoc transitional arrangements. The Agreement affirmed the desire of both India and Pakistan to continue negotiations in an atmosphere of cooperation and goodwill. This agreement created the sound spirit and peaceful solution to both the countries.

#### 9. Ideological Differences

Apart from the problems resulting directly from partition, there were problems relating to ideologies, power games and national interest. The problem of ideology can be traced back to the pre-partition days. The problem between the two countries arose on two counts namely Islam and Secularism. Jinnah's Presidential address at the Lohore Session of All India Muslim League of March 1940 created a rift in the minds of all the secular person. In that address, Jinnah said that the Hinduism and Islam are not religion in the strict sense of the word, but, are in fact different and distinct orders and it is a dream that the Hindus and the Muslim

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22 Shukla, Op.cit., p. 6.

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can ever evolve a common nationality. The people of India and Pakistan witness the same type of feelings even after partition. Some chauvinistic parties and people of India also created the same feelings in the minds of Pakistani. Liaquat Ali Khan declared in the Constituent Assembly that "Pakistan was founded because the Muslim of this sub-continent wanted to build-up their lives in accordance with the teaching and traditions of Islam, as they wanted to demonstrate to the world that Islam provides a panacea for the many<sup>24</sup> diseases which have crept into the life of humanity.

No doubt the above statements created a gap in bringing the two countries. But what the influences of these statements were in the minds of the people in the beginning after the partition they are not of the same spirit. As the time passes the influences of the statements were also cooled down, and many meetings were called between the two countries for normalization. In many fields, both the countries have also got much success.

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23 K. Sarwar Hasan, and Zubeida Hasan, eds., The Transfer of Power: Documents on the Foreign Relations of Pakistan (Karachi: The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, 1966), pp. 19-20.

24 Shukla, Op.cit., p. 10.

### Conclusion

In the beginning both India and Pakistan phased the problems of boundaries disputes, the problems of rehabilitation of refugees and the settlement of their properties, the treatment of minorities in both the countries, currency problems, the distribution of military stores and equipments of British India, and problems of Indus water disputes etc. But these problems were for time being. Later on, by and large, these problems were solved through talks, meetings and agreements by both the countries.

But the princely states Hyderabad and Kashmir created a big problem between the two countries. Both the states posed serious problems for the question of accession. The two states Hyderabad and Kashmir amounted to polar opposites of each other. Hyderabad had a Muslim ruler but a predominantly Hindu population. The conditions were reversed in Kashmir. The rulers were from minorities in both the states and both rulers hoped to become independent states after the departure of the British. These two factors led to difficulties in Indo-Pakistani relations because each side had a commitment to the states involved in the two states.

Pakistan, because of its Islamic character, felt compelled to show its solidarity with both the Nizam and the Muslims of Kashmir. Similarly India felt equally moved to identify with the Hindu of Hyderabad and the Maharaja of Kashmir. It felt to discredit the Nizam's claims to independence, because if his claims were given any credence, it could lead to the disintegration of the Indian Union, as the monarchs of the various princely states could all start asserting their demands for autonomy or independence. By the same token, Pakistani felt constrained to discredit Hari Singh's claims to independence for fear of appearing to foresake their Muslims in a territory for which they felt responsible.

From the geographical and Muslim dominated point of view, Pakistan wanted that Kashmir should accede to Pakistan but this ~~did~~ not happen because India sent her troops to Kashmir on the invitation of Maharaja and Kashmir ~~was~~ acceded to India. This step of India was vehemently criticised by Pakistan. On the other hand the Pakistan's claim over Kashmir was criticised by India.

Furthermore the carnage that accompanied Partition embittered the protagonists on both sides to such a high degree that the possibilities of misunderstanding increased dramatically. Each side had reason to mistrust the other and any generosity of spirit perished amidst the chaos and violence of Partition.

## C H A P T E R   I I

### INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS 1954-64

During this period, India-Pakistan relations were disrupted by the external powers in one or the other way. Particularly the Pakistan's alliance with U.S.A. and with some regional organisations, and the India's relations with Communists countries laid the seeds of bitterness between the two countries.

#### 1. Pakistan's Defence Agreement with the U.S.A.

Pakistan was and is still inferior to India in each and every fields. So in order to come on equal level, Pakistan began to seek support from Western countries. Pakistan, from the very beginning, wanted to come in contact of Islamic countries and Western countries for every kind of help. In the early fifties, Pakistan could only look to the United States for this kind of help. U.S.A., in turn, was seeking allies in Asia to counter the growing influence of Communist countries particularly of China and Russia. The idea of a U.S. - Pakistani military relationship first came under serious considerations in Washington in 1951. In

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1 Stephen P. Cohen, The Pakistan Army (New Delhi: Himalayan Books, 1984), P. 137.

the end of the year 1951, a limited arms assistance to Pakistan was approved by United States and agreement in principle was apparently reached by mid - 1952.

Pakistan initially desired to secure military assistance from Washington and thought to consider an exchange of air bases for military equipment.<sup>2</sup> This military programme was vehemently criticised by Indians, Soviets, and Chinese. Nehru warned that U.S. Pakistani alliance would bring the cold war to India's borders, with far-reaching consequences in South Asia. Determined to protect his domestic position, Nehru directed the Indian Congress Party to mount public protest against the programme. India also warned Pakistan that this arms aid might cause India to move closer to U.S.S.R.

In spite of the protest and demonstrations U.S.A. went ahead with its plan to aid Pakistan and finally an arms agreement was approved on February 8, 1954<sup>3</sup> by America for Pakistan. This plan of United States to aid Pakistan definitely created a gap between India and Pakistan on the one hand, and between U.S. and India on

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2 William J, Barnds, India, Pakistan and the Great Powers (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p.95.

3 Ibid., p. 96.

the other hand. President Eisenhower gave an assurance to Nehru that the military for Pakistan was not directed against India and said that U.S. would come to India's aid if Pakistan were ever to use the arms for aggression against India, and offering to give sympathetic consideration to any Indian request for arms. Nehru regarded such assurances as meaningless and said that India's opposition to military aid was based on calculation rather than on principle.<sup>4</sup>

The acceptance of military aid of U.S. by Pakistan created two problems especially. One was that Pakistan became the stooge in the hand of America and moved according to direction of U.S. Pakistan had no her own policies but was controlled by the other powers. Secondly, Pakistan's alliance with west deteriorated the relations between India and Pakistan, and India was compelled to have some alliance with some one for her defence protection.

## 2. Pakistan's Membership of SEATO and Baghdad Pact

For further help in military and economic fields, Pakistan joined South East Asian Treaty Organization

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<sup>4</sup> Ibid., p. 97.



(SEATO) in September 1954<sup>5</sup> and Baghdad Pact (later named CENTO) in September 1955.<sup>6</sup> Pakistan joined SEATO with the two aims. One is that Pakistan thought that if she did anything against the urging of America then her claim on U.S. military and economic assistance would be weakened. Second is that Pakistan got chance to raise her bilateral issues particularly Kashmir issue in the above Organization.

Pakistan raised Kashmir issue in various meetings of SEATO and Baghdad Pact. In the third meeting of SEATO that was held in March 1956 at Karachi, Pakistan highlighted the growing dissatisfaction in Kashmir. It was stated that the condition of law and order was worsening in Kashmir. In addition, the Government of Pakistan published exaggerated reports of the violations of borders by the Indian army personnel.<sup>7</sup> In all this, Pakistan's main objective was to put Kashmir on the agenda of impending SEATO Conference.

5 Satish Kumar, ed., Yearbook on India's Foreign Policy 1987/1988 (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1988), p. 84.

6 Ibid.

7 S.P. Shukla, India and Pakistan: The Origins of Armed Conflict (New Delhi: Deep & Deep Publications, 1984) p. 26.

For Pakistan's point of view the meeting of SEATO was an occasion of jubilation because Pakistani got chances to internationalise the Kashmir issue. In the Pakistan National Assembly, the Foreign Minister Mr. Hamidul Haq Choudhary said in March 1956, that Kashmiris should be given the right to decide their future has been accepted by the Member who formed the Council. He also added that the aggression against any member will be considered the aggression against all and all the member will come to rescue for the suffering member.<sup>8</sup>

The SEATO pronouncement over Kashmir was vehemently protested by Indian Government. Nehru said that the reference to Kashmir issue in the SEATO communique "Confirmed our worst apprehensions about the organisations which it represents" and added that "this could only mean that a military alliance is backing one country namely, Pakistan in its dispute with India."<sup>9</sup>

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8 Debates (National Assembly of Pakistan) March 26, 1956, Vol. 1, pp. 65-83.

9 Debates (Lok Sabha, India), March 20, 1956, Vol. III, Col. 3042.

Like SEATO Conference, Baghdad Pact Council at Tehran in April 1956 also mentioned Kashmir as a dispute. In particular the Baghdad Pact Council emphasized the need for an early settlement of the Palestine and Kashmir disputes.<sup>10</sup> On the one hand, Pakistan tried to bring the Kashmir issue in Baghdad Pact Joint Communique, and on the other hand, this communique was severely attacked in India. In June 1956, the All-India Congress Committee resolved that "The Committee regrets the reference to Kashmir in the recent meetings in Karachi and Tehran of the SEATO and Baghdad Pact Organisation."<sup>11</sup>

India tried to solve the Kashmir issue bilaterally and put up this proposal before Pakistan, but Pakistan did not agree. Due to this, India's attitude had undergone a great change since 1955. India was no more apologetic as in the past. There was a new stress in India on a clear recognition of her own national interests. The endeavours of India for direct negotiations with Pakistan over Kashmir

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10 The Dawn, April 21, 1956.

11 The Congress Bulletin Nos. 5-6 June, 1956, All India Congress Committee, p. 184.

proved completely futile. So, India made her alliance with Soviet Union, Prime Minister Khurushchev of Soviet Union paid a visit to India in December 1955,<sup>12</sup> and said that "the question of Kashmir as one of the states of the Republic of India, has already been decided by the people of Kashmir..... While in the Republic of India, we find an ally in the struggle for peace and peaceful solution of the unsettled problems, unfortunately we can't say the same about Pakistan." This statement of Soviet leader created a gap between the India<sup>and</sup>-Pakistan relations.

Further the Bilateral Executive Agreement in 1959 between U.S. and Pakistan ~~complicated~~ the problems between India and Pakistan because this agreement was a full<sup>fledged</sup> military alliance with United States. Under this agreement, U.S. committed itself to the preservation of independence and integrity of Pakistan and agreed to take "appropriate action including the use of armed forces"<sup>13</sup> in support of that goal.

12 Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations (New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1966) p. 300.

13 Satish Kumar, Op.cit., p. 86.

From the above discussion it becomes clear that Pakistan's primary interest of joining Baghdad Pact and SEATO was not because it perceived any major Communist threat but because it wanted to generate American support for its claims against India. This strategy is evident from the prominent member of the Pakistan Foreign Policy establishment. As S.M. Burke has said, "the arms aid given to Pakistan by America reduced the existing great disparity in the military capabilities of India and Pakistan, and enabled Pakistan to breathe easier than they ever had done before."<sup>14</sup>

To Pakistan the military aid from America was an instrument to achieve the following ends.

- a) To lessen the power inequality between her and India.
- b) To reduce the burden of heavy defence expenditure necessitated by a strong and hostile India.
- c) To receive diplomatic support in the solution of her dispute with India, and
- d) To get increased quantities of economic aid for development purposes.

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14 S.M. Burke, Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani Foreign Policies (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1974), p. 143.

Pakistan's entry into the above pacts definitely affected the policies of the sub-continent. First it introduced the cold war into the region as Pakistani allied itself to the U.S. in an attempt to limit expansion of communism. Significantly, India, desired to come into contact of Soviet Union.

Second impact of Pakistan-U.S. link was that it provided Pakistan with an important source of both political and military leverage against India. Nehru's concern was clearly reflected in a number of statements that he made soon after the formation of the two pacts. In a speech before Lok Sabha in 1956, Nehru stated that "the Pakistani newspaper and the statement of responsible people in Pakistan make it perfectly clear that they have joined the pact essentially because of India."<sup>15</sup>

### 3 The United Nations and the Kashmir Dispute

India and Pakistan could not reach to any solution for Kashmir issue. In the period 1953-1956, many proposals were discussed directly between the two countries, but every direct negotiations proved fruitless.

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15 J. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Publication Division, Govt. of India, 1961), P. 94.

Thus, the Kashmir issue went back to the Security Council again. At this juncture Pakistan took much interest to solve the Kashmir issue through U.N. because most of the permanent members of Security Council were in favour of Pakistan. Pakistan was gaining support from West on Suez Canal issue because Pakistan was totally in favour of West on this issue while India's main emphasis was on the sovereign rights of Egypt. In January 1957, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Feroz Khan Noon thought that it was an opportune moment to approach the Security Council to meet and take early action to implement the U.N. resolutions for holding a plebiscite in Kashmir. Feroz Khan Noon put up the following proposals before the U.N.

- a) India should be persuaded not to accept the accession of Kashmir state,
- b) The Security Council ought to direct India to accept all the terms and obligations of the international agreement for a plebiscite as embodied in the U.N. resolutions.
- c) The U.N. force should immediately be stationed in Kashmir for protection and internal Security<sup>16</sup> of the state.

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16 Gupta, op.cit., p. 313.

Noon said that these proposals could solve the problems between the two countries and could bring peace in sub-continent. But these proposals were vehemently criticised in India and were rejected. On January 23, 1957, the Indian representative V.K. Krishna Menon, with full of quotations from documents and press reports, justified Kashmir's accession to India as perfectly legal and valid.<sup>17</sup> Finally Menon accused Noon of distorting facts and completed his marathon speech by asking the Security Council to desist from unsettling the settled conditions in Kashmir and hoped that the peace in the region would not be disturbed under the weight of some of the super powers of the world. A significant point to note here<sup>18</sup> is that for the first time India accused the Security Council of violating the very first article of the U.N. charter and for the deadlock on Kashmir issue at the provocation of Anglo-U.S. alliance. The Five-Power resolution was moved even before the Indian statement was completed. This was completely rejected by India. Menon challenged the legality of the resolution and

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17 Ibid.

18 The Times of India, January 26, 1957.



charged that the resolution sowed the seeds of discard once more.

India was gaining some popularity and support from socialist countries. Soviet Union used her veto power saying that the resulting proposal would not contribute to the settlement of problems.<sup>19</sup> The Chinese reaction also appeared favourable to India. The Prime Minister of China Chou En Lai advised both India and Pakistan to settle the dispute through direct negotiations.<sup>20</sup> Later on many resolutions were passed by U.N. but no one can solve the Kashmir dispute. The Jarring Report of 1957 and the Graham Report of 1958 regarding Kashmir dispute also produced no result. As the border conflict between India and China widened, China came out with full throated support to Pakistan on Kashmir. On the other hand U.S.A. came close India as China vacated her seat. Nehru profusely lauded the Eisenhower visit of India.<sup>21</sup> Now, U.S.A. stated to support India and China to <sup>support</sup> Pakistan in each and every field. In 1960, China refused to discuss the boundary west of Karakoram Pass between Chinese Sinkiang and Kashmir. It was only

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19 Gupta, Op.cit., p. 320.

20 Shukla, Op.cit., p. 58.

21 J.L. Nehru, India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi Publication Division, Government of India, 1961), p. 601.

after this, India realised that China had "declined to recognise the accession of Kashmir to India."

The U.N. efforts as well as super-powers' effort regarding Kashmir dispute ended with no result. All the efforts that U.N. had succeeded in doing about Kashmir was to keep the ball rolling without any clear end in view. This failure revealed that there was fundamental weakness of the existing international order. The super-powers exploited India and Pakistan as tools to serve their global interests. They maintained relationship of understanding friendship to advance their legitimate and illegitimate interests. The time honoured standards of justice and righteousness of cause were tagged with the super-powers' naked self-interest which they persued. In this background, the Kashmir dispute had the dubious distinction of being a point of conflict between the two super-powers in the sense that they supported one or the other party in the dispute. In consequence, a workable solution could not be sought. It further risked procrastination to create conditions of permanent crisis on Kashmir.

In retrospect it will be pertinent to argue that both India and Pakistan regarded Kashmir as indispensable to them. The political strategic and ideological

controversies were advanced to secure better appreciation of their stand points. In their attempt to re-orient the thinking and attitudes of the people in their respective countries, leaders of both the countries issued aggressive statements which were, many a time, divorced from the reality of international policies.

#### 4. The Farakka Barrage Issue

The clash of interests between the two countries arose when India <sup>n</sup>planned to construct a dam across the river Ganges at Farakka a few miles upstream from East Pakistan (now, Bangladesh) because due to construction of this dam, India wanted to divert the water of Ganges through a feeder canal into the Bhagirath to flush the Hoogly.<sup>22</sup> India also claimed that due to this plan, the port of Calcutta can be saved from being silted up. As soon as India started taking keen interest in the plan and began the work to construct the barrage, Pakistan protested and asked India to consult her before going ahead with the project. In 1957, Pakistan suggested that the services of U.N. should be utilized to resolve the differences.<sup>23</sup> Pakistan had complained that the

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22 Shukla, Op.cit., p. 242.

23 The Report 1957, (Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India), pp. 15-16.

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Barrage would reduce the supply of waters to Pakistan. Pakistan continued to cause worries to the Government of India. However, India was not keen to associate Pakistan with the Project in any way. As a result the matter was dropped for the time being. In July 1960, the subject was reopened and talks were held between the engineering <sup>25</sup>experts of India and Pakistan. In October 1960, the two countries again discussed the problems. Some of the differences were ironed out but ~~the~~ matter was still a stumbling block in the mutual cooperation of the two countries.

The countries totally showed different aims for protecting their own interest and tried to find out as to what was most advantageous to their own countries. The higggle-hagglng was basic, almost ritualistic forms of negotiation between the two countries of all kinds. Both the countries adopted the method to bend each other. But in spite of these differences, the meetings between the two countries got success in ironing out some of the differences.

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24 Debates (Rajya Sabha, India), vol. XXII, Cols 4268.

25 The Hindu July 1, 1960.

## 5. The Indus Waters Treaty

The river waters dispute had been one of the blocking factors between the two countries. Almost all the water disputes originated from the partition. Indus water dispute is also one of them. A series of conferences and meetings were organized between the two countries. Lastly, World Bank was asked to direct its efforts for finding a solution which could ensure the independence of the two countries in the matter of the operation of supplies of water falling to the share of each. In February 1954, the Bank had made the following proposals:

- a) The water of eastern rivers Ravi, Beas and Sutlej should be used for India;
- b) The water of western rivers Indus, Jhelum and Chenab should be for the use of Pakistan;
- c) There should be a transition period during which Pakistan would construct a system of link canals to transfer water from the western rivers to replace the irrigation uses in Pakistan hitherto met from eastern rivers, and
- d) India should pay the cost of constructing these replacement link canals to the extent of the

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benefit derived by her therefrom.

The good offices of the World Bank, however, survived the strains and stresses of Indo-Pakistan relations during the decade of complicated negotiations over the water dispute. By May 1954, the main issues standing in the way of a settlement *had* crystalized, although numerous controversies over the financial and technical issues had to overcome.

Finally, after the continuous eight years discussion and negotiation between the two countries, with the mediation of World Bank, on September 19, 1960, the Indus-Water Treaty was concluded at Karachi by Field Marshal Ayub Khan and Pandit Nehru.

The treaty recognizes the need for fixing the delimitation in a spirit of goodwill and friendship, and defines the rights and obligations of the Government of India and Government of Pakistan concerning the use of water of the Indus river system. The treaty sets up a Permanent Indus Commission composed of two persons, one appointed by each Government. The Commission will have general responsibility for implementing

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26 G.W. Choudhury, Pakistan's Relations with India, 1947-1966 (Meerut: Meenakshi Prakashan, 1971), p. 125.

the provisions and will seek to reconcile any points  
<sup>27</sup>  
 of disagreement that may arise. In the treaty both  
 the Governments recognised their common interest in  
 the optimum development of the rivers and declare  
 their intention to cooperate by mutual agreement to  
 the fullest possible extent.

In the history of Indo-Pak relations the  
 Indus-Water dispute is the only dispute where both the  
 Governments have shown a positive spirit of coopera-  
 tion. If in future, they follow the same spirit of  
 cooperation and understanding, definitely they could  
 settle all their outstanding disputes.

6. The Sino-Indian Conflict and Its Impact on Indo-Pak Relations

The Chinese border invasion of October 20,  
<sup>28</sup>  
 1962, at several points in both Ladakh and NEFA  
 (Northeast Frontier Agency) abruptly complicated not  
 only India-China relationship but India-Pakistan  
 relationship also. In the conflict, India suffered  
 a big loss because Indian forces were grossly  
 unprepared to face the Chinese onslaught.

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27 Ibid, pp.128-129.

28 Barnds, op.cit., p. 175.

The Chinese conflict brought a profound consequences for both Indian foreign policy and national security policy. It clearly compeled India to give up the much vaunted non-aligned policy. Nehru who on a matter of principle had forthrightly rejected President Eisenhower's offer to provide arms if the need ever arose, now found himself turning to the United States for arms assistance. Nehru permitted a dramatic expansion of the Indian defence budget from 2.1 per cent of the GNP in 1961-62 to 3.0 per cent in 1962-63 and 4.5 per cent in 1964-65.<sup>29</sup>

This arms race and defence budget expansion of India had important implications for its relationship with Pakistan particularly. Pakistani leaders became fearful that the infusion of arms into India from United States and the United Kingdom would give India a distinct qualitative and quantitative edge over Pakistan. Additionally, as India paid more attention to China and abandoned its commitment to nonalignment, the Pakistani leadership experienced another fears. G. Ahmad a former member of the Civil Service of Pakistan

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29 Raju G.C. Thomas, The Defence of India (Delhi: Macmillan, 1978), pp. 147-48.



said that "Pakistan's friends, U.S. and U.K., have decided to build up India's military potential without first insisting and assuring that India solve its grave differences with Pakistan."<sup>30</sup>

Thus, India's programme of strengthening its defence system against China and modernizing its own military system was taken by Pakistan as a national threat. This arms proliferation of India had compelled Pakistan to come in closeness of China and an important border agreement with China was signed on March 2, 1963<sup>31</sup> in which Pakistan gave some of her territory to China. China and Pakistan also showed some of the Indian territory between Pakistani controlled Kashmir and the Chinese province of Sinkiang. These moves infuriated India because India was claiming that all of Kashmir was legally Indian and Pakistan had no territorial boundary with China. New Delhi also charged that Pakistan had surrendered some 2500 square miles of Kashmiri territory to China. In the reply, Pakistan said that she had surrendered no territory to China, and the agreement was provisional until there was a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

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30 Dawn, April 9, 1963.

31 Barnds, Op.cit., p. 189.

During the next two years, there was a proliferation of Sino-Pakistani contacts and activities. In 1964, China extended a \$ 60 million credit<sup>32</sup> to Pakistan for the purchase of Chinese goods. There were many cultural and air agreements between China and Pakistan also, but India's real apprehension, however, was not cultural missions or air agreements. New Delhi feared that China and Pakistan had formed a secret military alliance. This feeling was especially cultivated by Z.A. Bhutto, for his domestic politics as well as to increase India's apprehension, when he said on July 17, 1963 that "Any attack by India on Pakistan would no longer confine the stakes to the independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan. Any attack by India on Pakistan would also involve the security and territorial integrity of the largest<sup>33</sup> state in Asia".

Thus, it seems that the Indo-Chinese conflict of 1962 had not deteriorated the relations of India and China but it had also abruptly complicated the Indo-Pakistani relationship. With this war, India

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32 Ibid., p. 190.

33 S.P. Seth, "China as a Factor in Indo-Pakistan Politics", The World Today, vol. 25, No. 1 (January 1969), p. 43.

also realized the great need of military capability in order to hold off China and Pakistan simultaneously.

### Conclusion

From the forgoing discussion, it becomes clear that India-Pakistan relations were disrupted not only by their bilateral issues but the external powers in one or the other way had affected their relations. In the beginning of this period (1956-64), Pakistan matured her contact with Western and Islamic countries and received a lot of arms and economic aid especially from America. America also took the interest in supporting Pakistan for fighting with communism in South Asia region. Thus, this Pakistan-U.S. relations disrupted not only India-Pakistan relations but also brought cold war in the region. The arms aid to Pakistan from U.S. and Pakistan's joining the Baghdad Pact and SEATO that had provided a sense of security to Pakistan, compelled India to come in closeness of U.S.S.R. for maintaining balance of power in the region. Pakistan's primary interest of joining Baghdad Pact and SEATO was not because it perceived any major Communist threat but because it wanted to generate American support for its claims against India. Pakistan also took much interest to solve the Kashmir issue through

U.N. because most of the permanent members of Security Council at that time were in favour of Pakistan. But the U.N. efforts and Super Powers' efforts regarding Kashmir issue ended with no result. Super-powers exploited India and Pakistan as a tool to serve their global interests.

With the conflict of 1962 with China, India suffered much militarily and this brought a profound consequences to both Indian foreign policy and national security policy. From this defeat, India realized to strengthen her defence system. India which was only believing and following non-aligned policy, suddenly gave up her much vaunted non-aligned policy, and dramatically expanded <sup>her</sup> defence budget. With the formation of secret military pact between Pakistan and China, India realized the great need of military capability in order to hold off China and Pakistan simultaneously.

### C H A P T E R   I I I

#### THE INDO-PAKISTAN WAR OF 1965 AND TASHKENT DECLARATION

Before occurring<sup>of</sup> the actual war between India and Pakistan, a long list of the factors had affected the situations in the region in different ways. These factors compelled both the countries to opt different forms of foreign policy. Western arms aid and Indian defense build up following the Sino-Indian war foreshadowed for Pakistan a seriously adverse shift in the balance of power. Seeking ways to offset India's growing strength, Ayub and his colleagues gradually changed the orientation of their foreign policy. Pakistan, after the 1962 conflict of India-China, opted new foreign policy. In order to take help from China, Pakistan limited her relations with U.S.A. and had only formal relations. On the other hand, India started to move away from the principles of non-aligned movement. Pakistan's reaction to India's defeat by China was a complex mixture of pleasure, fear and frustration. The first reactions to India reverses in Pakistan were both sweet and sour. The sweet part was the enjoyment one gets from seeing a neighbourhood bully meeting a bigger bully. The sour part was in knowing that there was an even bigger bully in the

neighbourhood.<sup>1</sup>

# 1. Domestic Situation in India

As regional tensions expanded in the wake of the Chinese invasion of 1962, certain domestic changes in India and Pakistan also contributed towards the proclivity to resort to war. In November 1963, the Indian Home Minister Gulzarilal Nanda stated in the National Legislature<sup>2</sup> that Kashmir had been fully integrated into India. This aroused a wave of protests in Pakistan, but the Indian Government did not seem to be unduly concerned about the Pakistan reaction. Pakistan brought its case against the Indian efforts to integrate Kashmir before the Security Council, but the Indian delegate M.C. Chagla reminded the Council that Kashmir had become an integral part of India.

While Kashmir's integration into the Indian Union was proceeding apace, Sheikh Abdullah, the "Lion of Kashmir", was languishing in Indian prisons. However, in April 1964, he was released partly because of the widespread political agitation in Kashmir in the wake of the

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<sup>a</sup>  
1 W. A. Wilcox, India, Pakistan and the Rise of China (New York: Walker and Company, 1964), p. 75.

2 Russell, Brines, The India-Pakistan Conflict (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968), p. 236.

Hazratbal incident. After his release from prison, he went to Pakistan where he questioned the irrevocable character of the accession of Kashmir to India. He also contended, however, that the Kashmir dispute could be resolved only through amicable discussions between India and Pakistan. Despite Abdullah's remarks about Kashmir's accession, Prime Minister Nehru and President Ayub Khan agreed to meet in June 1964 to discuss the Kashmir problem and other outstanding bilateral issues. The meeting however did not occur because Nehru died, and the hopes of an early summit meeting between the two heads of governments receded. Shortly thereafter in June 1964, Shastri (Prime Minister of India) and Ayub Khan stressed<sup>3</sup> the urgent need for Indo-Pakistan understanding, but these sentiments were not rapidly translated into policy and subsequent events on the sub-continent prodded the two nations towards war.

## 2. Domestic Situation in Pakistan

While President Ayub Khan professed friendship after Nehru's death, it is reasonable to assume that he despaired of a negotiated settlement with India. Additionally,

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<sup>3</sup> Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations (New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1966), P. 361.

given India's recent efforts to efface Kashmir's special status, he probably also concluded that either the issue be resolved by force or be forever abandoned. At this, certain domestic changes took place in Pakistan which made conditions propitious for a bold initiative. President Ayub Khan held the regime's first election and thereby tested his scheme of Basic Democracy. In this election, Ayub won a clear mandate in West Pakistan while Fatima Jinnah (sister of Mohammad Ali Jinnah) came with majority in East Pakistan. This weakened<sup>ne</sup> position in East Pakistan became an opportunity for Z.A. Bhutto to have power and prestige. So, Bhutto, in the wake of the anti-Indian hysteria generated by the Hazratbal incident, pushed the generals into a successful war with India. Commenting on the significance of the election<sup>a</sup> Wane Wico~~X~~ pointed out that "weakened in the elections (in East Pakistan) and under pressure from Bhutto and the militants, Ayub Khan needed real success to restore the confidence of his government and of the attentive public. Since the base of the regime was in West Pakistan, that success had naturally to appeal to the values and goals of that region of the country where Kashmir and relations with India were the most powerful emotional issues."<sup>4</sup>

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4 Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani conflicts since 1947 (Lahore: Vanguard, 1988), p. 81.



It is impossible to say for sure just how much Bhutto pushed Ayub to go to war to satisfy his personal ambitions. Nevertheless, it appears that Bhutto did play a key role, particularly since he was instrumental in expanding Pakistan's links with China during this crucial time. The importance of Chinese<sup>e</sup> connection, was underscored in March 1965 when President Ayub Khan paid an eight day visit to China and China gave assurances<sup>5</sup> of help military support to Pakistan.

This military support to Pakistan by China cultivated an atmosphere of nervousness in India because Indian leaders and military thought that now they have to fight<sup>a</sup> two front war (one is with China and another is with Pakistan). While India was in no position to fight a two front war.

### 3. The Rann of Kutch Incident:

The tensions in this area had also become a hurdle between India-Pakistan relations. Though this area was both strategically and economically useless but jingoistic Indians have periodically claimed that oil reserves exist there. Skirmishes took place in this disputed area in January 1965 and both the countries

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5 Brines, Op.cit., p. 252.

claimed the border patrolling against each other. By all accounts, the Pakistani retaliated using regular troops. The fighting escalated quickly through the month of April 1965, with the Pakistanis trying out their new Patton<sup>6</sup> tanks. Kutch affairs was a proving ground for Pakistani men and material. It gave the Pakistani military an opportunity to assess Indian strength and vulnerabilities. According to Sisir Gupta, "Above all the attack on Kutch was a rehearsal for the conquest on Kashmir. Before launching a full-scale attack there, Ayub thought it necessary to try his new American weapons".<sup>7</sup>

The Indian defence strategy in 1965 against Pakistan also proved their inability to coordinate plans. This strategy was evident by Pakistan side particularly after the Kutch episode. This supposition also lends support to the thesis that the Kutch affair emboldened the Pakistani leadership and provided the necessary margin of confidence for an attack on Kashmir.

#### 4. The Outbreak of War

Taking the advantage of India's assessed military weakness due to 1962 conflict of China-India and the

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6 Brines, Op.cit., p. 288.

7 Ganguly, Op.cit., p. 84.

dangerously weak and frustrated position of India in Rann of Kutch episode, the Ayub Khan government of Pakistan launched its "Op Gibraltar"<sup>8</sup> 1965. Pakistan started this operation with the hope that Kashmiris would rise in revolt and support the so-called Muslim liberators from Pakistan, but this hope of Pakistan was shattered as the Kashmiris joined their hands with the Indian troops in defeating and routing the Pakistani infiltrators. Some Kashmiris also gave slogans " We will help you capture Muzaffarabad if you want us."<sup>9</sup> This atmosphere cultivated a good Army-Civil relationship during that turbulent period in the history of Kashmir.

Pakistan attacked India in 1965 basically due to three wrong impressions about India.

- (i) Pakistan grossly overestimated the support of local populace,
- (ii) Pakistan overestimated their attachment to notions of Islamic co<sup>o</sup>fraternity, and

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8 Chandra B Khanduri, "Analysis of the Kashmir Problem and an Approach to Solution", Strategic Analysis, Vol. XIII, No. 6 (September 1990), p. 622.

9 Ibid., pp. 622-23.

(iii) Pakistan under<sup>e</sup>~~x~~estimated the language barrier between the majority of the infiltrators and the Kashmiri population.

In this second Kashmir war no doubt both the countries suffered from each other. Sometime India crossed the borderline and sometime Pakistan crossed borderline at some places. But one important thing is that the outbreak of war signaled an important failure of U.S. policy in the sub-continent because all the economic and military aid of U.S. were suspended to both India and Pakistan. Due to this, U.S. was not having any influence on any country (either on India or Pakistan).

In spite of all these, U.S., Britain and the Soviet Union all insisted that stopping the fighting between India and Pakistan was the first order of business and cooperated in working out an acceptable terms. By mid-September 1965, the Security Council passed a resolution asking both parties to ceasefire. The U.N. General Secretary U. Thant subsequently consulted with President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Shastri. India firstly accepted the cease fire on September 20, 1965 and two days later Pakistan. The fighting was over, and the peace process began.

## 5. The Tashkent Agreement and Its Achievements

After the cease-fire, no country was having the gurd to bring both the countries (India and Pakistan) at a negotiating table. China had already lost its image in the region in the eyes of Indian and in the World by supplying arms to Pakistan during the war. As far as super powers are concerned, United States was concerned with the Arab-Israeli problems. Further U.S. was beginning to expand the war in Vietnam, drawing its attention away from the South Asia region. The other power that was able to mediate the dispute was United Kingdom but she did not desire to take this responsibility on her shoulder alone. The Security Council also showed its failure in resolving the differences between the two parties. In these conditions, the chances of mediation was left for Soviet Union.

The two parties finally met in Tashkent on January 4, 1966. With considerably skill and a mixture of persuasion and Cajolery, Prime Minister of Soviet Union Kosygin succeeded in hammering out an agreement between India and Pakistan. On January 10, 1966, the Agreement

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10 Denis Wright, India-Pakistan Relations 1962-1969 (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Private Limited, 1989), p. 75.

at Tashkent was signed between India and Pakistan through the mediation of Soviet Union. The Agreement declared that "all armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn not later than February 26, 1966, to positions they held prior to August 5, 1965, and both sides shall observe the cease-fire terms on the cease-fire line, less important provisions dealt with exchanging prisoners of war, restoring diplomatic relations, and resuming economic links and communications".<sup>11</sup>

The importance of Tashkent Declaration lay in that it represented important concession on both sides. The Indians gave up strategic positions captured in the Azad Kashmir region, and the Pakistani agreed to withdraw from territory what they had seized in the conflict. The Indians backed down from their original position that Pakistan acknowledged its responsibility for guerilla infiltration.

Throughout the negotiations whatever Kosygin played his role was admired by many Indians and Pakistani as well. Mr. Jha (an Indian delegation spokesman) described the role of Kosygin as "very correct, cautious and constructive."<sup>12</sup>

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11 Ibid.

12 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1965-66, p. 22188.

Pakistani were also very happy with the new role of Soviet Union and with their new status in Soviet eyes:

"Kosygin played his part not as representative of the world revolutionary movement but as a classical peace-maker in a classical situation of diplomatic mediation".<sup>13</sup>

Lal Bahadur Shastri's death, after few ours of signing the Tashkent Declaration, also shocked the people of both countries, because he played very important role in bringing closeness between the two countries. But in spite of all sympathies towards Declaration, there were also criticism\$against it in both the countries. Opposition parties for their own political advantage, were ready to attack any point of government policy. The right wing party in India, the Jan Sangh, was highly critical of the Declaration<sup>14</sup> and there was uneasiness in the more liberal ranks of the opposition. In Pakistan, the reaction was more violent; demonstrations occurred in Lahore, causing<sup>15</sup> the death of at least two people. An opposition leader in the National Assembly of Pakistan, Mukhlesuzzaman Khan,

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13 Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1966), p. 5.

14 B.L. Maheshwari, "Non-alignment", Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 5, No. 13 (March 1970), p. 1335.

15 The Times (London) January 15, 1966.

attacked Ayub for not consulting either cabinet ministers of the party about Tashkent, unlike Mr. Shastri, who had a mandate from his nation as well as *the party*.<sup>16</sup>

The feeling against Tashkent Declaration was stronger in Pakistan than it was in India. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto said that "Tashkent Declaration contains no specific solutions to our difficulties with India".<sup>17</sup> Many peoples were demanding the solution of Kashmir and were saying:

"We had fought with our back not to leave Kashmiri in lurch. After all these sacrifices, where do we stand?<sup>18</sup> The solution of Kashmir seemed to be as elusive as ever".

From the above discussion, it becomes clear that Tashkent Declaration had achieved nothing new at all in terms of permanent settlement of India-Pakistan problems. It brought a temporary respite between India and Pakistan

The ~~de~~claration made no reference to the no war pact which India had desired for many years while it did reaffirm that disputes should be settled by peaceful means.

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16 National Assembly Debates (Pakistan) Vol.I (Nos.1-12) 1966, p. 373.

17 Ibid.

18 Zaman Mukhtar, "Thoughts in Indo-Pakistan Relations in the Tashkent Era," Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 22, No.2 (1969), p. 130.



The one important result of Declaration was the Soviet diplomacy which got a chance to promote her policy towards the sub-continent. Soviet Union with this declaration got success in eroding western influence from the sub-continent and got chance to come in close to Pakistan.

The Soviet Union's aim to attempt a balance of power structure on the sub-continent came with its offer to supply Pakistan with arms and Air Marshal Nur Khan's <sup>expression</sup> of Pakistan's satisfaction about arms deal between Soviet Union and Pakistan created a confusion among Indians about Pakistan. While Mrs Indira Gandhi, after meeting with Kosygin on 16 July 1966 in Moscow, publically stated that Soviet Union had not made any arms agreement with <sup>19</sup> Pakistan. The rumours about the Soviet arms to Pakistan in 1966 gave Moscow the opportunity to test the reaction of Delhi to such a proposal. The Soviet leaders had also no desire to alienate India that is why in that year (1966), <sup>20</sup> they increased arms sales to India.

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19 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1965-66, p. 21569.

20 Arthur Stein, "India and the U.S.S.R.: the Post Nehru Period", Asian Survey, Vol. 7, No. 3 (March 1967), p. 126.

After 1966, Pakistan began to indicate that Pakistan was ready to modify the western commitment.<sup>21</sup> This official announcement was given by Pakistan only for taking the Soviet supports. Ayub Khan on September 25, 1967 also paid a visit to Moscow with his foreign minister Mr. Pirzada in this connection. Ayub thanked Soviet Union for its continuing assistance to India and Pakistan as far as establishing good relations were concerned, but remarked further that Kashmir stood in the way of such a relationship. Ayub Khan in this visit felt that the Soviet-Pakistan ties had been strengthened, but his primary assessment of the tour was seen in terms of India-Pakistan relations.

"The greatest advantage of this meeting was that we were able to apprise the Soviet leaders of developments subsequent to the Kashmir talks and inform them that, despite all our efforts, India is not agreeable to meaningful talks on Jammu and Kashmir".<sup>22</sup>

The Pakistan government regarded the first official visit of Kosygin (Soviet Prime Minister) of April 17, 1968,<sup>as</sup> very important because it was hoped that

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21 K. Sarwar Hasan, "The Background of American Arms Aid to Pakistan", Pakistan Horizon, Vol. 20, No.3 (March 1967), p. 126.

22 Keessing's Contemporary Archives, 1967-68, p. 22345.

it would result in large economic benefits for Pakistan, and perhaps the long awaited offer to sell military equipment to Pakistan. So in order to show an alienation from west, Pakistan authorised the closure of American air base at Peshwar<sup>a</sup> on April 6, 1968 few days before Kosygin was due to arrive in Rawalpindi. Foreign Minister of Pakistan Mr. Husain said "Pakistan had taken the step in keeping with our policy of developing bilateral relations of friendship and mutual understanding with all countries<sup>23</sup> but its real intent went well beyond that . While Kosygin described his concluding tour of Pakistan as "a dialogue between friends" and Soviet's role as neutral in the affairs of the sub-continent. But in spite of all these open discussions, there were some secret dealings between Soviet Union and Pakistan. When Soviet Union, in July 1968, confirmed that she should go ahead with the arms sale to Pakistan, Mrs. Indira Gandhi expressed India's objections through a letter to Kosygin and said, that Pakistan had no reasonable justification for seeking to increase its armed strength, because of the large supply of military equipment given to Pakistan between 1954 and 1965 through its alliance.<sup>24</sup> China's

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23 National Assembly Debates (Pakistan), vol. 1 (Nos. 1-15) 1968, May 20, 1968, pp. 808-809.

24 Lok Sabha Debates (India), vol.18 (Nos. 1-5), 1968, July 22, 1968, Col. 288.

contribution to arming Pakistan reduced the justification for the Soviet Union's supplying of arms to Pakistan. Soviet arms sale to Pakistan were the subject of a heated debate in the Lok Sabha also. The opposition in Indian Parliament got a good opportunity to attack the government and to criticise its failure of foreign policy but no one in the Indian Parliament was knowing the quantity or the character of the arms or the condition of their delivery to Pakistan. Seeing the upror in Indian Parliament over the arms sale, Ayub Khan mentioned that the equipment Pakistan would receive from Soviet Union represented only a very small portion of the U.S. \$ 900 <sup>25</sup> million Soviet aid which India received. All the Soviet aid, said Ayub in Tehran on his way to London on July 21, 1968, would fill certain small gaps in Pakistan's defences. This arms deal disrupted not only Indo-Soviet relations but also India-Pakistan. Pakistan happily accepted the Soviet help and used it as a propaganda weapon against India.

The officials in America were very cautious about the Soviet-Pakistan arms deal. After the announcement of Pakistan Soviet arms deal, U.S. sent a delegation to India

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25 Pakistan Times (Lahore) July 23, 1968.

which held discussions with Indian ministers from 26-28 July 1968. U.S. also announced that there was no change in her policy concerning arms supply to the subcontinent, and U.S. would maintain the "lethal weapons" embargo on India and Pakistan.

Here it seems that inspite of the bilateral issues as a hurdle between India and Pakistan relations, the role of super-powers and great powers had been more dangerous between India and Pakistan. Because the super-powers only wanted their base, influence and their interest sometimes in India and sometimes in Pakistan. The Chinese continued military supply to Pakistan since 1965 war of India-Pakistan and Pakistan's receiving China's aircraft, tanks and foreign exchange to buy arms had further disrupted the India-Pakistan relations.

In 1969, the new Republican President, Nixon did not make any pronounced change in U.S. policy towards the Indian sub-continent. Nixon did not want to appear as the partisan of either country. He wanted to leave an impression of evenhandedness towards both countries. But later in 1970, Nixon changed his attitude towards Pakistan and personally decided to sell Pakistan twin-jet bombers, jet fighters and armored personnel carriers

with a reported value ranging from \$ 15 million to \$ 40 million.<sup>26</sup> For all practical purposes, the U.S.-Pakistan alliance existed on paper only. Relations between India and United States became more distant when U.S. agreed to sell arms to Pakistan and when India ordered to closing of several U.S. cultural centres in 1970 with vague accusations that they were engaged in improper activities.

### Conclusion

From the above account, the 1965 war demonstrated that Pakistan attacked on India by two reason basically. One is that Pakistan thought that India had become very weak because of 1962 war with China and India is not in a position to win the war. The second reason is that Pakistan believed that if it did not act in a decisive manner, the state of Kashmir would be integrated into India and international interest for Pakistan's concerns would dwindle.

The second Kashmir war of 1965 demonstrated the willingness of both sides to use substantial force to achieve particular ends. As a result, the Pakistani

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26 The New York Times, October 11, 1970.

leadership learned that the Indian armed forces could not be easily routed and had come a long way from the Chinese debacle of 1962. On the Indian side, the war provided a degree of comfort to the military whose prestige and morale had sunk to an all time low in the aftermath of 1962 conflict.

The biggest achievement between India and Pakistan was that the Tashkent Agreement was signed between the two countries through the mediation of Soviet Union. The importance of Tashkent Agreement lay that it represented important concessions on both sides. Both the countries agreed to withdraw from the territory that they had seized in conflict. But in spite of all these achievement, Tashkent Declaration had achieved nothing new at all in terms of permanent settlement of India-Pakistan problems. It brought a temporary respite to India-Pakistan hostilities. India and Pakistan remained suspicious and unyielding towards each other, and the Kashmir dispute remained as unresolved as ever.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE BANGLADESH CRISIS AND THE SIMLA AGREEMENT

The Bangladesh war is commonly thought to have<sup>1</sup> begun on December 3, 1971 with a Pakistani air attack on a number of military bases in India's northwestern region. Despite the surprise nature of attack, it did little damage, and the Indian Air Force retaliated the next day, hitting several Pakistan air bases. But before occurring the actual war there were many factors which had contributed a lot for bringing a war like situation. This chapter examines the various factors that how they had affected the domestic and external policies and Foreign relation; and how they had made the situation more worse and finally how these situations created a rift between India and Pakistan.

#### 1. Economic Disparities

After the 1965 war, Pakistan suffered from economic crisis. So, Pakistan did not care for the maintenance of her eastern wing and the people of eastern wing of Pakistan were badly affected. The economic disparities between the two wings of Pakistan had become so great and the

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1 Robert Jackson, South Asian Crisis (New York: Praeger, 1975), p. 105.



ideological bonds between the two wings were beginning to fray. Following the 1965 war with India, another source of resentment was the realization among the East Pakistani leaders that the Kashmir issue was essentially a West Pakistani cause, for which East Pakistan was being made needlessly vulnerable. As these issues began to divide the two wings, the ethereal quality of the ideological bonds became increasingly apparent.

## 2. Tashkent and Dismal Scene

The Tashkent declaration of 1966 that sought to bring about a lasting peace between the two countries (India and Pakistan) did not have the same significance for the two countries. The agreement was criticised in India as well as in Pakistan by some group of people, but in India majority of the people respected the agreement. Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri made it clear that agreement is an achievement because after a great deal of discussion the two countries agreed not to use force against each other and have decided to settle the dispute amicably.

On the other side in Pakistan, the student groups were actively encouraged by two religious parties Nizam-i-Islam and the Council of Muslim League. The students rioted in a number of major cities in Pakistan to express

their disenchantment<sup>2</sup> with the agreement, while actually these students encouraged by religious parties were against Ayub's return in power. In contrast, the Awami League leader Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, whose base was almost solely in East Pakistan, and some other leaders refrained from criticizing the Agreement. Mujibur Rehman did not criticize the agreement because he did not want to antagonize the Indian leadership against himself and wanted to bring world attention towards the disparities between East and West. Pakistan. Mujibur Rehman with a small group also declined<sup>3</sup> the invitation called by the West Pakistani political parties for a National Conference to discuss the key issues confronting the country. The Conference was completely failed because Mujibur Rehman leading his group demanded more autonomy to East Pakistan. This demand culminated in the break-up of Pakistan.

### 3. The Language Problem

In Bangladesh crisis language had also played very crucial role. It was a fundamental inability of the West Pakistani political leader to accommodate<sup>m</sup> the hopes and

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2 Lawrence Ziring, The Ayub Khan Era (Syracuse; Syracuse University Press, 1971), p. 74.

3 Ibid., p. 79.

expectations of the majority of the East Pakistanis.

Despite the common bond of Islam, profound differences between East and West Pakistan existed. The majority of West Pakistanis were either liking Urdu or speaking Urdu and the East Pakistani, Bengali. In addition the West Pakistani regarded Bengali Islam as tainted by Hinduism<sup>4</sup> and thus in need of purification. Now it is clear that the relationship between East and West Pakistan was not only tenuous but also asymmetric. The West Pakistani leadership did not view their Eastern wing as equals and in fact dealt with them paternalistically at best, and exploitatively at worst. This language and cultural division increased the tension between East and West Pakistan, which culminated in the 1971 war.

#### 4. Pakistani Domestic Policies and Mujib's Six Points

The Pakistani leaders had played different role in political field in order to show their personal image, importance and in order to establish themselves and in order to come in power. Even most of the leaders had not cared about national interest. These activities were seen in high spirit particularly between the 1966-1971 in

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4 Marta R. Nicholas, and Philip Oldenburg, Bangladesh: The Birth of a New Nation (Madras: M. Seshachalam and Co. 1972), p. 15.

Pakistan. This was the main reason of the dismemberment of Pakistan.

Sheikh Mujibur Rehman in February 1966 at the All Pakistan National Conference at Lahore, almost immediately after the Tashkent Agreement between India and Pakistan,<sup>5</sup> gave his six point programme. Those were as follow:

- i) There shall be a federal government at the centre. Elections to the federal legislature and the legislatures of the federating units shall be direct, and on the basis of universal adult franchise.
- ii) Federal government shall be responsible for defence and foreign affairs only. All other functions shall be taken care of by the federating units themselves.
- iii) There shall be separate currencies, or single currency but completely controlled by the regional reserve banks.
- iv) Federating units shall provide money to the federal government for its functioning on the basis of a predetermined procedure.

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5 Jagdev Singh, Dismemberment of Pakistan: 1971 Indo-Pak War (New Delhi: Lancer, 1988), pp. 41-42.

- v) Federating units shall maintain their own foreign exchange accounts, and made foreign exchange available to the federal government on the basis of a predetermined procedure.
- vi) Federating units can raise their own militias and para military forces as necessary, for national security.

These points were basically a demand of regional autonomy for East Pakistan. These points also dramatically limited the power of the central government to the areas of defence and foreign affairs, Ayub outrightly rejected all these demands on the ground that they smacked of secessionism. Mujibur Rehman in April 1966 was arrested under the defence of Pakistan rules and the East Pakistan safety ordinance on a charge of sedition. This marked the start of the two-year jail term for Mujibur Rehman which culminated in the Agartala Conspiracy case of 1968. The alleged aim of the conspiracy was to capture a part of East Bengal and set up an independent government. On January 7, 1968, Rehman along with thirty-four others including some civil and military officials were arrested in connection with the Agartala Conspiracy case and put on trial on June 19, 1968. With this arrest

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6 Ibid.

of Mujibur Rehman, his popularity grew so much. Autonomist sentiment continued to swell in East Pakistan despite Rehman's absence. Later on at the time of Mujib's trial, charges were dropped against him. These dropped charges against Mujib proved a failure to Ayub's regime which was a milestone on the path to its own disintegration and that of Pakistan. The prominent historian of the Pakistani Army Fazal Mugeem Khan also said by criticising the attitude of Ayub Khan "The Agartala Conspiracy Trial provoked adverse reactions and whispers about trumped up charges received credence. The accused person began acquiring an image of heroes and fighters for East Pakistan's rights.<sup>7</sup>

However, the furore against the trial of Mujibur Rehman and some other leaders was so loud that the politicians in both the wings started to unite among themselves. A democratic Action Committee under the leadership of Nasrullah Khan was organised which called for the liberalization of some of the harshest aspects of the regime. Forced with this barrage of opposition, Ayub began to capitulate, first by dropping the Agartala

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7 Fazal Mugeem Khan, Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership (Islamabad: Muqueem National Book Foundation, 1973) p. 13.

conspiracy case and releasing Mujibur Rehman then by calling for a Conference in March 1969. But the Conference of the political leaders was failure because of regional feelings and violence erupted once again. On March 25, 1969, Ayub handed over power to General Yahya Khan who reimposed the Martial Law.

Faced with the continuing demands of the various political parties and Mujib's insistence on the Six Point Programme on November 28, 1969, Yahya promised to hold elections and also expressed a desire to dissolve West Pakistan. Yahya proved to be true to his word, and from January 1970 permitted full political activity. Following extensive discussions with the various contestants for Power, Yahya came out with legal Framework Order<sup>8</sup> on March 31, 1970. It included five basic principles designed to guide and direct any political arrangements but it was a far cry from the expectations of Mujib's Six Point Programme and did not succeed in bringing the national spirit in Awami League and in some other political leaders because the Order was having some dictatorial attitudes.

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<sup>8</sup> G.W. Choudhury, The Last Days of United Pakistan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974), p.94.

The shortcomings of the Legal Frame Work Order were not lost on Mujib and the Awami League who continued to press for regional autonomy. The fundamental inability and unwillingness of Yahya's regime to concede certain basic political demands and grievances fueled Mujib's campaign. In fact, one can argue that what was emerging within Pakistan were two separate nationalisms:

- a) The nationalism of West Pakistan was predicated on the predominance of the West over the East and,
- b) The nationalism of the East was based on relationship of parity.

No longer could the supposedly transcendent quality of any ideology or rule contain the opposing nationalisms. The tangible differences had become too great to be ignored.

## 9

The two natural disasters of August and November 1970 in East Pakistan further gave a set back to the Pakistan nationalism, because these disasters were a havoc for the people and properties both, and whatever the help was expected by the people of East wing of Pakistan was not come into reality. The Army which was

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9 Brig Jagdev Singh, Op.cit., pp. 39-40.



called for help did nothing except to provide minor help and playing cards sitting in barracks, organising cinema shows, and relaxing.

In the national election of December 7, 1970,<sup>10</sup> Mujib's victory of 160 seats out of 162 in East Pakistan and other parties' poor performance indicated the polarization of popular feelings between East and West Pakistan. Faced with this unexpected outcome, the leaders of regime and Bhutto thought that the primacy of the military and the West were in jeopardy with a Bengali majority in the National Assembly. Thus, Yahya acting in concert with Bhutto decided to postpone the convening of the National Assembly indefinitely. When in March 1971 Yahya announced a meeting of all major parties in Decca, Mujibur Rehman earlier refused to attend but later responded under increasing pressure from the more radical members of his<sup>11</sup> own party and issued a new set of demands:

- a) the withdrawal<sup>a</sup> of Martial law,
- b) the transfer of power to elected representatives,
- c) the return of troops to their barracks, and
- d) an inquiry into recent police firings.

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10 G.W. Choudhry, Op.cit., p. 127.

11 Jagdev Singh, Op.cit., p. 48.

Simultaneously, Mujib called for a state-wide non-cooperation movement which proved to be a complete success. A last effort at negotiations broke down over the issues of investments and foreign trade. Shortly, thereafter, Yahya denounced Mujib's non-cooperation movement as an "act of treason". Mujib and some Awami League members were arrested and the West Pakistani leaders also refused to hand over power to the elected representative of East wing. Later on March 25, 1971 the Pakistani Armed forces cracked down in Dacca.

In fact, the Pakistani crisis demonstrated that the cultural ties, like those of ethnicity and language had kept Muslim apart. The divisions arising out of these ties had, of course, been exacerbated by the economic grievances of the East against the West. In addition the poor representation of Bengali in Armed forces and civil services and their exclusion from the decision making circles make the people of Eastern wing disenchanted. Thus under these circumstances, it became impossible to hold a nation together.

##### 5. The Bengali Secessionist Movement and India's Role

No doubt the above factors were sufficient in and of themselves to bring about the break-up of Pakistan but India's role is also unforgettable that she had played in


encouraging the secessionist forces of Pakistan through economic support, moral support and giving training to them. These attitudes of India became a hurdle between the relation of Pakistan and India.

The official Indian reaction to the crackdown in Dacca was taken by Pakistan as an interference in the internal matter of Pakistan because Mrs. Indira Gandhi on March 27, 1971 said in Lok Sabha. "The values for which the victorious Awami League stood were our values ..... for which we have always stood and for which we have always spoken". She also said<sup>12</sup> "we have always raised our voice for those who have suffered". From this moment India shifted her previous policy by providing support to a secessionist movement in Pakistan. India started to train and arm Bangaldeshi forces inside India and extended covert support to the Bangladesh provisional government to organize a guerilla war in East Pakistan.<sup>13</sup> The Bangladeshi resistance movement known as the "Mukti Bahini" (Liberation brigade) was placed under the command of a retired East Pakistani colonel M.A.G. Osmani.

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12 Indira Gandhi, India and Bangladesh (New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972), pp. 9-10.

13 Jackson, p. 451.



These trainings and support to Bangladeshi guerilla by India further disrupted the relation between India and Pakistan, because this guerilla organization with the Indian support disrupted the line of communication by blowing up bridges, power lines, and telegraphic equipment, by killing collaborators and by harrying the West Pakistani authorities in general.

As the crisis in Pakistan grew and spilled over into India, the Indian leaders inched closer to a policy of confrontation but before going into any confrontation India wanted to show the crisis of East Pakistan to the international community and later wanted to receive world opinion in her own favour. In this connection Mrs Gandhi sent Foreign Minister Swaran Singh on an international tour of many countries, Mrs Gandhi herself paid a visit to Western Capitals in October and November 1971 and she met with partial success in convincing the U.S. leadership to cut off arms to Pakistan. However, evidence shows that this cutoff was by no means complete, and an specified  
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amount of American weapons did trickle into Pakistan during the course of conflict.

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14 Sumit Ganguly, The Origins of War in South Asia: Indo-Pakistani Conflicts since 1947 (Karachi: Vanguard, 1988), p. 127.

On the other hand, India got much success in focussing the problems of East Pakistan and refugees in the eye of Soviet Union. The Soviet President Podgorny on April 13, 1971 urged the Pakistani leadership to end<sup>15</sup> the "bloodshed and repression" and to arrive at a political settlement with Mujibur Rehman and other politicians who have received such convincing support by the overwhelming majority of the people of East Pakistan at the recent general elections. Later on a treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation was signed between India and Soviet Union on August 9, 1971 in New Delhi. The treaty, both in its substance and timing, was having two important foreign policy objective -

- a) For the Soviet Union, it appeared to legitimise further the Soviet security role in South Asia at low political cost and second,
- b) From the Indian security perspective, the treaty provided a check on what was held to be the nascent political axis between Washington, Peking and Islamabad, while preserving India's scope for Independent action.

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15 Timothy George, Security in Southern Asia 2: India and the Great Powers (Hampshire (England): Gower Publishing Company, Ltd., 1984), pp. 89-90.

The signing of the treaty between India and Soviet Union was taken by Pakistan in a serious way. Even many western observers expressed concern that India might seek 'to take advantage of the assurance given by the treaty<sup>17</sup> in the crisis of East Pakistan. Soviet Union herself accepted the statement of Mrs Gandhi that India is determined to take all necessary measures to stop the flow of refugees from East Pakistan to India and to ensure that those refugees who are already in India to return to<sup>18</sup> their homeland without delay. After the signing of treaty the Soviet arms were also reported to reach in India that encouraged India to move towards confrontation with Pakistan without any hesitation.

#### 6. The Outbreak of Hostilities

In light of the rapidly deteriorating situation in East Bengal, the New Delhi Government felt compelled to act militarily on December 3, 1971. The strike came on when Pakistani provided the military rationale for direct Indian intervention by attacking several Indian Air Force bases in North-western India. Mrs Gandhi who was in

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17 The Times, August 10, 1971.

18 Keesing's, 1971, p. 24991.

Calcutta at the time, flew to New Delhi where she proclaimed a state of emergency and said that the country was on a "war footing"<sup>19</sup> and "the war in Bangladesh has become a war on India".

India in retaliation also give a befitting reply and attacked many important Pakistan places. The Indian Army supporting the Bangladesh guerilla forces, was able quickly to overrun the former East Pakistan. In the west though the conflict was more balanced, the Indians were able to capture some territory in Kashmir. Lastly Pakistan was defeated by India and Pakistan surrendered herself before Indian Armed forces. Indians also got success in trapping 90,000 Pakistani soldiers. East Pakistan was separated from Pakistan and became an independent state known as "Bangladesh".

In this war, no doubt, India had suffered economically as well as militarily but Pakistan suffered a lot and also lost her eastern wing. From this war India showed her superiority in arms forces and established her permanent image in the eyes of the world. Soviet Union was also benefitted with this war because the successful use of Soviet arms by Indian forces, coupled

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19 Jagdev Singh, Op. Cit., p. 180

with the perceived failure of Chinese and American policies, permitted the Soviet Union to emerge after the conflict with its prestige as a reliable, effective partner enhanced both in India and the broader South Asia region.

To grapple with the issues in India-Pakistan relations during the war, it is necessary to understand the nature of Indian support in Bangladesh struggle for liberation. In this connection it is needed to ask three questions-

- (a) Why did India choose to militarily intervene?
- (b) What were the forces which supported or opposed India's intervention and why,
- (c) What India wanted to gain?

India's interest in the Bangladesh war was primarily politico-strategic. India and Pakistan have been locked in a conflictual relationship ever since the partition of the sub-continent. The two wars that they have fought (1947 and 1965) changed neither the power balance nor the political equation. Therefore, the political turmoil in East Pakistan in 1970-71 which culminated in a civil war was for India a golden opportunity to dismember its enemy, India's military intervention on behalf of the Bangladeshi freedom fighters was indeed motivated by this resolve. The presence of 10 million odd East Pakistani



refugees on its soil and the establishment of an exile government in Calcutta merely provided the necessary justification for its action. The atrocities done by the Pakistani government upon unarmed people of East Bengal was condemned by Indian parliament in March 1971 unmistakably and the parliament assured them that their struggle and sacrifices will receive the whole hearted sympathy and support of the people of India.<sup>20</sup>

Regarding the intervention, there was a mixed reaction to India's military support. The various heterogeneous forces - the conservatives and liberals, the radicals and rightists, the secularists and religious zealots, the civilians and military, and so on had closed their ranks on one point, i.e. overpowering the Pakistani military Junta and winning independence for Bangladesh. But over the question of strategy in general, and India's military role in particular, there were disagreements. By and large, the protagonists of conventional war were in favour of India's intervention while those who favoured a peoples war were not. But in the western wing of Pakistan and some other Muslim countries the people were not in favour of India's intervention in Bangladesh on almost all points.

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20 Partha S. Ghosh, Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1989), p. 61.

As far as India's gain is concerned, India had four principal objectives -

- i) To see that Pakistan lost its eastern province and its power was reduced.
- ii) To see the refugees returning to Bangladesh,
- iii) to see that the Communists, particularly pro-Chinese variety, did not gain in political strength through the liberation movement, and
- iv) to see that the new nation accept India's pre-eminence in the region as a fact of life.

In spite of the above points, India was benefitted on other issues. As Pakistan came apart, its claim on Kashmir also eroded in a major way. The inability of the West Pakistanis to convince their brethren in the East to remain in the same polity, made it exceedingly difficult for the Pakistani leadership to lay a claim on Kashmir on the basis of its religious composition. Naturally, India took advantage of the discrepancy between fact and theory.

#### 7. The Simla Agreement and the Peace Process

✓ The turbulent period 1970-71 marked a turning point in international politics in South Asia in general and India-Pakistan relations in particular. The period

witnessed the genesis of an internal political crisis within the United Pakistan, the secessionist movement and the civil war in East Bengal, the Indian intervention and culminating in the emergence of Bangladesh as a result of the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971. The Simla Agreement of 1972 was a milestone because it formed the legal basis for settling the problems arising out of the Bangladesh war and for normalisation of India - Pakistan relations and establishment of durable peace in the sub-continent.

The Simla Agreement was signed on July 2, 1972 by Indian Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi and Pakistani President Mr. Z.A. Bhutto. The accord reiterated the desire of both the countries to normalise their trade, political and economic relations etc. / In her Rajya Sabha speech on August 2, 1972 on the Simla Pact, Mrs. Indira Gandhi stressed the need for peace in the sub-continent in these words: "I have always believed, and I do believe even today that India's major enemy is not Pakistan, it is not even big powers, which are interested in their sphere of influence. India's greatest enemy is the economic backwardness of the country. It is the poverty of the country. If we do not have that handicap, we would have done many things in the world. We can

overcome this handicap, if we have peace".<sup>21</sup>

Mr. Bhutto too had shown positive response in this direction and said that "Pakistan wants peace with India, not because it is afraid but because peace is necessary for the progress of nation".<sup>22</sup>

At Simla, India, even after winning the war, did not try to impose her views over Pakistan but make Pakistan a partner in peace and peace based on equality was concluded. In order to initiate the process of the establishment of peace, India and Pakistan agreed that "their forces shall be withdrawn to their side of the international border. The withdrawal shall commence upon entry into force of this agreement and shall be completed within a period of thirty days of".

Both countries implemented almost all the provisions of the agreement within a short duration of three years of the conclusion of the pact. In the past several agreements were signed between the two countries with the intention of resolving their disputes and establishing

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21 Rajya Sabha (India), Debates, August 2, 1972.

22 G.S. Bhargava, Success or Surrender: The Simla Summit (New Delhi: Sterling, 1972), p. 124.

peace between them as well as in the region, but none of them proved useful in establishing cooperative understanding and durable peace in full spirit. Upto some extent, Indus Water Treaty of 1960 was more helpful in dissolving the controversial problem of division of Indus Water between India and Pakistan and it is the only problem which had been settled since 1947 between them, and the rest of the treaties were of very short term significance and all of them failed to resolve actual tension. / Now the obvious question is how far the Simla Agreement differs from the rest of the agreements and to what extent it has succeeded in establishing durable peace.

The significance of the Simla Agreement and its unique character were highlighted in the statements of prominent political leaders in both the countries.

Sardar Swaran Singh, erstwhile External Affairs Minister of India, in his report to Parliamentary Consultative Committee attached to his ministry said, "The Simla Agreement was very much unlike the other agreements between India and Pakistan and particularly the Tashkent Declaration of 1966." According to him there were following differences between the two:

1. The Tashkent accord had been achieved through the good offices of a third country namely the Soviet Union, while the Simla Agreement was the result of bilateral negotiations.
2. India and Pakistan, under Tashkent Agreement, agreed to withdraw their forces to the 1949 Cease-Fire Line in Jammu and Kashmir, whereas according to the Simla Agreement, the UN-Supervised cease-fire line was replaced by a mutually demarcated Line of the Actual Control.
3. Under the Tashkent Declaration, India insisted on the use of some of United Nations machinery for reconciliation but there was no such provisions in the<sup>23</sup> Simla Agreement.

Similarly, Bipinpal Das, the then Indian Deputy Foreign Minister of India, while discussing the text of Simla Agreement, called it, "a sound and excellent beginning, a right step in the right direction, a herald of new era, an era of peace, progress and prosperity not only for India and Pakistan but for whole of Asia and perhaps a shining light house in the entire world". He further

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23 Ibid., p. 66.

said that for the first time both countries had agreed<sup>24</sup>  
to settle all disputes through bilateral negotiations.

Mrs Gandhi said that the Simla Agreement was in  
pursuance of domestic and international policies follow-<sup>25</sup>  
ed by India in three years.

Mr. Bhutto said, "Peace in the subcontinent was<sup>26</sup>  
not only in India's interest but equally in Pakistan's".

It is only the Simla Accord that taught Mr.  
Bhutto about his own condition as well as of his own  
country. Bhutto realized that if he failed to establish  
friendly and cordial relations with India, he will lose  
considerably his prestige in the eyes of Asian countries  
as well as among his own people, because India had normal  
relations with all her neighbours. This caused great  
change in his thinking and till yesterday the so-called  
war like Bhutto who was always talking about wars and  
destruction at once realized the importance of durable  
peace, and took necessary and concrete steps to gain  
durable peace.

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24 Ibid., pp. 69-70.

25 Ibid., p. 72.

26 The Pakistan Times, July 3, 1972.

In pursuance of the Simla Agreement that trade and cooperation in economic and in other fields will be resumed, as far as possible, the two countries signed a Trade Protocol on November 30, 1974 at Rawalpindi<sup>27</sup> providing for resumption of trade from December 7, 1974. According to the Protocol, the two countries decided that the trade would be in convertible currency and to begin with generally on a government to government basis or through government controlled trade corporations of the two countries unless otherwise agreed. This would prevent speculative exchanges and illegal leakages, and would help in establishing trade through mutually beneficial channels.<sup>28</sup>

Regarding the provision of payments in convertible currency, some problems arose between the two countries because it was in the interest of India to have trade in rupees. The problem was overcome when India gave concession to Pakistan. The two countries also decided in the Protocol that the trade would be on the basis of the "most favoured nation" principle in accordance with the provisions of the GATT.<sup>29</sup>

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27 Surendra Chopra, Post-Simla Indo-Pakistan Relations (New Delhi: Deep and Deep Publications, 1988), p. 207.

28 Ibid., p. 208.

29 The Hindustan Times, January 11, 1986.



The Protocol noted immediate possibilities of commencing trade in cotton, engineering goods, jute manufacturers, iron ore, railway equipment, rice and tea. The leader of Pakistani delegation, Eijaz Ahmed Naik, Characterised the Protocol as a major step towards normalization of relations in the Indian sub-<sup>30</sup>continent in accordance with the Simla Agreement.

No doubt, the signing of the Simla Agreement laid the foundation of new contacts and opened possibilities of meaningful trade. But the actual trade started only after the signing of the Trade Agreement of January 23, 1975. This agreement firstly was valid for one year<sup>31</sup> and later it was extended for another period of two year. In this agreement it was made mandatory that both the countries have to treat the times of imports and export strictly for home consumption. Both the countries also decided that such items under no circumstances would be<sup>32</sup> re-exported to other countries.

In one of the most spectacular developments since the Simla Pact, India and Pakistan agreed to re-establish diplomatic relations by exchanging ambassadors and decided

30 Chopra, p. 209.

31 Kalim Bahadur, "India and Pakistan", International Studies, Vol. 27 (3-4).

32 Chopra, p. 213.

to restore rail, road and air links after three days talks in the middle of May 1976 at Islamabad. Mrs Gandhi expressed the hope that the Islamabad accord<sup>33</sup> would lead to a "proper climate of understanding" between the two countries. On the other hand, Bhutto also assured Mrs. Gandhi that Pakistan would implement the accord by the agreed date".

In spite of the above talks, regarding different matters, many developmental cooperation were discussed between the two countries. It is only in the Simla Agreement both countries for the first time decided to solve the dispute on any issue bilaterally.

### Conclusion

From the above discussion, it becomes clear that the ideological crisis threatened the very existence of United Pakistan. It was the ideological differences that created the internal crisis in Pakistan, and the East Pakistani peoples refused to accept a subservient role and desired for autonomy. This autonomist demands were met with harsh measures by Pakistan and India got an opportunity to support the autonomist movement. In India, the refugees were coming from Bangladesh. So India

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33 Chopra, p. 224.

thought that it was cheaper to go to war than to absorb the refugees into its already bloated population. Finally these factors propelled India and Pakistan on a collision, and East Bengal was separated.

In this war of 1971, India unquestionably established her military superiority not only over Pakistan but even in South Asia region. With India's superiority in the region, it made sense for Pakistan to develop some nuclear capability. Resentment against India for its part in 1971 war and the dismemberment of Pakistan reinforced long-held animosities and feelings of strategic vulnerability, which fielded the desire for nuclear weapons.

As Pakistan came apart, its claim on Kashmir also eroded in a major way. The inability of the West Pakistani to convince their brethren in the East to remain in the same polity, made it exceedingly difficult for the Pakistani leadership to lay a claim on Kashmir on the basis of its religious composition. Naturally India took advantage of the discrepancy between fact and theory.

For the establishment of durable peace in the sub-continent and for the settlement of problems arising out of Bangladesh war, Simla Agreement played very important role. The greatest merit of the Simla Agreement is that the two countries decided to renounce the use or threat of use of force against each other, to put an end to the era of conflict and confrontation, and commit themselves to standing cooperation and peaceful coexistence.

The Simla Agreement for both Indian and Pakistani leaders served as a guidepost towards peace-building. It helped to give a sense of direction to Pakistan's search for national identity and it has given an opportunity to India to show its sense of responsibility as a power which seeks a durable peace system with its neighbours. The Simla Agreement not only reduced the development of nuclear and arms race in the region but it had improved the trade and economic development also.

## PART II

### POST-SIMLA DEVELOPMENTS

## C H A P T E R    V

### INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS DURING THE JANATA RULE, 1977-79

Perhaps no single year since 1947 has been so momentous in the political annals of India as 1977. It has been momentous for the unexpected but epoch-making political change that occurred with the fall of Mrs. Indira Gandhi's emergency regime through the ballot box. It has also been momentous for promised qualitative change in the style of politics in the country and the performance of the ruling elite. Finally, it has been momentous for bringing a drastic change in the foreign policy of India and developing relations with those countries from which Congress or Indira regime was not having good relations. But before going further, it is necessary to highlight the internal developments and crisis of India just before 1977.

#### 1. Internal Developments in India and Collapse of Indira Regime

In India between 1974 and early 1976, an appalling situation came to prevail, a situation of utter laxity, alarming flabbiness, near complete erosion of the ethos of work and impermissible disregard of the financial disciplines necessary for a country like India. The most irresponsible demands were put forward and encouraged by many political parties and groups - and the slightest resistance led to agitations and demonstration which

often ended in violence, joined in competitive radicalism by various political parties as well as rump groups. One step leading to another, some of the opposition parties decided to abandon the path of democracy, refused to abide by the rules of the democratic system and tried to find a short-cut to power not by winning elections but by capturing the seat of power through direct action.<sup>1</sup>

The first step in this strategy was seen in Gujarat in January 1974 when a student committee was formed to lead the agitation and to demand the legislator to resign from the Assembly of Gujarat. The houses of legislators were raided and they were threatened with dire consequences if they did not resign. Finally Morarji Desai leader of Congress went to hunger strike in support of the demand<sup>2</sup> for dissolution of the Gujarat Assembly. In order to save Morarji Desai's life, the Assembly was dissolved. For the opposition, this opened the flood gates. A similar battle cry was taken up in Bihar and other places of the country.

The prophet of "lost causes" Shri Jaya Prakash Narayan jumped into the fray at this stage and gave a call for total revolution". Open declarations were made by him

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1 V.P. Dutt, "The Emergency in India: Background and Rationale", Asian Survey, Vol. XVI, No.12 (December 1976) ; p. 1126.

2 Ibid.

and many other opposition leaders that the agitation to paralyze legislatures and the governments would be spread to all the states and the centre as well. In a speech to September 9, 1974, while announcing the plans for the Bihar agitation, Jaya Prakash Narayan said:

From this date (October 3-5, 1974) there will be no trains running through Bihar, buses would be off the road, work in government offices including secretariat would be<sup>3</sup> paralysed and shops will remain closed.

In the same speech, J. Narayan again said, "It is now an open confrontation with the centre and not merely the Bihar Government. The State Government has neither status nor stamina".

The movement for "total revolution" was on and was given impetus by increasing the strength of opposition, Jaya Prakash Narayan, himself, outlined the following programme for his movement:

- a) boycott of school and colleges and examinations for one year by the students;
- b) "gherao" of MLA to force them to resign from membership in the Assembly;
- c) Social boycott of M.L.As.;
- d) formation of a parallel Assembly;

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3 The Statesman (New Delhi) September 10, 1974.



- e) paralysing work in government offices,
- f) no tax campaign;
- g) boycott of courts;
- h) establishment of parallel government and parallel courts,
- i) appeal to armed forces, police, and government<sup>4</sup> servants for support of the movement.

Some of the other leaders of opposition parties criticised the Indira Government and did their efforts to continue the agitation against the government. George Fernandes, one of the leaders of Socialist Party and the Railwaymen's Union said in Madras on March 29, 1974: "Realise the strength which you possess. Seven days' strike of the Indian Railways every thermal station in the country would close down. Ten days strike on the Indian Railways - every steel mill in India would close down, and the industry in the country would come to a halt for the next 12 months. If once the steel mill furnace is switched off, it takes nine months to re-fire. A 15 days strike in the Indian Railways -- the country<sup>5</sup> will starve".

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4 Dutt, Op.cit., p. 1127.

5 The Hindu (Madras) March 30, 1974.

Likewise many other leaders also agitated the general people and students by giving fiery speeches against the government and about the high prices of the things. The R.S.S. and other political and pressure groups were also preaching hatred against lower castes and other communities. A veritable campaign of hatred and columny against individuals in the congress party and against the Prime Minister in particular was unleashed. The kind of scurrilous campaign that was carried on against Mrs. Indira Gandhi was unique in contemporary history. The Jan Sangh and R.S.S. were the agencies used for spreading the most fantastic rumours. This climate<sup>6</sup> of violence and columny resulted in the assassination of the Railway Minister L.N. Mishra, and an attempt on the life of the Chief Justice A.N. Roy.

The role of a section of press in this whole situation was most unfortunate. Some newspapers, including some big ones, contributed to the build up of an atmosphere of tension, agitation and anarchy. They had no comment to make when the opposition used blatantly undemocratic means, adopted tactics of gherao and intimidation, staged dharnas in Parliament and State Assemblies, and used the most vituperative language in their political compaigns. They

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6 Dutt, Op.cit., p. 1133.

adopted a see no evil, speak no evil, hear no evil" policy where the opposition was concerned, but they were ready to pounce upon the Congress Party and the Government for any major or minor, real or fancied, lapse. They gave respectability to rumours and some of them became openly partisan.

This was the background of uncertainty, chaos and lawlessness that compelled the government to take any drastic step in order to imply rules and regulations. The immediate crisis was resolved when on June 25, 1975 the President on the advice of Mrs. Indira Gandhi declared a state of emergency. Mrs Gandhi's saying was that the imposition of emergency was the required needs in order to avert conditions of chaos and lawlessness, Mrs Gandhi and her supporters' opinion was that the emergency was declared according to the provisions of the constitution. All the constitutional procedures were abided by at the time of declaration. Not a single step has been taken in violation of the provisions of the constitution. While the imposition of emergency was vehemently criticised by

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7 David Taylor, "India-The start of a new era". Asian Affairs, Vol. XI, Part III, October 1980, p. 247.

most of the opposition leaders. It was said that through emergency, Mrs. Indira Gandhi wanted to remain in power. In this connection, many leaders of opposition were also arrested.

During the emergency, Mrs. India Gandhi received much popularity. Some people supported her and her party due to sympathetic attitude towards Congress, and some supported due to fear and some due to their personal gain. But majority of people were against the very norms of emergency by heart. This could not be understood by Mrs. Indira Gandhi and her advisers. All the reports that she received predicated a massive victory for her. Finally, she could never believe that the opposition parties, in view of the short time at their disposal, would form a single party, cooperate effectively, and evoke a martyr's response from the people. Having the wrong impressions about her party's image in the eyes of the people, Indira Gandhi suddenly announced that election would be held in March 1977.<sup>8</sup>

In the election campaign, Mrs. Gandhi's position was deteriorated day by day and the image of opposition party "Janta Party" was improved. Many Congress leaders

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8 Iqbal Narain, "India 1977: From Promise to Dis-enchantment", Asian Survey, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, February 1978, p. 106.

also left Congress party and joined Janta Party. Majority of the people were irritated with the unwarranted arrests, firings, barbaric, inhuman, and unimaginative administration of the family planning programme. At the time of election, masses realised what they were missing during emergency. The election struck the final blow to the dominant Congress system, which was already disintegrating under the weight of its internal contradictions. The three major bases of Congress's support - the rural electorate, the Muslims and the Harijans - had become alienated from it in good measure in the wake of emergency excesses in general and the family planning programme in particular. Jaggiwan Ram's exit from the Congress had its own share in striking a serious wedge in the Harijan support base of the organization. With this, the Congress lost her image in the eyes of the people and Indira regime was collapsed.

## 2. Coming to Power of the Janata Party

The majority of the people were irritated with the emergency and cast their vote in favour of Janata Party in the general election of the Lok Sabha of March 1977. The election resulted in the resounding defeat of Indira Gandhi's party Congress (I). The Janata Party won a

commanding 328<sup>9</sup> of the 542 parliamentary seats and Janata Party came in power. The Janata Government with Moraji Desai as Prime Minister was sworn in on March 24, 1977.

### 3. Reorientation of Indian Foreign Policy

Politically, the year 1977 is something of a landmark in the history of Independent India not only *from the* domestic point of view in India but also *from* the external point of view. With the formation of the Janata Government in 1977, it was expected that a drastic change in India's foreign policy would take place. It was hoped that there would be a certain amount of cooling off of relations with Soviet Union and more intimate relations with U.S.A. but this was not seen. The Janata Government tried to develop very intimate relations with both the super powers, and bring about greater balance and sobriety.

Non-alignment is the cornerstone of India's Foreign Policy and the policy has been identified as the policy of non-alignment. The Janata Government too adopted this traditional policy but added the prefix of "genuine" or "proper" before non-alignment. Its election manifesto

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9 George Timothy, Security in Southern Asia 2: India and the Great Powers ( England: Gower, 1984), p.100.

declared that "it is committed to genuine non-alignment free from attachment to any power bloc". On March 24, 1977, the day Morarji Desai was sworn in as Prime Minister, he emphatically declared at a press conference in New Delhi that "The foreign policy of India will be a 'proper' non-alignment policy. It will be fully non-aligned, no<sup>10</sup> suspicion of any alignment with any body. Initiating a debate in the Lok Sabha on the demands for grants for the Ministry of External Affairs on June 29, 1977, Atal Bihari Vajpayee presented a full exposition of the Janata Government's non-alignment policy and its view of "proper" or "genuine" non-alignment. He said, "Non-alignment is not the policy of an individual or a party. This is based on national consensus. The policy of non-alignment is in fact a logical and essential extension of the national<sup>11</sup> independence in the field of international affairs.

Like all other political parties, The Janata Party also made foreign policy pronouncement in its election manifesto, which showed the broad framework of the party's foreign policy. Speaking at a seminar on continuity and

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10 Indian and Foreign Review, Vol. 14, No. 12, April 1, 1977, p. 6.

11 Lok Sabha Debates (India), Vol. 3, No. 16, June 29, 1977, Col. 193.

change in India's Foreign Policy" at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, on May 12, 1978, Foreign Minister A.E. Vajpayee referred to goals and objectives of the Janata Government.

"The election manifesto of the Janata Party had defined the goals of its foreign policy clearly and precisely. Even though, as you are well aware, the historic elections of March 1977, were fought entirely on domestic issues, the directions given in the manifesto became my government's firm guide lines in the conduct of its foreign policy".<sup>12</sup>

The Janata Party's election manifesto and the various statements and speeches of Janata leaders on different occasions explained the main objectives and goals of the Janata Government.

The Janata manifesto had made a special reference to the South Asia region. Vajpayee described his South Asian policy as a policy of "turning some swords into ploughshares" in his first foreign policy speech in the Lok Sabha on June 29, 1977: "We have recognised that our

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12 Atal Behari Vajpayee "India's Foreign Policy Today", in Prasad, Bimal (ed.), India's Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1979), p. 379.



first priority must be to promote a relationship of cooperation and trust with our immediate neighbours. We shall be vigilant about our territorial integrity but pose no threat to their national personalities. We believe it is in our separate and common interest to forge, on the basis of geography, the sinews of economic cooperation in the subcontinent. If we succeed, we could ease the burdens for all our peoples so that some of the swords can be turned into ploughshares and the entire region can better tackle the common enemy of poverty and inherited degradation.<sup>13</sup>

The Janata Government tried to improve relations with China on the basis of Panchsheel. Mr Vajpayee said in Parliament, "Based on the old five principles, we must have as our goal the forging of beneficial bilateral relations as in appropriate between two large Asian countries like India and China."<sup>14</sup> With this process two things was achieved. First, uneasy relations with China in the past had distorted the priorities of the country by imposing a heavy defence burden. Secondly,

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13 Foreign Affairs Record, June 1977, pp. 91-92.

14 Husan Lal Behl and Dilbagh Singh, "India's Foreign Policy under Janata Rule" Social Sciences Research Journal, Vol. VI, No. 192 March-July 1981, p. 111.

it was desirable to cultivate friendly relations with China so that Pakistan may not revert to its old stance. On the other hand China was also eager to improve relations with India because they were so much engrossed in their domestic problems that they wanted peace on borders with India.

Apart from giving "first priority" to bilateral relations with immediate neighbours, the Janata Government declared its intension to pursue a policy of close cooperation with the developing countries of Asia, Africa<sup>15</sup> and Latin America. India also extended its support to the anti-racial policies and liberation movements in Africa.

Thus Janata Government emphasised "beneficial bilateralism" as the operational guideline of Indian Foreign Policy, which means mutually beneficial bilateral relations with all countries for close cooperation in economic, technological and commercial fields. It also declared in its manifesto that it will oppose all forms of colonialism and racialism. Further the Janata Government made a special reference to the move for the establishment of a new International Economic Order. Its election

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15 Ibid.

manifesto laid down that "it ..... will strive for the peaceful settlement of all international disputes and will work with other third world nations to establish a new and just international economic order.<sup>16</sup>

Regarding Nuclear policy, the Janata Party had no perspective. Mr. Morarji Desai promised that "if it was not necessary to have nuclear explosions for peaceful purpose, then it should never be done.<sup>17</sup> An additional feature of the Janata's Foreign Policy was that it upheld "liberty" and "Human Rights" and was willing to denounce their violation whenever and wherever this might occur.<sup>18</sup>

In short, Janata Party followed a foreign policy which was highly pragmatic and aimed at promotion of national interest. However, there was not much deviation from the basic principles on which the Indian foreign policy had been based so far. There was no much changes. The shifts in India's foreign policy during Janata rule were neither new nor great except some minor changes. If there had been a change, it was a fresh thrust to the promotion of the cause of peace and disarmament, to

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16 Ibid.

17 Husan Lal Behl and Dilbagh Singh, Op.cit., p. 112.

18 Ibid.

strength stability and cooperative spirit to fortify independence and freedom from exploitation.

#### 4. New Chapter in Indo-Pakistan Relations

With the formation of the Janata Government in India, a significant shift in India's foreign policy came in scene towards not only with Pakistan but about other countries also. But here I have to discuss India's and Pakistan's attitude towards each other during Janata period particularly. The Janata Government in India projected its policy towards India's immediate neighbours as a major show-piece of success in the realm of foreign policy. This policy was described as<sup>19</sup> "beneficial bilateralism. The Janata Government repeatedly emphasized "beneficial bilateralism" as the operational guideline of India's foreign policy which called for the development of mutual beneficial bilateral relations with all countries of the world in general and with India's neighbouring countries in particular on the basis of "equality, mutual respect and appreciation of each other's sensitivities and aspirations". The main aim of this "neighbourhood diplomacy" was to promote and

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19 S.D. Muni, "India's Beneficial Bilateralism in South Asia", India Quarterly, Vol. XXXV, No. 4, October-December 1979, p. 417.

enrich India's relations with the neighbours as a means not only to solving inherited problems but also to creating a climate of confidence and mutual goodwill in the region so that more harmonious and beneficial relations in economic, political and cultural fields might be promoted in the true spirit of peaceful coexistence.

The Janata Government, while setting out to define its policy towards Pakistan and its neighbours, first took a critical scrutiny of its predecessor's policy on the subject. In this scrutiny, it was found that the previous government's (Mrs. Gandhi's Government) policy was criticised by Janata Government on the ground that it suffered from a duality of using "good neighbourliness" as a cliché on the one hand and adoption of a  
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"superior and imperious tone" on the other. There was also certain lack of credibility on account of the problem of dealing with nationalism and sensitivities  
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nearer home. The Janata Government declared to end this duality and restore credibility by building "bridges of trust and cooperation with Pakistan and other neighbours

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20 A.B. Vajpayee, "India's Foreign Policy Today" International Studies, Vol. 17, Nos. 3-4, July-December 1978, p. 381.

21 A.B. Vajpayee, "India's Foreign Policy in a changing World", Indian & Foreign Review, Vol. 15, No. 21, August 15, 1978, p. 13.

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with diligence and trust.

The main goal of this policy of Janata Government was to serve India's national as well Pakistan's interest and of other south Asian countries, because the peace and stability in this region is mainly depend on the good and cooperative relations of India and Pakistan.

The execution of the policy of "beneficial bilateralism and good neighbourliness" had really brought a new chapter in India-Pakistan relations. This policy had especially four features:

- a) Personal rapport,
- b) resolving longstanding bilateral issues through mutual negotiations,
- c) Expansion of bilateral cooperation
- d) non-interference in internal affairs.

a) Personal Rapport: First of all, the Janata Government leaders sought to establish personal rapport at the highest level with their counterpart in each other countries. This was done through the exchange of visits of each other country. An important feature of these exchange of

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22 A.B. Vajpayee, "India and the changing International Order", Indian and Foreign Review, Vol. 15, No. 9, February 15, 1978, p. 12.

visits was that the Indian side adopted a style of presentation that was noticeably modest and amicable. This was particularly so in case of Foreign Minister A.B. Vajpayee. During his visit, he not only dispelled apprehensions in the Pakistani minds arising out of his Jan Sangh/R.S.S. background but also charmed his Pakistani audience by love for, and command of Urdu poetry.<sup>23</sup> Mr. A.B. Vajpayee through his action and style won the confidence of the Pakistani people.

b) Resolving Longstanding Bilateral Issues: The Janata Government realised from the very beginning that complete normalisation of relations between India and Pakistan was possible only if all outstanding issues between the two countries were resolved to the mutual satisfaction by making concession to each other. Besides, India's serious border disputes with Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir, the construction and design of the Salal Hydro-electric Project over the Chenab in the upper reaches of Jammu and Kashmir was an important issue which became new irritant in mutual relationships of India and Pakistan. Significantly, the Janata Government was successful in reaching an agreement with Pakistan amicably through bilateral negotiation on April 4, 1978. The Salal Project is the first major scheme which has come up on the western

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23 Dawn (Karachi), February 10, 1970.

rivers. Since the signing of the Indus Water Treaty, it is an important agreement relating to the use of common waters. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Agha Shahi said that this agreement was a new step towards the road of Indo-Pakistani friendship and normalisation of relations. While supporting the agreement, Indian Foreign Minister Vajpayee said in the Lok Sabha: "The agreement once again demonstrates that the Janata Government respects inherited obligations and seeks to build with greater vigour cooperative relations with our immediate neighbours"<sup>24</sup>. Zia-ul-Haq also congratulated Vajpayee for talks of the agreement and expressed the hope that relations between the two countries would continue to develop in a spirit of mutual accommodation<sup>25</sup> and to the benefit of both the countries. Thus, the agreement was generally welcomed in both India and Pakistan, because it had brought to an end a potentially explosive dispute which had dragged on for eight years and which could have embittered relations between the two countries.

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24 Surendra Chopra, Post-Simla Indo-Pak Relations, (New Delhi: Deep & Deep, 1983), p. 228.

25 The Tribune (Chandigarh) June 10, 1980.



c) Expansion of Bilateral Cooperation: Janata Government was not only eager to resolve all outstanding issues with its neighbours bilaterally but also to expand the areas of mutual cooperation in various fields in the spirit of economic accommodation on India's part. This policy of closer interaction and cooperation with immediate neighbour was vigorously pursued from the very beginning of the Janata period. Vajpayee, the Janata Foreign Minister, emphasised the "logic of economic cooperation in a spirit which is of advantage to both countries. Considering the atmosphere more congenial after the exit of Mrs Indra Gandhi, General Zia asked India to have a more liberal posture and give Pakistan a more favourable balance of trade. An important development which took place during the Janata regime was that the trade was resumed on government to government basis<sup>26</sup> as envisaged by the 1974 protocol. It resulted in a slump in India's exports and created an unfavourable balance. In spite of unfavourable balance of trade, the Indian Government was keen to continue with much desired closer link with Pakistan.

A telecommunication Agreement was signed between India and Pakistan on October 1, 1977, at Islamabad. The

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26 Chopra, Op.cit., p. 217.

agreement provided for the continuence of the existing telecommunication services put into operation under the Indo-Pakistan Telecommunication Agreement of September, 1974 and for their improvement by the establishment of a direct satellite link between the two countries.<sup>27</sup>

During Mr. Vajpayee's goodwill visit to Pakistan in February 1978, both sides held discussions on further exchanges in the areas of agriculture, culture and sports. Being "big brother", India agreed to exchange farm technology, and offered Indian assistance to Pakistan in the field of peaceful nuclear research.<sup>28</sup> Here the Indian Government under Janata rule tried to bring accommodating adjustment at all the meetings of India and Pakistan. Even Zia-ul-Haq went to the extent of saying that "our relations will improve as they (accommodating attitudes)<sup>29</sup> should be between two friends".

d) Non-interference in Internal Affairs: The Janata Government also followed the policy of neutrality and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries particularly of neighbouring countries. The spirit

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27 Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. 23, No. 11, 1977, p. 189.

28 The Times of India (New Delhi), August 15, 1977.

29 The Statesman, February 7, 1978.

and enthusiasm of Janata Government's policy of neutrality and non-interference can be guessed from the views of A.B. Vajpayee when he pointed out in his address at a seminar in New Delhi in May 1977 and he said:

"The Janata Government, from the first day of its existence, set out deliberately to clear the Cobwebs of suspicion, and banish the fear of interference. We have not only professed strict non-interference in the internal affairs of its neighbours, but also practised it, often in the face of great temptation to do the contrary. In seeking cooperation from and offering it to our neighbours, we have never imposed ourselves upon them. We have generally tried to explain to them the mutuality of advantage in bilateralism and allowed the irresistible logic of geography to assert itself... We have conducted and are conducting an open policy of friendship, mutually advantageous cooperation and equal and "beneficial  
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bilateralism" with our neighbours".

The Janata Government followed the policy of neutrality and non-interference not only verbally but various leaders of Janata Government had also shown it

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30 Vajpayee, "India's Foreign Policy Today" in *Bimal Prasad* (ed.), *India's Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1979), pp. 3-4.

practically at many occasion. The occasion came on July 5, 1977 when Z.A. Bhutto was displaced from office in a military coup. The Janata Government regarded the overthrow of the Bhutto regime as an "internal affair"<sup>31</sup> of that country and did not pass any comment. India's foreign Minister Vajpayee reiterated this position during his official visit in February 1978 and said that India respected the right of each country to determine its political system. When the death sentence was confirmed on Z.A. Bhutto and when he was hanged in March 1979, there was no change in Indian Government's position. In fact when Prime Minister Morarji Desai was asked especially on this issue during his Bangladesh visit, he<sup>32</sup> refused to make any comment. Only President of India, Mr. Reddy made a statement that on "humanitarian grounds"<sup>33</sup> President Zia-ul-Haq should spare Bhutto's life.

In view of the sharp political cleavages that existed within Pakistan, the position of neutrality and non-interference as observed by India during the Janata regime appear to be fairly effective. Pakistan was facing severe political challenges internally and needed international support and recognition in her drives for

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32 Bangladesh Times (Dacca) April 18, 1979.

33 The Times of India, February 12, 1979.

survival and systemance. Here, India's position of neutrality and non-interference meant that India showed the gesture of accommodation towards Pakistan. Thus, the thrust of the Janata Government's position in respect of neutrality and non-interference constituted a significant departure in an ideological sense and in respect of previous government of India.

#### 5. Evaluation of Janata's Policy Towards Pakistan

The Janata's policy aimed at serving concrete national interests and advance the process of cooperation not only between Pakistan and India but in the sub-continent as well. The gains of the Janata policy was that India's approach (in Janata regime) invoked reciprocity in some matters from its neighbours which helped a lot in bringing closeness in following ways:

(i) Pakistan responded to India's suggestions for opening bilateral links and channels for the flow of people, communication and information between the two countries. By the middle of 1979, on an average 9000 Pakistani and 14,000 Indian visas were being granted for visits between the two countries.

(ii) Owing to the Janata Government's new approach, the political atmosphere between India and Pakistan was also relaxed. For example Mr. A.B. Vajpayee in his visit to

Islamabad of February 1978, held talks with Zia-ul Haq and Agha Shahi in peaceful atmosphere. Vajpayee also rejected the notion of hegemony over the region by any one country.<sup>34</sup> Whatever value one may assign to this statement, it helped in creating a feeling of understanding between India and Pakistan.

(iii) The rhetoric of harmony and mutual confidence by the teachers of both India and Pakistan cultivated a pleasant atmosphere between India and Pakistan at least for time being. Soon after taking the oath of office on March 24, 1977, Prime Minister Morarji Desai stated in a press conference that India wanted friendly relations with all countries. If the treaty of peace and friendship with the Soviet Union stood in the way of friendship with the others, then it would have to go.<sup>35</sup>

On the other occasion when Agha Shahi visited India in April 1978, Desai told the Pakistani Journalists that he was prepared to solve all problems with Pakistan through negotiations and that there was more understanding between Pakistan and India today than in the past thirty years.<sup>36</sup> Zia-ul Haq said that Desai was

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34 Keessing's Contemporary Archives, June 9, 1979, p. 29019.

35 Peking Review, March 25, 1978.

36 India Today, (New Delhi), February 16-19, 1980, p.84.

sincer and enthusiastic towards improvement of relations with Pakistan.

6. The Development of the Afghan Crisis and the Indian Approach

Though war has not taken place between India and Pakistan since 1971, a number of events have taken place that have affected the relations of these two countries. One of the most important events is the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan produced a crisis not simply for the Afghan people but for the regions of South and South-West Asia as well. It confronted the main regional actors - Pakistan, Iran and India with a new political - strategic situation to which they reacted in distinctive ways. However, Soviet invasion has affected the whole world particularly the Afghanistan's neighbours but here I have to study the effects of invasion in South Asia especially on India-Pakistan relations. For the countries of Pakistan and India, the Soviet invasion seriously changed the regional balance of power, and put them almost overnight in the uneviable position of having to respond to this new development and cope with its consequences in their own particular ways. Their responses, however, came to be formulated not solely on the basis of the needs and aspirations of the Afghan people. Naturally, they also took

into account their own interests. The responses that they adopted essentially mirrored these particular interest and substantially differed from each other. Pakistan chose to pursue active opposition to the Soviet invasion, and India made no public condemnation of the invasion.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 27, 1979,<sup>37</sup> occurred during the final days of Charan Singh's caretaker Government. The Soviet troops entered Afghanistan, overthrew the government of Hafizullah Amin and installed a new regime under the leadership of Babrak Karmal.

A number of factors arises from the Soviet invasion which shaped Pakistan's response. This Pakistan's response and the Soviet relations with India shaped the Indian approach to the Afghan crisis.

Pakistan showed a number of reasons to become very fearful of the implications of the Soviet invasion for its national integrity and security as well as regional interest. Pakistan, therefore, found herself

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37 George Timothy, ed. , Security in Southern Asia 2: India and the Great Powers (England: Gower Publishing Company Ltd., 1984), pp. 110-111.



with little choice but to adopt a stance of active opposition to the invasion by providing greater logistic support for the Mujahideen and acting as the main conduit for supply to them of outside arms which largely became available only when the Soviet invasion generated international sympathy for Mujahideen.

The whole development of Afghan crisis provided the international assistance which began to pour into Pakistan for the Afghan refugees and Mujahideen, this type of assistance helped Pakistan, and Zia achieved three important things:

- a) First, he was able on the one hand to strengthen and sustain his military base of support, and on the other hand to generate an unprecedented level of economic activity and growth in support of greater domestic stability.
- b) Second, he managed to assume a central position in regional power politics and to earn for his regime a larger degree of international respectability than would normally be the case with a regime of that type.
- c) Finally, he succeeded in drawing on the first two to demoralise his domestic opponents and neutralise his external critics. As a result, Pakistan secured what one might call conflict based social and economic stability.

This could in no way please India. The renewal of U.S.-Pakistan ties and the growth of China-Pakistan friendship was contrary to the regional and global interest of India.

India's response towards the invasion of Afghanistan by U.S.S.R. reflected her own national peculiarities because India did not want to make Soviet Union unhappy and wanted to make the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 1971, alive that is why India could not publically condemn the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet Union. India's representative at the U.N., Brajesh Mishra, justified the Russian invasion of Afghanistan referring to "the attempts of the outside powers to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan by training, arming and encouraging subversive elements." <sup>38</sup> He further at the Emergency session of U.N. General Assembly in a carefully worded declaration, stated that "the Soviet Government has assured our Government that its troops went to Afghanistan at the request of the Afghan Government, a request that was first made by President Amin on December 26, 1979 and repeated by his successor on December 28, 1979, and we have been further assured that

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38 New York Times (Weekly Review), January 13, 1980.

the Soviet troops will be withdrawn when requested to do so by the Afghan Government. We have no reason to doubt such assurances, particularly from a friendly country<sup>39</sup> like the Soviet Union. Later, Indira Gandhi told a reporter that she was indeed against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan but that she regarded the U.S. as<sup>40</sup> responsible for destabilising the region. India even criticised the General Assembly's discussing the Soviet invasion and did not take part in supporting the resolution against Soviet Union in which Assembly strongly deplored the Russian intervention in Afghanistan and called for "the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of<sup>41</sup> foreign troops.

The position which India adopted during the General Assembly Session provoked considerable amazement particularly to Pakistan and his allies. Subsequently Indian officials sought to downplay it and did not reiterate it publically in nearly as stark terms. For example, the Indian Foreign Minister P.V. Narsimha Rao speaking in Parliament on January 23, 1980 said that India

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39 UN General Assembly Sixth Emergency Special Session, Provisional Verbatism Record of the Third Meeting, Document (A/ES-6/P.V. 3, General Assembly, U.N., January 11, 1980).

40 Mohammad Ahsen Chaudhri, Pakistan and World Society (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 1987), p. 117.

41 Ibid.

hoped that ".... the people of Afghanistan will be able to resolve their internal problems without outside interference....." We are against the presence of foreign troops and bases in any country. We have expressed our hope that the Soviet forces will withdraw from Afghanistan. He also expressed deep concern about the induction of arms in the region (a reference to talk at the time of possible American military aid to Pakistan) and the introduction of Great power confrontation as a threat to 'the peace and stability of the region including the security of India.<sup>42</sup> The Indian reaction to the bloody coup of April 1978 in which under the aegis of pro-Moscow the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) toppled the republican government of Mohammed Daud, was also quite relaxed. The prevailing belief in India was that the Soviet Union had<sup>43</sup> not initiated the April 1978 coup but rather had exploited the opportunities presented by it.

From the above arguments of Indian officials and leaders, it becomes clear that India's approach to Afghan crisis is depend on two points. One is on India's security in the region. In this way, India opposed more to the

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42 Foreign Affairs Record, January 1980, p. 19.

43 Timothy, Op.cit., p. 111.

supply of arms to the Pakistan from other countries particularly from U.S. and China than that of the Soviet invasion. Second, India remain wanted to maintain her relations with Soviet Union because Soviet Union had come to India's rescue in her crucial time.

### Conclusion

The Janata Party followed a foreign policy which was highly pragmatic and aimed at promotion of national interests. However, there was not much deviation from the basic principles on which the Indian foreign policy had been based so far. If there had been any deviation then it was a fresh thrust to strengthen peace, stability and cooperative spirit to fortify independence and freedom from exploitation.

During the Janata period the bilateral relations were improved with neighbours particularly with Pakistan. The Janata policy created a climate of confidence and mutual goodwill between India and Pakistan. Through the exchange of visits between India and Pakistan, the leaders of both the countries dispelled the apprehensions of fundamentalism of some of the Muslim and Hindu organizations from the mind of the people of both the countries. With this, many outstanding disputes between India and Pakistan were resolved and the areas of mutual cooperation in various fields were expanded.

Regarding the Afghan crisis India followed two views. First, she felt a fear for her security because of massive arms supply to Pakistan by U.S. and China. Secondly, India could not publically condemned the invasion of Afghanistan by Soviet Union because India wanted to keep alive her relations with Soviet Union.

## C H A P T E R VI

### MAJOR PROBLEMS IN INDO-PAKISTAN RELATIONS, 1980-92

It is well known fact that India and Pakistan since their very inception had conflictual and controversial policies. Many bilateral issues and some internal factors came as a hurdle between India and Pakistan, and the relations between the two countries deteriorated. Pakistan had the belief that it was politically and economically weaker than India. This inherent weakness and limitation of her position vis-a-vis India led her to counter this bid by seeking a "patrons" who would support her in her diplomatic disputes with India and guarantee her security against any threat from the quarter. Pakistan in this sense was successful in making friendship to those major powers who can come to her rescue in her crucial time. Pakistan, through the help of west and some Muslim countries, developed both her arms and nuclear field, and her economic condition also, which brought a threat to India's security.

#### 1. Indian Objections to Pakistan's Arms Purchases

Pakistan had been the traditional arms purchaser from United States since partition, and most of the arms in Pakistan are supplied by U.S. In spite of U.S. link, Pakistan had also developed her relations with China ,

France and some other countries for economic and defence support from time to time.

(a) Pakistan's Purchase of Arms from the U.S.: The United States tended to neglect Pakistan after 1971 despite General Yahya Khan's role in getting the U.S.A. and China close to each other. Z.A. Bhutto was not wholly trusted by U.S. policy makers. However, Pakistan's new military ruler General Zia-ul-Haq has proved to be an extremely shrewd ruler. It was Zia-ul-Haq who, due to invasion of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, made Pakistan very important to the U.S. overnight. U.S. was also in search of such ally as Pakistan was. Zia astutely expected American over-action to the Soviet entry into Afghanistan not only to prop up his own regime but also to refurbish the Pakistan image. Pakistan became in U.S. perception "a front line state" and assumed a strategic importance which transcended all other considerations. Zia-ul-Haq, in the bargain with U.S., was able to prevail upon the U.S. to provide massive economic and military aid. Zia who had earlier rejected the U.S. aid worth \$ 400 million describing it as "peanuts", established a new security relationship with U.S. by accepting \$ 3.2 billion<sup>1</sup> economic and

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1 Satish Kumar, ed., Yearbook on India's Foreign Policy 1987/88 (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1988), p. 86.



military aid package in 1981. The U.S. viewed its connections with Pakistan, its anti-Soviet "strategic consensus" plan and Pakistan needed U.S. support for its security in view of the changed geographical situation in the region. Pakistan required massive arms supply for promoting U.S. interests in the region and in this context managed arms for itself with some top and new weapons. Pakistan had nevertheless accepted the status of a "frontline state" and embarked upon an ambitious expansion and modernisation programme for its armed forces with the friendly countries. In June 1981, Reagan administration concluded a major agreement for the transfers of sophisticated American military equipment<sup>2</sup> and technology to Pakistan.

Thus the U.S. arms aid to Pakistan in the wake of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan caused understandable adverse reaction to India. It not only hindered the India's improving relations with Pakistan but also increased Indian military dependence on the Soviet Union. These developments sparked off another bout of race for more and more arms in South Asia especially between India and Pakistan. With the Soviet intervention, the region of South Asia was directly involved by two super powers.

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<sup>2</sup> New York Times, June 16, 1981.

The most serious impact was the emergence of "New Cold War" which had been brought to the region. The Indian experts thought that the arms and weapons supplied by U.S.A. to Pakistan would be of little use against Soviet Union. They were more likely to be used against India. This has been the Indian experience during 1965 and 1971 war. This time United States has shown no desire to assure India that the weapons supplied by it to Pakistan would not be used against India.

In this significant change in Asia, the new relationship between Pakistan and United States shows that Pakistan has come to occupy an important place in U.S. strategic plans in the region. With the establishment of the U.S. Central Command in Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, the security relationship between U.S.A. and Pakistan was currently at an all time high. It is presumed that in the U.S. strategy, Pakistan had major even vital role to play in the region. This development of U.S. in Indian Ocean impinges on India's security environment because in the event of conflict between India and Pakistan, the Central Command could be of great assistance to Pakistan. It was not difficult to understand

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3 V.D. Chopra, ed., Pakistan and Asian Peace (New Delhi: Patriot Publishers, 1985), p. 117.

India's concern about these developments in its neighbourhood. Since Pakistan was the centre of this strategic network, India-Pakistan relations had been adversely affected.

The Pakistan's acquiring Airborne Warning and command System (AWACS) combined with most sophisticated F-16 with nuclear capability and Harpoon missiles<sup>4</sup> from the United States further upset the military balance in the region. The justification for the supply of this sophisticated system to Pakistan was the alleged frequent violations of that country's border by Soviet and Afghan aircraft. While the reality was that the AWACS was ineffective in the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan. The experts opined that AWACS would, on the other hand, be of tremendous value in monitoring Indian air-space as well as a significant portion of the Soviet airspace in the Tashkent region. The Indian experts believed that the introduction of AWACS into Pakistan would pose great challenges to India's air defence in future and at present a completely new paradigm of security concern to the defence planners.

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4 J.K. Baral, "Indo-Pak Diplomacy since 1981: Motivations, Strategies and Prospects", Foreign Affairs Reports, Vol. XXXV, Nos. 4-5, April-May 1986, p. 33.

When in the beginning of 1987 United States Congress was going to discuss the second tranche of arms<sup>5</sup> supplies to Pakistan including the AWACS, Pakistan wanted to give the U.S. Congressmen an impression of a beleaguered nation facing both the Soviet threat, and the massive Indian armed forces. This would certainly facilitated the approval by the Congress of the United States a massive economic and arms aid amounting to 4.2 billion dollars. India was keen to de-escalate tension rapidly and to demonstrate the routine nature of the exercises<sup>6</sup> which had no hostile intent behind them. India also wanted to ensure that the Members of Senate and House of Representative should not be misled by the Pakistan's false propaganda.

(b) China's Arms Supply to Pakistan: Another dispute between India and Pakistan was the close link that has been established between Pakistan and China in the production of armaments. It has changed from one of simple arms sales to Pakistan albeit under "friendship rates" to one of cooperation in its production. The improving relations of Pakistan and China were directed

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5 The Times of India, January 24, 1987.

6 The Hindu, February 27, 1987.

against India. With the sales of arms by China to Pakistan, Pakistan derives two distinct advantages.

1. First, it created the prospect of having to fight a battle on two fronts for India that can present India with a formidable challenge.
2. Second, Pakistan brought China's role as countervailing power in South Asia especially against India.

With the deteriorating relations between India and China climaxing in 1962, Pakistan hoped to achieve its objectives that was every kind of help from China against India. China on the other hand was willing to give all kinds of help to Pakistan. In the Indo-Pak war of 1965, China naturally sided with Pakistan secretly. In July 1966, the first military agreement between China and Pakistan valued at \$ 120 million<sup>7</sup> was signed, signalling the commencement of a strategic military relationship. Between 1966 and 1980, arms transfers from China to Pakistan amounted to more than \$ 630 million.<sup>8</sup> These supply of arms to Pakistan not only strengthened Pakistan but it created an insecurity for India as well as for South Asia region. For improving relations with Pakistan,

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7 Alka Acharya, "China's Arms Sale: The Fulcrum of its South Asia Policy", Strategic Analysis, Vol. XV, No.2, May 1992, p. 157.

8 Ibid.

China lent her aegis to the bilateral efforts between India and Pakistan. Better relations of India and Pakistan were precluded to hostilities and the China's help gave Pakistan time to recover from the war.

The 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion by India gave fresh impetus to China's efforts in South Asia and to Pakistan an opportunity to raise an anti-Indian propaganda for her own security. On this issue, China assured Pakistan of full and resolute support in its just struggle in defence of its national independence and sovereignty against foreign aggression and interference, including that against nuclear threat and nuclear blackmail.<sup>9</sup>

In the meanwhile the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan provided Pakistan an opportunity to build up her defence. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan upgraded Pakistan's value as a strategic frontline state and thereby received a substantial quantity of sophisticated weaponry from U.S. and China, Pakistan meanwhile proved an invaluable ally by playing the go-between in the Sino-

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9 Yaacov I. Vertzberger, "China's Diplomacy and Strategy Towards South Asia: From benign Neglect to Prominence" Strategic Digest, July 1987, p. 1304.

American rapprochement, for which it was duly rewarded by both. At this juncture India with an alliance of U.S.S.R. had to face U.S. + China and Pakistan in this region.

In late 1985, a Chinese warships first ever visit to Pakistan and some other country of the region caused some concern to India. Reportedly, Chinese planners were closely watching the accelerating pace of India's naval expansion. The expedition apparently was intended as a demonstration of the fact that Beijing did not consider the Indian ocean as belonging to India because a significant proportion of China's sea borne trade flows through the Indian ocean. China's naval cooperation with Pakistan also seems to be on the rise. Pakistan had expressed an interest in a Chinese Han Class nuclear attack submarine after India had leased the Soviet Charlie class submarine in 1989. China also made funds for Pakistan's naval modernisation programme.<sup>10</sup>

The sudden manufacture of a variety of missiles in Pakistan has an obvious China connection. Pakistan acquired on lease during 1989 of eight Garcia and Brook-class frigates, along with MR-SM 1 anti-aircraft missiles

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10 Alka Acharya, op.cit., p. 160.

and Honeywell Mk 46 Mod 5 light weight anti-submarine torpedoes: all costing a mere U.S. \$ 68 million from China. These were in addition to 10 secondhand frigates including two leander class from the U.K.<sup>11</sup> These acquisition has virtually doubled Pakistan's naval capability in a period of one year. Simultaneously Pakistan established <sup>herself</sup> as an arms exporter even though in a low technology spectrum. With support from China and to some extent from U.S.A. along with financial help from other Arab countries, Pakistan can emerge as a major arms producer and can emerge as a power in the region which may pose a danger to India. During the early 1990s the Pakistan Air Force's acquiring 72 F-16s and nearly 150 F-7 Ps (Chinese Mig 21) and updating tank force into her army further created a tension between India and Pakistan. The Pakistan's purchasing of arms endangered peace and security in South Asia especially for India. Due to the danger of security and integrity India also tried to develop her arms fields. Thus, India and Pakistan both witnessed an alarming rise in arms race and military expenditure. On the other hand China continued to enhance its arms sales to Pakistan. It is evident in the table

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11 Jane's Defence Weekly, June 17, 1989, p. 1223.



given below:

Table

Supply of Major Weapons from China to Pakistan ( 1980-90)

Recipient	No. Ordered	Weapon Designation	Weapon Description	Year of order/ Licence	Year(s) of Deliveries	No. Deliv. Prod-uced	Comments
Pakistan	75	F-7	Fighter	1983	1986-90	12	
	75	F-7	Fighter	1989	-	-	
	98	Q-5 Fantan A	Fighter	-	1986-88	-	
	25	Karakoram 8	Jet Trainer	1987	-	50	
	-	7.59	MBT	1975	1978-90	50	
	-	Hong Kong	Portable SAM	1988	1988-90	50	Arming M-113 APCs
	-	T-69	MBT	1989	1990	20	Deal worth \$1.2b, Pak designation
		Red-Arrow 8 <sup>L</sup>	Anti-tank missile	1989	-	-	P-90
		Itan Jiao 7P	Fighter Planes	-	1991	*	

Source: SIPRI Yearbook 1991.

<sup>L</sup> : Licenced Production.

\* : Source Reported in China Aeronautics and Astronautics in News.

China also categorically warned the west that she would continue to maximise profits from arms sales as long as other countries are doing this business.<sup>12</sup> The indiscriminate sale of arms and missiles by China to Pakistan has not disrupted only India-Pakistan relations but has also made the situation much harder in the region to attain peace.

(c) Indian Alarm at Pakistan's Nuclear Programme:

Pakistan nuclear ambitions are a new source of conflict in India-Pakistan relations. Pakistan's nuclear plans flow from its desire to combat its weaker military forces would not look on Pakistan army as a mere walk-over. The defeat and the surrender of the Pakistan army at Dacca in December 1971 goaded the Pakistani leadership to redouble their efforts on the nuclear weapons' trail. Senior Pakistani military leader believed that Pakistan can never afford to achieve parity or even near parity in conventional forces with India and hence, it is important for Pakistan to opt for a nuclear weapon status. Pakistan, in order to achieve this nuclear status, matured her contact with many western countries from time to time. Finally, Pakistan achieved a nuclear weapon status through

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12 The Times of India, March 10, 1992, p. 7.

a dedicated clandestine programme. Its nuclear policy has rested on a "triad of ambiguity, deterrence, and no unilateral renunciation of the nuclear option."

The decision to manufacture nuclear weapons was taken in 1972 by the Pakistan government under the late Z.A. Bhutto. This was two years before India's nuclear explosion at Pokhran of 1974. Long before these events, Bhutto had clarified the ultimate objective of Pakistan's nuclear programme. Bhutto told in an interview that Pakistan would even eat grass but make a bomb.<sup>13</sup> During his tenure as Prime Minister of Pakistan, Bhutto repeated his determination to make Pakistan a nuclear weapons power. For this purpose the Kahuta Plant under the charge of Abdul Qadeer Khan was developed. In producing weapons grade Uranium, Pakistan took the help of Britain, Switzerland, West Germany through clandestine and illegal means, and directly from France and China. Pakistan's nuclear programme was progressed with funds from oil-rich Arab countries mainly. The events in Afghanistan of 1979 opened a new chapter in Pakistan-U.S. relations and provided an opportunity for Pakistan to help more and more from Muslim countries especially that helped Pakistan

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13 Satish Kumar, Op.cit., p. 88.

with economic point of view. Pakistan developed her nuclear programme without facing financial problems. Abdul Qadeer Khan in 1984 gave well publicised interviews to inform the world of the progress being made in his institute and claimed that "by God's grace, Pakistan is among the few countries which have acquired <sup>14</sup> mastery over Uranium enrichment. The leading scientist of Pakistan also claimed that Pakistan could achieve within two years what had taken some western countries <sup>15</sup> in nearly 20 years and cost them \$ 2 billion. These developments created a suspicion about the security and integrity for India in minds of the Indians. Pakistan's deliberately overplaying her nuclear success to make India to bend its strategy. Pakistan was thinking that through Pakistan's propaganda towards nuclear threshold, India would be forced to sign "No war Pact" and accepts its other proposal meant to "remove the nuclear danger from the subcontinent. The other reason of overplaying her nuclear success was to establish Pakistan's superiority over India and at least India should not dare to attack on Pakistan.

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14 Nawa-i-Waqt (Lahore), February 10, 1984.

15 Ibid.

The year 1987 further opened a hurdle between India and Pakistan, when Abdul Qadeer in January 1987 in an interview with Journalist Kuldeep Nayar opened that Pakistan had already produced the nuclear bomb. Abdul Qadeer later retracted his statement. The entire episode of the Kuldeep Nayar - Abdul Qadeer Khan interview left the impression of Pakistan's devious nuclear diplomacy. Further Zia-ul Haq sought to give an impression that Pakistan's programme was peaceful and he let Abdul Qadeer to give the impression that Pakistan had been able to manufacture a nuclear bomb.<sup>16</sup> Here, Pakistan's nuclear politics showed herself as a poker game. Now, the question arises why Pakistan had been playing a poker game in nuclear policies? Pakistan did this thing because:

- i. One motivation was India factor. Since it was a widely held belief in Pakistani circles that India acquired nuclear weapons after the 1974 Pokhran explosion. So, Pakistan thought that a state of asymmetry between India and Pakistan should not be allowed to continue.

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16 Tribune, March 9, 1987.

- ii. Pakistan was not interested in making an explicit declaration of its possession of a nuclear bomb through testing a nuclear weapon, because this would give India the excuse to resume its own nuclear weapons programme.
- iii. Pakistan was not sure about U.S. attitude in case Pakistan tests a nuclear device. Pakistan is far too dependent on U.S. military and economic aid and cannot afford to be deprived of it.

Thus, Pakistan secretly developed her nuclear programme taking care about her financial and military help from other countries especially from U.S.A.

Pakistan's Army Chief General Aslam Beg acknowledging in 1989 that his country's nuclear programme was designed to provide a "meaningful deterrent",<sup>17</sup> to India further created a tension between India and Pakistan relations.

(d) U.S. Shifting Priorities towards India: Pakistan, in fact, was occasionally important to the United States as a strategic ally in the context of America's cold war against the Soviet Union. Pakistan dutifully toed the

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17 Jasjit Singh, "Nuclear Weapon Proliferation in Asia", Strategic Analysis, Vol. 14, No. 12, March 1992, p. 1350.

U.S. line first by enrolling itself as member of U.S.-sponsored regional security alliance structures and later by accepting the role of a "frontline state" and as conduit during the Afghanistan conflict. While the U.S. always considered Pakistan as an ally in the cold war, the latter sought close alliance with the former to strengthen itself vis-a-vis India. Pakistan, due to this close ties with U.S. got considerable military and economic help from Washington, especially since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

However, the Afghan conflict took a different turn with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and later with the vanishing of Soviet Union from the earth as one sovereign nation, Pakistan's usefulness to U.S. policy calculations was bound to change. Even the U.S. administration, which had turned a blind eye to Pakistan's clandestine nuclear weapons programme during the Afghan crisis, quickly changed its policy and suspended its military and economic assistance to Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment. The Pressler Amendment made it clear that no assistance shall be furnished to Pakistan and no military equipment or technology shall be sold or transferred to Pakistan, unless the U.S. President shall have certified in writing to the Speaker of the House of

Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate..... that Pakistan<sup>18</sup> does not possess a nuclear explosive device.

The downturn in U.S. - Pakistan relations came due to increasing Indo-U.S. defence cooperation, since then the Pakistani Policy-makers had begun to perceive American policy towards India through the prism of the zero-sum-game. Already frustrated over the U.S. aid cut and disappointed overruling Indo-American cooperation, the Pakistani ruling elites became more suspicious about the new U.S. "designs" in South Asia. The former Chief of Staff of Pakistani Army General Aslam Beg said in a seminar that the "most important development affecting Pakistan's security is the new strategic alignment<sup>19</sup> between the U.S. and India. The India-U.S. naval exercises in the Indian Ocean is one of the watermarks in Indo-U.S. defence cooperation. Pakistan took these exercises as a threat for herself and said that these exercises are targetted against Pakistan.

In order to meet the challenges arising out of the suspension of U.S. military assistance and Indo-U.S.

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18 Independent, (Bombay) July 27, 1992.

19 Dawn, July 30, 1992.



close cooperation, Pakistan first took some active diplomatic initiative in search of alternative sources of spare parts as well as military equipments. Pakistan developed her relations with France and China more and more. Syed Ghous Ali Shah, Pakistan's Defence Minister, visited Paris at the invitation of French Defence Minister, Pierre Joxe. Both Defence Ministers signed an important agreement on defence cooperation on June 25, 1992, to strengthen French-Pak links in the fields of research and development, production and acquisition of defence system and equipment. By early September 1992, there were talks about supply of defence equipment by France to the Pakistani Air Force and Navy and a bilateral arms deal worth about \$ 900 million.<sup>20</sup> Pakistan Air Force also gave her consent to purchase Mirage-2000 aircraft from France. France on the other hand decided to sell four diesel-powered submarines of the Agosta 90 class to<sup>21</sup> Pakistan.

Pakistan turned to China too in order to strengthen its strategic relations and Pakistan, in August 1992, sought Chinese F-7P aircraft amidst the controversy over

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20 Hindu, September 15, 1992.

21 Mahapatra Chintamani, "U.S.-Pak Relations. Inching Back to Normally", Strategic Analysis, Vol. XV, No.9, December 1992, p. 867.

the F-16 deal with the United States. There was also<sup>22</sup> dealing of M-11 missiles supply and purchase of ground to ground missiles supply from China to Pakistan, which was equal in range of India's Prithvi missile. Pakistan has the requisite delivery system in the shape of F- 16 and Mirage III/5 aircraft. Pakistan is currently<sup>23</sup> believed to possess at least 6-12 nuclear weapons each of approximately 20 K.T. yield variety. Pakistan's Foreign Secretary Shahryar Khan openly admitted on February 7, 1992, that his country had the capacity to assemble at least one nuclear device whenever it desired to do so. This is the first time that any Pakistani official has publically acknowledged the extent of Pakistan's nuclear programme.

Thus, it becomes clear that Pakistan always tried to improve her defence system and the nuclear asymmetry adverse to India was intensified. Pakistan's policy has been to establishing strategic relations with those countries who can prove themselves as a danger for India or who can support Pakistan during the conflict between India and Pakistan. The nuclear diplomacy of Pakistan and the Pakistan's policy to develop strategic

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22 Ibid.

23 Jasjit Singh, Op.cit., p. 1351.

ties with France and China induced a change in the Indian perception of policy and India joined the American side. The arms aggrandisement and nuclear programme of Pakistan is still in the race. The difference is that earlier Pakistan was having alliance with U.S. and was taking help from U.S. but at present she has changed her track of alliance from America to China and France. Whatever the danger India was having from Pakistan earlier, the same danger India is still facing from Pakistan side because Pakistan is in no mood to suspend her nuclear programme and arms purchase.

## 2. India's Objections to Pakistan's Post-invasion Policy

Prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet role in South Asia was at a low except for Indo-Soviet friendship. But the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan changed the political scenario of this region leading to improvement in Pak-U.S. relation, and further deteriorating the India-Pakistan relations. As a result, Pakistan thought her security problems on three fronts;

- (a) from India,
- (b) from regionalists and dissident groups within Pakistan,
- and,
- (c) from the Soviet presence on the border of Pakistan.

Having the above points in mind, Pakistan made her policy and relations with other countries.

The Soviet invasion compelled Pakistan to search her security, and provided the opportunities to Pakistan the international sympathy. Pakistan's policies strengthened the foundation for much closer relations not only with the Afghan resistance but also with Beijing, Washington and important Muslim countries in the Middle East, which found it beneficial to assist the country as much as possible. Pakistan, initially in September 1981, a substantial economic and military assistance amounted to \$ 3.2 billion received from the United States to bolster her security and received second package amounted to <sup>24</sup> \$ 4 billion from U.S.

This markedly strengthened Pakistan's position. India expressed fear by saying that any arms supplied to Pakistan under the present pretext would one day be turned against India. Mrs Indira Gandhi badly asserted. "Do you seriously think that Pakistan is going to stand up to the Soviet Union? I don't think that anybody thinks that at all. Certainly American officials themselves have said <sup>25</sup> .... these (arms) would be used against India.

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24 Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 33, No. 3, March 1987, p. 34995.

25 George Timothy, Security in Southern Asia 2: India and the Great Powers (England: Gower Publishing Company Ltd., 1984), p. 117.

India's diplomatic campaign against the enhanced military aid to Pakistan was not having any effect but it further increased the intimacy between U.S. and Pakistan, and U.S. had more doubt about the continue moral support to Soviet Union by India because India was not criticizing Soviet invasion in a strong way. So, U.S., for her own interest in South Asia and reducing the dominance of Communism regime spread by Soviet Union, supported Pakistan and appreciated Pakistan's steadfastness against Soviet threats. Another important gesture was that the American Congress did not apply cut on the administration's aid proposal to Pakistan during 1985-86. In addition to some other weapons and military hardware, Pakistan received <sup>26</sup> 40 F-16 aircraft between 1985 and 1986.

President Reagan's administration has also subordinated its concerns about non-proliferation to what perceives to be larger security questions in the region. As a result, the Pakistanis have a freer hand to proceed with their nuclear programme. President Reagan also reaffirmed American support to Pakistan under the Mutual Security Pact of 1959, when the Soviets issued a warning to Pakistan about its nuclear programme, the U.S. government advised them in 1986 to keep hands off

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26 Safdar Mahmood, Pakistan : Political Roots and Development, (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers Private Ltd. 1990), p. 199.

<sup>27</sup>  
Pakistan. With this, the Pakistani were given an impetus for nuclear programme. The nuclear programme of Pakistan contributed to nuclear arms race on the sub-continent which posed a danger to the region particularly to India.

Pakistan's support to Mujahidin of Afghanistan was justified on the ground that the Soviet Union is providing the support to dissident <sup>28</sup> ethnic groups (Baluchi and Pushtun) within Pakistan which is a threat to the national integrity of Pakistan. So in retaliation Pakistan provided support to Mujahideen. This policy was opted by Pakistan having the idea that Mujahideen will come to Pakistan's rescue whenever need will arise in future and the U.S. will give more and more help to Pakistan.

After the Soviet invasion Pakistan wanted to come more close to China in order to take support for her side. So exchange of visits were made between the leaders of Pakistan and China. The Chinese Prime Minister Zhao Ziang, in June 1981, visited Pakistan and supported Pakistan's stand on Afghanistan issue and emphasised the

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27 The Muslim, January 2, 1986.

28 Timothy, Op.cit., p. 118.

identity of view. Sino-Pak relations in economic, trade, scientific and technological fields have been firmly established. Pakistan also got some military hardware from China. Further the Chinese President in his visit of April 1984 of Pakistan supported Pakistan's stand regarding Russian invasion of Afghanistan and demanded immediate withdrawal of Russian army from Afghanistan. India here not liked the military help of China to Pakistan. Here it is Pakistan who was more responsible for the deterioration of India-China's cordial relations because Pakistan propagated the effects of invasion more than the reality, and took the support from outside more than the required needs. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan also provided Pakistan to come into closeness of the Islamic countries, and Pakistan exploited the situation and took benefit from the Islamic countries. In such a situation Pakistan improved her defence through the aid given by Saudi Arabia and other Islamic countries which posed a danger to Indian security. An Islamic Conference was called in Islamabad from January 26-29, 1980 in which all the member of 36 Islamic countries denounced the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the strongest possible language, as a flagrant violation of

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29 Safdar Mahmood, Op.cit., p. 186.

30 Ibid., p. 118.

the U.N. and Islamic Conference Charters. They also demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan. When in Mid-July 1980 Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi visited New <sup>31</sup> Delhi, appraised the Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, of the steps taken during the Conference of Islamic Foreign Minister in Islamabad to deal with the Afghan crisis. He also made it clear that Pakistan wanted a political solution to the problem and that India would not be able to escape the consequences of any external threat to the security of Pakistan. Mrs. Gandhi was opposed to the calling of a Conference of <sup>32</sup> Islamic Foreign Minister to discuss the Afghan situation. Her contention was that the Soviet presence in Afghanistan should be viewed in the context of the overall situation in the region and the growing presence of various powers in the Indian Ocean and Gulf area. She was obviously referring to the American naval presence in <sup>33</sup> the Indian Ocean. Here the national interest oriented policies of India and Pakistan further deteriorated their cooperative relations and both have doubt about each

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31 Ibid., p. 87.

32 Dawn, July 20, 1980.

33 Ibid.



other's defence systems. Thus the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have not only compeled the countries of the region to change their policies but had also upset the balance in the sub-continent.

With the withdrawal of Soviet Union from Afghanistan, the Afghan conflict took a different turn. Now Pakistan through her policy game is not going to receive anything from Islamic countries and U.S. especially which had made Pakistan militarily and economically strong during Afghan crisis. U.S. also has suspended her economic and military aid thinking that Pakistan is not having strategic importance for America especially after the vanishing of Soviet Union from the earth as one sovereign nation. So, in these circumstances, Pakistan is hardly getting any success in securing any support on her policy towards Afghanistan which may help Pakistan in strengthening her defence capability, and which may lead any danger to India's security and stability.

### 3. Pakistan's Alleged Involvement in Punjab Insurgency

Punjab problem is one of the recent development in the way of blocking factors of India-Pakistan relations. The dysfunctional activities carried by Sikh extremists in Punjab in collaboration with the Pro-

Pakistan elements and the Pakistani hands in extremist activity has created an atmosphere of disturbance and suspicions in India-Pakistan relations. The training given by Pakistan to Sikh terrorists at various places in Pakistan and supplying weapons to them has deteriorated the process of normalisation between the two countries.

There has been evidence to show Pakistani connection in the Khalistan demand by Sikh extremists. In July 1983, a special team of reporters from the statesman came out with revealing information about Pakistan's "Khalistan" connection. They reported that the Pakistan government was in touch with the protagon-  
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 ists of "Khalistan" in Britain, U.S.A. and Canada. But after the blue operation, the Pakistani activities against India and her support to Sikh came out openly. The Pakistani T.V. had shown and had been showing highly exaggerated account of the happening in Punjab. It distorted the vedio-tapes by superimposing photographs. It showed various parts of the Golden Temple of Amritsar

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34 P.S. Ghosh, Cooperation and Conflict in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar Publication, 1988), p. 45.

as having been damaged by gunfire. The T.V. also showed old pictures of Bhindrawala making fiery speeches including the one in which he exhorted the Sikhs to fight till<sup>35</sup> the last. It was made to appear as if he was speaking to his community during the military operation. The purpose obviously was to incite the Sikhs living within the range of Pakistan T.V. on Indian side of the border.

The Pakistani media made every possible efforts to incite the Sikh community. The Pakistani Press had been indulging in circulating news about the happenings in Amritsar in particular, pictures of armed Sikhs, injured and being diseased, marching Sikh army, picture and statements of some of the "ministers" of the so-called Khalistan government, supplements on Khalistan were a common theme in almost all the Pakistani newspapers during the month of June 1984 and even afterwards. A large number of articles and editorials were published<sup>36</sup> which showed sympathy for the sessionists cause. The army action in the Golden Temple was characterised as the equalent of an army storming the Ka'aba or the

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35 See Chopra, "Indo-Pakistan Relations" in B.M. Jain, ed., Reflections on India's Foreign Policy (Jaipur: RBSA Publishers, 1989), p. 92.

36 Ibid.

37 Vatican. The editorial of newspaper "Muslim" characterised the military action as a violation of human rights  
 38 of the Sikh community. The Jung carried certain statements of Bhindrawal which were highly inflammatory including one in which he had said that by arming Hindus "you  
 39 cannot turn jackals into lions. The same paper carried a cartoon on the front page in which Mrs. Indira Gandhi was named "General" India Gandhi wearing two medals, one for killing Muslim and the other for killing Sikhs. Mrs Gandhi was shown in the company of "General Dyer and  
 40 General Hitler. With the passage of time, more facts of Pakistan's complicity with the extremists in Punjab came to light. In North America and U.K., Pakistani joined the marches organised by Jammu and Kashmir Liberation  
 41 Front (J.K.L.F.) and the Sikh extremists. In Jammu and Kashmir Pro-Pakistan elements joined hands with the deserters and extremist elements and raised pro-Pakistan and pro-Khalistan slogans. Worse still a Pakistani press official posted in London Embassy, Outbuddin Aziz despatched news from London to the United Press of Pakistan

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37 The Muslim, June 8, 1984.

38 Ibid.

39 Jung, June 8, 1984

40 Ibid.

41 Hindustan Times, July 3, 1984.

regarding the activities of the Sikh secessionists. The news got a wide coverage in the Pakistani press, some publishing their editions in London. It had also been reported that such newspapers were distributed into the Sikh organisations and Gurdwaras in U.K.<sup>42</sup> In 1986, an investigative report by India Today revealed the moral<sup>43</sup> and material assistance that the Sikh extremists were receiving from the Pakistani authorities. In September 1987, Rajiv Gandhi reiterated serious concern over Pakistan's continuing complicity in providing arms, training, funds and sanctuary to terrorists indulging in subversive and anti-national activities in Punjab.<sup>44</sup> Various meetings were organised between India and Pakistan regarding terrorist activities but the result proved completely futile. In May 1988, the Home Secretaries of both the countries met for the second time to discuss issues about cross-border terrorism. The Indian delegation presented a 21 page statement entitled "Involvement of Pakistan in Terrorism in Punjab" containing details of training camps, etc, in Pakistan.

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42 For details of these exposures see Inderjit, "Pakistan's Hand in Punjab". The Tribune, May 1986.

43 Ghosh, Op.cit., p. 45.

44 The Times of India, September 14, 1987.

The latter, however, denied the charges and dismissed them as something "intended to play to the gallery". Eventually both the delegates agreed to undertake joint patrols along the border. But there was no agreement on the Indian insistence that the joint patrols undertake<sup>45</sup> hot pursuit of terrorists to their bases. This agreement, in the real sense, did nothing for reducing the help supplied to extremists of Punjab by Pakistan. It was an insulting agreement for India because Pakistan had not accepted any proposal of India and it was a kind of warning to Indian Government that it would simply discredited India's legitimate charges against Pakistan.

During his tour abroad of May-June 1988, Rajiv Gandhi unleashed a barrage of accusation against Pakistan<sup>46</sup> for its role in Punjab turmoil. In August 1988, Indian allegation assumed serious proportions when it charged Pakistani authorities of keeping Sikh terrorists to the extent of plotting to Kill Rajiv Gandhi and his Home Minister Buta Singh. In a long statement presented to both the Houses of Parliament, the Government made categorical allegations against Pakistan in this regard based

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45 India Today, June 15, 1988, p. 96.

46 M.J. Akbar, "Diplomatic Salvoes Against Exporter of Terror". Telegraph, June 10, 1988.

on documentary evidence captured from the Golden Temple following Operation Black Thunder, the police action to flush out terrorists from the premises of the Golden Temple conduct in May 1988.<sup>47</sup> Rajiv Gandhi on August 15, 1988, delivering his Independence Day address from the ramparts of Red Fort in Delhi, virtually threatened Pakistan with dire consequences if it did not desist from efforts to destabilise the Punjab.<sup>48</sup> This was a clear hardening posture on the part of India against Pakistan.

The Pakistan's support to Sikh separatists has become a source of tension between the two countries. Pakistan's interference in India's internal affairs have become a serious hindrance in the process of normalisation. This has also created problems in economic as well as political cooperation.

#### 4. Pakistan's Alleged Involvement in Kashmir Insurgency

Kashmir has been one of the major blocking factor in India-Pakistan relations since partition. Since partition, Pakistan raised Kashmir issue many time at various forums and many conflict took place between the two countries but Kashmir is still dwending as a problem

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47 Hindu, August 6, 1988.

48 Hindu, August 16, 1988.

between the two countries. The military efforts by the Pakistan leadership failed to generate adequate response and support from the Kashmiri people both in 1947-48 and 1965 war. Pakistan, after the defeat in Bangladesh war of 1971, also realised her weakness, a feeling had grown in Pakistan's military and political circles that no military action could separate Kashmir from India or could make Kashmir an independent state. Thus, Pakistan changed her strategy to one of creating a climate for unlawful activities, insurrection by giving support and training to extremists of Kashmir.

The State of Jammu and Kashmir is influenced greatly by politics and pronouncements of the ruling elites of Pakistan. The problem of this Muslim dominated State is characterised by two paralld and equal strong elements.

- a) its demand for autonomy and,
- b) its pro-Pakistanism.

Together these elements are supported by Pakistan through various means and tactics. These means and tactics, which are against India, have serious implications for India-Pakistan relations.

The tactics of interference by Pakistan in Indian internal affairs namely inciting Kashmiri, training them



and giving financial help to them have damaged bilateral relations of two countries.

After the Indo-Pak war of 1971, it was General Zia-ul Haq who built up a psychological base for taking revenge of the "1971 defeat", by quoting "Begin what Indians did in East Pakistan". After the assassination of Mrs. Indira Gandhi in 1984, Pakistan selected Punjab and Kashmir as the most likely area where terrorism followed by low level insurgencies could be fully exploited to Pakistan's advantage. While the Indian government was busy in handling the terrorism in Punjab, Pakistan's area of influence" shifted to Kashmir. With a vulnerable border, large gaps between posts on the line of control, the Pakistani put into effect plans for infiltration of militants into Kashmir. Cadres were trained and equipped with weapons supplied by the U.S. administration for the Afghan Mujahidin. The large quantity of arms seized from the Kashmiri extremists by Indian Army many times indicates that there was considerable flow of weapons into the valley<sup>49</sup> from Pakistan. A large number of militants of the J.K.L.F. were gradually infiltrated into the valley after 1987, when

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49 Illustrated Weekly of India, March 10, 1985, p. 10-11, 13.

the Indian Army (Indian Peace Keeping Force) was busy<sup>50</sup> in Sri Lanka. Indian army's business in Sri Lanka gave Pakistan two things:

1. One is that Pakistan got chance to supply weapons to militants in India and sending trained militants in India more freely, and,
2. Second is that India's image as a peaceable country was distorted by Pakistan because Pakistan projected India in the image of "Big bully" of South Asia.

The Pakistan's help to Kashmiri militants created continue turmoil in Kashmir. Militants supported by Pakistan performed many unlawful activities such as murdering and kidnapping many important officials of the State including the kidnap of Rubaiya Sayeed (the daughter of then Union Home Minister Mufti Mohd. Sayeed). When Indian Government operated more police forces for controlling all these activities then it was vehemently criticised by Pakistan. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan Sahibzada Yakub Khan said that force was being used to "suppress the freedom movement" in Kashmir and this pained the Kashmiri very much". Our heart is bleeding for their miseries. He said adding the objective for which the

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50 Chandra B. Khanduri, "Analysis of the Kashmir Problem and an Approach to Solution" Strategic Analysis, Vol. XIII, No. 6, September 1990, p. 626.

Kashmiri have waged the struggle can't be crushed like this. Giving the highly exaggerated account of the happening in the Kashmir valley, Yakub, said, "hundreds" of people had been killed, "many more" injured and <sup>51</sup> thousand were being arrested.

The Prime Minister of Pakistan Mrs Benazir <sup>52</sup> Bhutto's opening a fund of Rs. 100 million ( \$ 4.65 million) for the relief and welfare of Kashmiri has further created confusion for India. Because the fund was not actually for the relief of Kashmiri but through this, Mrs. Benazir Bhutto wanted to show sympathy for Kashmiri and wanted to establish her prestige in the international scene.

The tactical manoeuvring in the occupied Kashmir region by Pakistan armed forces and some of their radar formations closer to the borders with India have further created tension between India and Pakistan. Seeing this hectic military activity to the border, Prime Minister of India V.P. Singh warned Pakistan in a speech in the Lok Sabha, "Our message to Pakistan is that you can't get away with taking Kashmir without a war," Two days later Home Minister Mufti Mohd. Sayeed was of the view that a

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51 Hindustan Times, January 31, 1990.

52 Ibid., April 2, 1990.

war with Pakistan would be justified if it would break "the stranglehold of the secessionists.

The Pakistan's exciting attitude to Kashmiri militant for crossing the line of control again and again brought the possibility of an outbreak of war between the two countries. On February 5, 1992, Pakistan observed a total strike to demonstrate solidarity with the people of Kashmir in the wake of Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front's (J.K.L.F.) proposed march of 50,000 people<sup>54</sup> across the line of control. Eight months later, the similar situation arose with the threatened crossing of the line of control on October 24, 1992. Pakistan not only supported the Kashmiri march earlier but propagated it also with the aim that:

- i) Pakistan will have an special role for the cause of Muslims in the world.
- ii) Through this support, Pakistan also wanted to take help from Muslim countries. In this way Pakistan got success upto some extent because some of the

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53 Keesing's Record of World Events, Vol. 36, No. 4, April, 1990, p. 37377.

54 Hindustan Times, November 10, 1992, p. 13.

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Saudis and Iranians promised all supports to Kashmiri militants against India.

- iii) Pakistani ruling leaders did all these steps for diverting the attention of the people from the real cause, for suppressing internal unrest which was posing a threat to their seats.

Though with this march, no war took place between India and Pakistan but the environment that Pakistan made was such that the people live in a state of war psychosis which prevented any improvement in the relations. Pakistan's support of insurgency in Punjab and Kashmir was raised by Indians and Indians blamed Pakistan that it has been conducting a proxy war by funding, arming, training and infiltrating militants in the hope that the valley would secede to Pakistan.

#### 5. Dispute Over Siachin Glacier

Apart from Kashmir, the dispute over Siachin is another cause of friction between India and Pakistan . The Siachin Glacier (75 km. long and 2.8 km. wide) is situated in the most inhospitable terrain in 640 km.

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55 Asian Recorder, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 16 November 11-17, 1992, p. 22714.

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long Karakoram range. Access to this glacier from Pakistan's side is very difficult. The Siachin Glacier adjoins the large chunk of Kashmir territory that was ceded by Pakistan to China as part of Pakistan-China border agreement in 1963. The Aksai Chin area under the illegal occupation of China is also close to the glacier. In the event of combined pressure from Pakistan and China in the area, India's access to Karakoram pass could become difficult.

There have been clashes in the Siachin glacier area since 1984. The first skirmishes had taken place in April 1984 which was primarily a probing operation but taking advantage of Indian troops pre-occupation in the state of Punjab, Islamabad tried to occupy it. A serious clash took place on June 23, 1984 and Pakistan's forces were beaten back. Once again, during the month of February 1985, "fire fights" lasted 17 days at a stretch.<sup>57</sup> Further Zia accused India of violating Simla Agreement by unilaterally occupying Siachin Glacier and<sup>58</sup> cautioned that it would mar the Indo-Pakistan relations.

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56 For details, see Gen. P.M. Pasricha, "The Siachin Glacier: An Graphic offensive by Pakistan." Strategic Analysis, Vol.IX, No. 9 December 1985, p. 855.

57 Jane's Defence Weekly, July 6, 1985, p. 9.

58 Statesman, April 7, 1986.

The Pakistan's President Zia-ul Haq, changing his stand on the status and ownership of the Siachin Glacier, in September 1986, described Siachin Glacier as a "no man's land" which India had taken one fine morning. But Zia's statement was criticised by many Pakistanis. The Retired Air Marshal Asghar Khan said, "If we accept this as a no man's land, then our tribal areas are also not Pakistani territory, shall we give them away"? This indicates that if sometimes Zia and other leaders tried to normalise the situation then they could not do so because of their domestic pressures.

In the last week of September 1987, Pakistan launched an attack on the Indian post in the Siachin region. India also retaliated. In this clash, both the countries suffered heavy loss of life, property. The magnitude of this attack by Pakistan was making a determined effort to overrun the glacier. The attack and counter attack between the two countries badly disrupted their mutual cooperation many time.

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59 Surendra Chopra, "Indo-Pak Relations" in B.M. Jain ed., Reflections on India's Foreign Policy (Jaipur: RBSA Publishers, 2989), p. 100.

60 See Kalim Bahadur, "India-Pakistan Relations" in Satish Kumar, ed., Yearbook on India's Foreign Policy 1987/88, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1988), p. 91.

In order to get peaceful settlement, both the countries at official and non-official level have several meetings but found no adequate solution. In the fifth round of talks in Islamabad in 1989 on Siachin Glacier issue, the two countries reached an agreement concerning the "redeployment of troops on both sides but it could not be signed and thus not implemented because of change in the Governments in New Delhi and Islamabad then. The recent six round of India-Pakistan talks on the Siachin<sup>61</sup> Glacier Issue, held at New Delhi in early November 1992 after the gap of more than three years had not proved any amicable solution for resolving the disputes between the two countries except discussing to end the eight year old confrontation in the area, discussing the demilitarisation of the Glacier area only in sentences. Since April 1984, the Defence secretaries of India and Pakistan have met several times to resolve difference on the question of "ownership of Siachin Glacier." The meetings yielded no agreed solution although they were considered useful.

### Conclusion

From the above discussion it is known that no doubt some of the bilateral factors of both the countries

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61 Hindustan Times, November 3, 1992.



have been the blocking factors in mutual cooperation of India and Pakistan but in spite of these the role of external factors are also not less in making the situation tense in South Asia (Particularly between India and Pakistan).

The policy of Pakistan's purchase of arms from U.S., China and other countries is directed against India. Pakistan, for the aggrandisement of arms, economic and nuclear programme, tried to exploit every situation which had occurred in South Asia region. It was Zia-ul-Haq who made Pakistan very important to U.S. overnight when Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, and Pakistan became "a frontline state" in U.S. perception. Through this tactics, Pakistan received a lot of arms and economic aid from America and other countries, and built up her defence system. The aim of Pakistan's purchase of arms and improving relations with China is to bring China's role as a countervailing power in South Asia especially against India. Pakistan's alliance with U.S. and China compelled India to have an alliance with U.S.S.R. At this juncture, India with an alliance of U.S.S.R had to face Pakistan + U.S. and China in this region. But after the Soviet disintegration, this burden of India was reduced because U.S. shifted her priorities towards India in place of Pakistan.

Punjab, Kashmir and Siachin Glacier are also the major blocking factors in India-Pakistan relations. Kashmir has been one of the problems since partition. Before 1971, Pakistan tried to take Kashmir through military efforts but after the defeat in Bangladesh war of 1971 realised that no military action could separate Kashmir from India or could make Kashmir an independent state. Thus, Pakistan changed her strategy to one of creating a climate of unlawful activities, insurrection by giving support and training to extremists of Kashmir. Pakistan also opted the same attitude towards the Sikh separatists of Indian Punjab that has become a source of tension between India and Pakistan.

## C H A P T E R VII

### THE QUEST FOR PROGRESS: FORMATION OF INDO-PAKISTAN JOINT COMMISSION

An analysis of India-Pakistan relation since 1947 indicates that the bilateral improvements of the two countries are the surest guarantee of economic prosperity and long term political stability in the sub-continent. Both subjective and objective factors play an important role in the process of normalisation and improving relations between the two countries.

Many steps between the two countries were taken for improving relations. A major break through was made by the agreement to establish a Joint Commission to promote bilateral cooperation. But before highlighting the contribution of Joint Commission in the improvement of India - Pakistan relations, it is necessary to point out the circumstances in which it came into existence. A proposal by Pakistani President Zia-ul Haq for a non-aggression pact between Pakistan and India, and Indian counter proposal for a treaty of friendship and cooperation were discussed at a meeting in New Delhi on January 29/February 1, 1982. As a preliminary step, India proposed the setting

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1 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, October 8, 1982, P. 31746.

up of a Joint Commission. The Indian proposal for a permanent Joint Commission was reportedly accepted in principle by the Pakistani side on January 31, 1982. Mrs. Gandhi also made it known that India was prepared to conclude a treaty of friendship and cooperation with Pakistan such as India had signed with the Soviet Union in 1971. She also reaffirmed that India had no intention of attacking Pakistan.<sup>2</sup>

A Joint Statement issued after the talks on February 1, 1982 noted that "the air was cleared sufficiently to facilitate specific consideration of the elements which could constitute the substance of such an agreement."

#### 1. The Agreement Signed

The Draft Agreement for setting up the India-Pakistan Joint Commission was initiated by the Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan, M.K. Rasgotra and Ejaz Naik respectively, and later formally signed by the Foreign Minister of India, P.V. Narasimha Rao and the Foreign Minister of Pakistan Lt. Gen. Sahibzada Yaqub Khan in the presence of Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi

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2 Ibid.

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and President Zia-ul Haq on March 10, 1983 at New Delhi. Mrs. Gandhi said that the signing of the Agreement on the Joint Commission is important for helping to open one by one the doors in a relationship that has been closed for far too long.<sup>4</sup> Reciprocally, Zia also expressed the hope that the two countries would proceed along the road of closer cooperation.<sup>5</sup>

Yaqub Khan pointed out that the signing of the Agreement in the presence of Mrs. Gandhi and Zia-ul Haq demonstrated that it was backed by the political will and enjoyed the support of the two leaders. Yaqub Khan also said that a no war pact would "reiterate and reaffirm" the two countries' mutual resolve to maintain peace and refrain from the threat or use of force and settle differences exclusively by peaceful means. On the Indian proposal for a treaty of friendship, he said that it would provide the foundation for the building of an edifice of cooperation and good neighbourliness between the two countries.<sup>6</sup>

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3 Ibid., Vol. XXXVI, No. 3, March 1986, p. 34240.

4 Statesman, March 11, 1983.

5 Hindustan Times, March 11, 1983.

6 Ibid.

According to the Agreement the two Governments have to take necessary legal and administrative measures to implement the agreed principles of cooperation as suggested by the Commission. It was also specified that the Commission may set up as many sub-Commissions as necessary. While the Joint Commission will meet annually in Islamabad and New Delhi alternatively, the sub-Commissions may meet as and when desired.

The Commission was certainly a step forward in strengthening and promoting cooperation between the two countries for mutual benefit in economic, trade, industrial, education, health, consular, tourism, travel, information, scientific and technological fields. But one thing is to be noted that promotion of the good neighbourly relations and economic cooperation were attempted prior to a solution of the outstanding political and military problems between the two countries.<sup>7</sup>

Another important point in the Agreement was that for the functional purpose, the work of the Commission at the first Joint Commission meeting held in Islamabad on June 1-4, 1983, was divided into four sub-commissions each

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7 Surendra Chopra, Post-Simla Indo-Pakistan Relations (New Delhi: Deep & Deep, Publications, 1988), p.239.

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dealing with a specified fields.

- Sub-Commission I ... This part of the Commission is on economic matters dealt with industry, agriculture, communication, health, science and technology.
- Sub-Commission II ... This Commission deals with trade.
- Sub-Commission III ... This was entrusted with information, education, culture, sports and social sciences.
- Sub-Commission IV ... This was grappled with matters relating to travel, tourism and consuls.

With this division of the Commission in the first meeting nothing much was emerged but one thing is to be noted that the discussions and dialogue took place in a spirit of amity and this was an achievement in itself.

On his return from the first meeting of the Commission at Islamabad, Narsimha Rao expressed his satisfaction over the outcome of his visit, which, he said, was a "success". He said the efforts made by the Sub-

Commissions were very successful. They came with several<sup>9</sup> useful recommendations in different fields of cooperation.

Expressing his pleasure at the most useful progress of the four days meeting (June 1-4, 1983), Rao<sup>10</sup> said that these discussions affect persons who are poor, distant and looking for contacts and to whose happiness we have the responsibility to contribute. On the other hand, Sahibzada Yaqub Khan described the discussions as a historic endeavour that would foster a conducive climate in which the full of cooperation between the two countries<sup>11</sup> can be realized.

In this meeting both sides agreed to recommend to their Government a cut in the postal rates by 15 to 20 per cent and improvement in the telecommunication facilities.<sup>11</sup> In the field of science and technology, it was agreed that exchange of delegations may take place between the two countries to suggest concrete measure for cooperation in such areas as energy, metalurgy, marine sciences, genetic engineering and biotechnology, medical research, environment and optics. The Sub-Commission

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9 Hindustan Times, June 5, 1983.

10 Ibid.

11 Chopra, Op.cit., p. 241.



dealing with information, education, social sciences, culture and sports, agreed on a programme for cooperation. On cultural cooperation, the Indian side presented a draft agreement while Pakistan presented a draft regarding exchange of archival materials. Discussions regarding the avoidance of double taxation were also held. In the field of agriculture the two sides entered into an agreement for exchange of scientists, technologists and experts, germ plasm and breeding materials, scientific literature, information, and methodologies. Both sides agreed to explore the possibility of cooperation among the specialized institutions in the fields of agricultural research. Promotion of tourism and organized groups of professionals and academicians, as also collaboration between for settling up joint projects was agreed to.<sup>12</sup> The Pakistani Delegation proposed expanding the scope of the shipping protocol of January 1975. The Indian side suggested that carriage of all third country cargo should be included within the scope of the protocol. The Indian side also suggested that the two countries should explore the possibilities of cooperation in the establishment of joint venture in third countries especially in North Africa and West Asia.<sup>13</sup>

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12 Ibid., p. 241.

13 Hindustan Times, June 5, 1983.

## 2. The Working of the Commission

The India-Pakistan Joint Commission earnestly embarked on expanding bilateral relations. But trade received jolt when the representatives of private sector in Pakistan became eager for resumption of private trade with India, in the first ministerial meeting of Indo-Pakistan Joint Commission held in June, 1983 in Islamabad. Pakistan ruled out resumption of free private trade with India because free flow of manufactured goods from India would greatly harm the indigenous industries of Pakistan.<sup>14</sup>

Further progress in Indo-Pakistan relations was seen when a three day meeting (January 15-17, 1984) of Sub-Commission I (Economic Matters) and II (Trade) of the India-Pakistan Joint Commission concluded.<sup>15</sup> The meeting was attended by the Indian delegations headed by Commerce Secretary Abid Husain and Pakistani delegations headed by Pakistan Commerce Secretary Izharul Haq. The Joint agreement signed by them was described as a major step forward leading to a qualitative change<sup>16</sup> in the trading relations of the two countries.

14 Satyabrati Rai Chaudhari, "Joint Commission Failure: Shrinking Trade with Pak", National Herald, December 14, 1983.

15 India, Lok Sabha, Debates, XLIX (6), March 1, 1984, p. 213.

16 Dawn Overseas, January 26, 1984.

In order to further increase the level of trade, nineteen items were identified for bulk trading between the two countries. Ten of them for export to India and <sup>17</sup> nine of them to Pakistan. The list of items are given as follows:

The Items for Exports from Pakistan to India	The Items for Exports from India to Pakistan
1. Fertilizer (Urea)	Iron ore
2. Low grade coal	Steel Mill Rolls
3. Pig iron	Stainless steel sheds
4. Soda Ash	Mica and Mica products
5. Fresh and dried fruits	Selected Chemicals
6. Petroleum products	Jute and Jute products
7. Fish	Tea
8. Rock salt	Coffee
9. Onyx	Bidi leaves
10. Industrial alcohol	-

Both sides also agreed, inter alia, to find ways and means for gradually inducting the private sector in the trade between the two countries and to make all possible efforts to meet each other's requirements of

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17 India, Lok Sabha, Debates, XLIV (7), March 2, 1984, P. 207.

essential commodities. Leaders of both delegations expressed their satisfaction with the outcome of the meeting. But, according to Abid Husain, the real test lay in how the proposals were put into practice. Izhar-ul Haq expressed his satisfaction describing the agreed formulation as a "good beginning".

In Sub-Commission I on economic matters, the most important point discussed introduction of advance booking of passengers, travelling between India and Pakistan, to and fro certain nominated pairs of stations. This scheme was proposed to be implemented with effect from July 1, <sup>1984</sup> Under this system, passengers travelling between India and Pakistan would be able to buy through tickets in their own currency to seven designated rail-<sup>18</sup> way stations in either country.

The India-Pakistan Sub-Commission on economic matter which concluded its deliberations in Islamabad on January 17, 1984, decided to constitute a Working Group consisting of Secretaries of Planning and two senior officials of the Planning Commission of both the countries to formulate suggestions for economic cooperation. It also finalized the exchange of visits between

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18 India, Lok Sabha. Debates XLVII (31), April 5, 1984, p. 293.

their planners, scientists, industrialists and health managers. Steps were discussed to improve telecommunications between the two countries particularly the coaxial cable link between Lahore and Amristar. In the field of shipping, it was agreed that it would mutually beneficial to expand the scope of the 1975 protocol on resumption of shipping services between the two countries<sup>19</sup> to cover the third country carriage cargo.

Apart from the meeting of the above two Sub-Commissions, a three-day meeting of other two Sub-Commissions (III & IV dealing with information, education, social sciences, culture and sports, and travel, tourism and consular matters respectively) of India-Pakistan Joint Commission at the officials level was held in New Delhi (from January 19 to 21, 1984)<sup>20</sup>. The meeting was inaugurated by the then Foreign Secretary of India, M. Rasgotra whose speech in Hindi was itself a reflection of the country's composite culture that was the mixture of Sanskritized Hindi and Chaste Urdu. Rasgotra also

19 Times of India, January 18, 1984.

20 India, Lok Sabha Debates, March 1, 1984 (The ten-member delegation led by culture and Joint Secretary M.A. Beg for the Sub-Commission III, while Tourism Joint Secretary Mohsin Kamal led Pakistani team for Sub-Commission IV. The Sub-Commission III was led by Information and Broadcasting Joint Secretary J.K. Bhattacharya and Sub-Commission IV by Home Ministry Joint Secretary Surjit Singh).

recalled Indira Gandhi's comment that the setting up of the India-Pakistan Joint Commission as a forum for forging constructive and mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries would help in transcending the differences and misunderstandings of the past.<sup>21</sup>

In the New Delhi meeting of the Sub-Commission, both India and Pakistan decided to issue double transit visas to facilitate travel. For the promotion of group tourism, a protocol was also finalized. They decided that there will be cooperation in the field of publishing the Urdu textbooks, and between museums and archives of the two countries. There will be consultation between archaeological experts and exchange visits for conservation of monuments. Exchange of archival materials had been suggested. It was agreed to consider measures to increase the number of shrines that can be visited by pilgrims in both countries. Fresh proposals were made to give an impetus to the tempo of exchanges in the field of sports, radio and television. It was decided that Pakistani Radio and Television Programmes will be made available for All India Radio and Doordarshan for selection and use. The Indian side was also asked for ghazals and music recitals on audio and video-tapes.<sup>22</sup>

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21 Times of India, January 20, 1984.

22 Hindustan Times, January 22, 1984.

India and Pakistan discussed various issues in these Sub-Commissions' meetings, and good progress was expected between the two countries. The principal results of the meetings of the four Sub-Commissions of India-Pakistan held in January 1984 were: an agreement on through railway booking effective from July 1, 1984, between seven designated stations in the two countries; finalisation of the text of a Protocol on Group Tourism to be signed soon; an agreement on providing double entry transit visas between the two countries; a decision to establish a working group in the field of planning; preparation of a draft agreement on cooperation in agricultural research; identification of specific items for bulk trading between the two countries; a decision to increase the tempo of exchanges in the field of sports; and expansion of the scope of the shipping protocol of 1975.

The Protocol on Group Tourism signed at Islamabad  
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 on May 20, 1984 which was proposed by both the countries in the previous Indo-Pakistan Joint Commission's meeting of January 1984, further improved the relations between India and Pakistan. The Indian and Pakistani Foreign

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23 India, Lok Sabha, Debates, July 27, 1984, p. 46.

Secretaries M. Rasgotra and Niaz A. Naik signed the Protocol and said that the new visa rules would help<sup>24</sup> in removing tension in Indo-Pakistan ties.

The main points covered in the Protocol were as follows:

1. Both sides agreed on the Development of Group Tourism between the two countries on the basis of reciprocity.
2. It was agreed that promotion of group tourism would be for a maximum period of 15 days for groups of 30 to 100 persons.
3. The Protocol allowed the movement of up to 8000 nationals of each country every year-more specifically 2000 in each quarter.
4. The modalities of group tourism will be handled by the Government Corporations viz (ITDC) Indian Tourism Development Corporation and Pakistan Tourism Development Corporation (PTDC).
5. It was decided that initially the group could go by air only.

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24 Statesman, May 21, 1984.



6. The tourists travelling in groups will not be required to personally report to the police station.
7. Nationals of the two countries were granted visa only to visit friends or relatives or for pilgrimages. Visa will be applied for one month in advance.
8. A visitor's visa, issued for three months, can be extended upto one year.
9. The diplomatic staff will be given visa for the entire duration of their assignment. Although it is being done, there is no agreement sanctioning it.
10. The non-diplomatic staff, whose visa are periodically renewed will also get them for the duration of assignment.
11. For businessmen, who are required to travel frequently between the two countries, triple entry visa will be issued up to a maximum period of six months.
12. There will be exchange of experience between the two countries in statistics, research and publicity materials.

13. The Protocol will remain in force for a period of one year but can be revoked by either party giving written notice. After one year there will be a review.

14. The Protocol will not cover national of third countries.

After signing the Protocol of May 20, 1984, under the aegis of Indo-Pakistan Joint Commission, some progress was seen between India and Pakistan. Two groups consisting of 38 and 19 tourists from Pakistan visited India in March 1985.<sup>25</sup> A group of 100 passengers has been booked by India Tourism Development Corporation to attend a Conference in Karachi and visit places of tourist interest.

The second meeting of Indo-Pakistan Commission<sup>26</sup> was held in New Delhi on July 2-4, 1985. The Commission was expected to have met 12 months before but it was postponed because of deterioration in relations following Indian accusations of Pakistani involvement in

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25 India, Lok Sabha, Debates, VII,(2), July 24, 1985, p. 120.

26 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. XXXII, No.3, March 1986, p. 34240.

disturbances in the Indian State of Punjab. Thus, the second meeting was concluded on July 4, 1985 in New-Delhi, by the Minister of Agriculture and rural Development Buta Singh and Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Sahibzada Yaqub Khan on behalf of their countries. The<sup>27</sup> outcome of the meeting of the Sub-Commissions were:

1. The signing of an agricultural cooperation agreement.
2. Cultural exchange programmes.
3. Finalisation of through railway booking facilities between designated railway stations with effect from 1st October, 1985.
4. Waiver of the requirement of policy reporting in respect of bonafied businessmen and holders of transit visas.
5. Agreement on setting up of a working group for co-operation in the field of planning.
6. The exchange of radio and T.V. programme.
7. To curb the smuggling of narcotics across the Indo-Pakistan border.

Both countries have similar perceptions of various matters, Yaqub Khan and the then Indian Minister of External Affairs Khurshid Alam Khan said "The just concluded second meeting is one more step forward"<sup>28</sup> in Indo-

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27 India, Lok Sabha, Debates, VII (2) July 24, 1985, p. 75.

28 Indian Express, July 5, 1985, p. 1.

### Pakistan relations.

In spite of the large areas of collaboration, the cooperation in the field of bilateral trade was tardy. Khurshid Alam Khan in his concluding remarks said, "while we have made progress in some areas, we are yet to register any positive movement in areas like <sup>29</sup> trade. Pakistan's stand on bilateral trade was rejected by India as discriminatory, when India offered for wheat, Pakistan said that there was arrangement of <sup>30</sup> supply of wheat from U.S. and Australia. Now, it becomes clear that Pakistan's rigid attitude towards Indo-Pakistan trade is partly determined by the businessmen having links with multinational corporations who are earning super profits and partly by the western manufacturers.

The deadlock between Indo-Pakistan trade, which was stagnated since last eight years, came at the end with the discussion of Finance Minister V.P. Singh and his counterpart Mahbubul Haq at Islamabad on January 10, 1987, when Pakistan allowed private sector imports from

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29 Times of India, July 5, 1985, p. 1.

30 Ibid.

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India in 42 items. Under the agreement, the private sector in Pakistan was allowed to import the items including tea, books, viscose fibre and yarn, ferro alloys, calculators, calculating machines, onions, bidi leaves and rigs etc. While India can mainly import from Pakistan fertiliser (Urea) cotton, iron and steel items. Both Singh and Haq told a joint news conference that<sup>32</sup> their discussions had been "fruitful and positive."

A little improvement was seen in Indo-Pakistan relations when Zia in February 1987 came to see cricket at Jaipur and responded by saying that he would like to see the meetings of Sub-Commissions on trade and economic matters. It was decided that the two Sub-Commissions on trade and culture should meet after the necessary ground work was prepared. This had delayed the meeting and the meeting of Indo-Pakistan Sub-Commission-I on economic matters and Sub-Commission-II<sup>33</sup> on trade was held in New Delhi in early August 1987. In this meeting both the countries, for expanding cooperation, talked in the field of industry, agriculture, communications, health, science, technology and trade.

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31 India, Lok Sabha, Debates XV(28) April 4, 1986, p. 262.

32 Hindustan Times, January 11, 1986.

33 India, Lok Sabha Debates, XXX(69), August 21, 1987, pp. 132-134.

A major improvement in India-Pakistan relations was seen when all the four Sub-Committees of the Indo-Pakistan Joint Commission met in Islamabad on July 17-<sup>34</sup> 19, 1989 for the first time since 1985. This was the third meeting of all four Sub-Commissions. In this meeting both the countries took concrete steps to strengthen cooperation in the field of trade, culture and information, easing visa and travel restrictions and promoting tourism.

Some new decisions were taken in the meeting of the Commission which was co-chaired by the then Indian External Affairs Minister P.V. Narsimha Rao and the then Pakistan Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yaqub Khan. Some of the new decisions taken by the Commission were as<sup>35</sup> follows:

- (i) The two sides agreed to exchange delegations of businessmen in order to increase bilateral industrial cooperation. They agreed to exchange medical research delegations in the field of ecology and coronary (heart) diseases.

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34 Keessing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. 35, No.7-8, 1989, p. 36813.

35 Pakistan News, Volume X, No. 2, August 1, 1989,p.3.

- (ii) Both sides agreed to avoid double taxation and adopted a three year cultural exchange programme for 1989-91. The programme provides for cooperation in the field of:
  - (a) Education: Including providing fellowship/ scholarship to students in either country for the first time, exchange of educationists, historians, scientists, academicians and other experts in the field of education;
  - (b) Art and Culture: Including exchange of musicians, artists, folk dance and music exhibition of arts and crafts etc.,
  - (c) Both sides agreed to exchange radio, T.V. and its programme; agreed to encourage exchange of sportsmen, athletes etc.
- (iii) In the field of travel and tourism, both sides agreed to increase the number of places that can be visited by national of either country from four to eight. Both sides agreed that persons with visas valid upto 14 days will be exempted from police reporting on reciprocal basis. Both the sides agreed to increase the number of

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pilgrims and places of pilgrimages and other many issues were discussed between the two countries.

These positive steps definitely contributed to boosting cooperation in the economic and other fields, and both countries tried to improve their relations by discussing various matters and have accepted almost all the recommendations of the Joint Commission since its inception. But the important point is that both the countries should adhere conscientiously to the genuine objectives of the Commission, i.e., overall improvement of economic, trade, tourism and cultural relations between India and Pakistan, and this can't be achieved in a day or two but it is a long process and both sides should sincerely cooperate each other for bringing the aims and objectives of the Commission into real practice.

### 3. An Assessment of the Working of the Joint Commission

The India-Pakistan Joint Commission's agenda consists mainly of two broad issues:

1. To improve mutual cooperation between India and Pakistan;
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2. To normalize relations between India and Pakistan by discussing economic, trade, tourism and cultural fields.

In the past, several agreements were concluded between the two countries but none of them proved as useful to advance multifarious cooperations as this one. Now, the question arises how far India-Pakistan Joint Commission differs with the rest of the agreements and to what extent it is authentic in bringing both the countries close to each other.

Here, I make an effort to explain the importance of Joint Commission by quoting from the statements of a few political leaders from both countries.

Indira Gandhi said "the signing of Joint Commission is important for helping to open one by one the doors in the relationship that has been closed for far too long.<sup>37</sup>

The then Foreign Minister of Pakistan Sahibzada Yaqub Khan said "Joint Commission constituted an important milestone on the road to a future of harmony and cooperation between our neighbouring countries.

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37 Statesman, March 12, 1983.

This will be an institutional frame work for strengthening bilateral relations. We shall now able to explore systematically the potential for a beneficial relations in a number of agreed fields" "Through Joint Commission, the two countries would be able to bridge any gaps of communication which have at times, interrupted or impeded the growth of trust and confidence" <sup>38</sup> he said.

Speaking at the ceremony the then Foreign Minister of India P.V. Narsimha Rao said, "It is a cause for satisfaction that consultations between the governments of India and Pakistan have culminated this morning in the formal signing of the Joint Commission Agreement." He said, "It is my sincere hope that as the tempo of activities of the Joint Commission and the sub-commissions set up under it pick up many more worthwhile ideas about multifacet cooperation between the two countries will surface." <sup>39</sup>

In a three day meeting (from 19-21 January 1984) of Sub-commission at New Delhi, the then Indian Foreign Secretary M. Rasgotra recalled that Indira Gandhi had suggested the setting up of India-Pakistan Joint Commission as a forum for forgoing constructive and mutually

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38 Dawn, March 11, 1983.

39 Ibid.

beneficial cooperation between the two countries which would help in transcending the differences and misunderstandings of the past.<sup>40</sup>

Both the Foreign Minister of Pakistan and the Indian Minister of External Affairs Yaqub Khan and Khursheed Alam Khan respectively in the second meeting of the Joint Commission said, "Once more step forward had been taken at just concluded second meeting of the Joint Commission."<sup>41</sup>

Now, we see that various meetings and discussions have taken place to implement the provisions of the Agreement on the Joint Commission and almost all the provisions were practically accepted by the two countries.

Good neighbourliness is an essential requirement for the national security and socio-economic development of both the countries. The Commission provides a framework for creating an altogether new relationship between India and Pakistan, as both sides have agreed that the basic issues and causes of conflict between them can be resolved only through dialogue, negotiations and mutual cooperation.

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40 Hindustan Times, January 20, 1984.

41 Indian Express, July 5, 1985.

For bringing India and Pakistan closer to each other various methods can be adopted and the establishment of a common market is one of them. But the question arises what should be the nature of socio-economic contact between them. Should it be of the nature of European Common Market? or a new method should be evolved? If there is a need for a new method, then what should be its nature? The answer to this question is that there should be free exchange of goods and free movement of the businessmen at this stage and the final method should be evolved after some experience. The main problem related to this is that of exchange of currency and its standard. However, this can be resolved through payments in foreign currency acceptable to both the countries, such as pound or dollar.

For the proper functioning of the Joint Commission and improving the Indo-Pakistan relations, there is need to control arms race and to develop economic, trade, tourism and cultural relations. So for the policy makers of both countries it is necessary that they should adopt bilateral cooperation and the peace-race instead of the arms race, & their major objective of their foreign policies.

In spite of bilateral talks and negotiations of India and Pakistan there are some regional and international organisations which have provided an opportunity to both India and Pakistan to develop their political as well as economic relations. In this field, SAARC has played a very important role.

#### 4. SAARC and Indo-Pakistan Cooperation

It is in the SAARC where the leaders of India and Pakistan and other member countries realized that, " regional cooperation among countries of South Asia is mutually beneficial, desirable and necessary for promoting the welfare and improving the quality of life of the people in the region...., Economic, Social and technical cooperation among the countries of South Asia would contribute significantly to national and collective self reliance.... increased cooperation, contacts and exchanges among the countries of the region will contribute to the promotion of friendship and understanding among their peoples. This realization of the leaders of the region has compelled to cooperate one another. Mrs Gandhi in 1983 said that South Asian Regional Cooperation is allied solely to development and to the strengthening of the

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42 Sumit Chakravarti, "South Asian Regional Cooperation" Indian And Foreign Review, Vol. 24, No.2 November 16, 1986.

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economics of our individual countries. In Bangalore Summit, the leaders of the member countries referring to the "global economic crisis" agreed to consult and cooperate in international economic conferences and institutions to achieve the objectives of enlarged  
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concessional assistance.

Another development in economic cooperation and other field between India and Pakistan and other member countries, is the SAARC convention of Supression of terrorism and the agreement establishing a Food Security Reserve at the Kathmandu Summit. Economic sectors was given a push up when the leaders of SAARC , at Kathmandu agreed that a study be undertaken on the trade flows between the countries of the region, their trade regimes  
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and their industrial protection systems.

The fourth Summit of SAARC held at Islamabad from December 29-31, 1988 is more important for India and Pakistan because it provided an opportunity to Ms. Benazir Bhutto and Rajiv Gandhi to discuss various

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43 Ibid.

44 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Volume XXXII, No. 2, 1986, p. 34815.

45 Foreign Affairs Record, Volume 34, No. 8 August 1988, pp. 273-274.

bilateral issues. Rajiv's visit of this SAARC meeting in Islamabad was also the first official visit by an Indian Prime Minister since Pandit Nehru's visit to sign the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty. Three bilateral accords were signed between the two leaders on December 31, 1988.<sup>46</sup> They are:

1. To exchange detailed information on nuclear power and research facilities and to refrain from attacking each other's nuclear installations.
2. To end the 'double taxation' of each other's airlines, and
3. To increase cultural cooperation and exchange.

At a joint press conference on December 31, 1988 Rajiv Gandhi observed that the meeting would help in normalizing relations. Benazir Bhutto said that both Pakistan and India were prepared to consider the possibility of reduction in military strength.<sup>47</sup> She also assured that Pakistan had no intention to interfere in India's internal affairs. Realising the importance of the Summit meeting Rajiv stated that the policies pursued by the Pakistan's People Party (PPP) were better than those of previous regime.<sup>48</sup>

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46 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Volume 35, No. 2, 1989, p. 36485.

47. Ibid.

48 Hindustan Times, January 1, 1989.

Referring to the SAARC Summit of December 1988. The Foreign Secretary, Niaz A. Naik said it gave an excellent opportunity for Indo-Pakistan deliberations at the highest level. It was felt that trade could be promoted through greater contacts between the people. It was in this context that the SAARC Passport for judges and parliamentations was agreed upon which could<sup>49</sup> be extended to businessmen and journalists.

The recent SAARC Summit held in Colombo on<sup>50</sup> December 21, 1991, further provided an opportunity to the leaders of India and Pakistan as well as to the other member state for improving the bilateral and multi-lateral cooperation among the member countries. India-Pakistan and other member states committed to suppress terrorism in the region and highlighted the importance of human rights. The member states committed for the creation of an inter-governmental group to seek agreement on trade liberalization among countries and to establish a SAARC preferential trade agreement by 1997. Member States also undertook to form an independent "South Asian Poverty Alleviation Committee" to conduct an indepth study of diverse experiences of the seven nation groupings.

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49 Tribune, January 29, 1989.

50 Keesing's Vol. 37, No. 12, December 1991, p. 38684.



##### 5. The Non-aligned Movement and Indo-Pakistan Cooperation

Like SAARC, the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) has also provided opportunities (to both India and Pakistan) for meeting and discussing various matters. This had played an effective role in easing the situation and has denigrated the role of nuclear weapons in world affairs. It is the non-aligned movement that has provided the leaders of India and Pakistan to discuss various bilateral issues in 1983 at New Delhi and finally they signed India-Pakistan Joint Commission in Vigyan Bhawan which has played an effective role in improving economic cooperation and other relations of India and Pakistan. In non-aligned Summit of Delhi, the Indian draft for the final declaration of the conference, divided between an economic and political part, gave particular emphasis to economic matters with proposals for immediate measures to **tackle** the global economic crisis and to promote development. Indira Gandhi, in her inaugural keynote address, stressed the urgent necessity for nuclear disarmament and said that the non-aligned countries shall seek "not charity or philanthropy but sound economic

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51 Keesing's, Volume XXIX, No, 8, 1983, p. 32349.

sense" with specific proposals on restructuring the world economic system.<sup>52</sup> The economic declaration was backed up by:

1. A comprehensive "action programme for economic cooperation;
2. A declaration on collective action for global prosperity; and
3. A declaration on collective self reliance among non-aligned and other developing countries.<sup>53</sup> It is clear that these some new declaration and the basic principles of non-alignment, though they are not only related to India and Pakistan, have penetrated the new spirit in the mind of Indians and Pakistani to cooperate each other in different fields.

The non-aligned Summit held at Belgrade in September 1989 has worked a lot in economic as well as political development. The declaration of the meeting emphasized that a 'new international economic order' remained the central goal of the organisation.<sup>54</sup> The meeting also provided opportunity to Indian and Pakistani

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53 Ibid., p. 32353.

54 Keesing's, Volume, 35, No. 9, 1989, p. 36907.

leaders to discuss their bilateral issues. Mrs Nusrat Bhutto, Senior Minister of Pakistan, referred to 'trust building exercise' with India. She said Pakistan had advanced several proposals to promote peace, security and arms control in the region of South Asia. The agreement signed, last December between Pakistan and India not to attack each other nuclear facilities constitutes a confidence building measure, we also hope that India will respond to our proposals, including the proposal<sup>55</sup> to keep south Asia free of nuclear weapons. A 15-nation economic Summit was planned to strengthen South Coopera-<sup>56</sup> tion and an open dialogue with North, and the Rajiv's calling on September 5, 1989 for the establishment of a 'Planet Protection Fund', under U.N. auspices, to develop or purchase conservation-compatible technologies and to be financed by a contribution by each country (with the exception of the poorest) equivalent to 0.1 percent of<sup>57</sup> their gross domestic product, have further improved the intimacy between India and Pakistan as well as among other countries.

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55 Patriot, September 7, 1989.

56 Ibid., September 10, 1989.

57 Keesing's, Vol. 35, No. 9, 1989, p. 36907.

The recent 10th Non-aligned Summit held at  
 58 Jakarta (Indonesia) in the first week of September  
 . 1992 further provided an occasion for Indian and  
 Pakistani leaders to discuss their bilateral problems,  
 and for improving relations. But nothing much was  
 achieved between India and Pakistan because Pakistan  
 raised the Kashmir issue in the Summit. Mr. P.V.  
 Narsimha Rao, in retaliation, made an oblique reference  
 to Pakistan and reminded the Summit that Non-aligned  
 Movement had moved on because it concentrated on global  
 59 issues, "rather than frittering away its energies in  
 bilateral disputes within itself which would have spelt  
 disaster to its very existence long ago." In the  
 Summit the new dimension to the effort to improve ties  
 with Pakistan was that India told Pakistan that it was  
 agreeable to bilateral discussions on confidence build-  
 60 ing measures in the nuclear arena.

In addition to the SAARC and the Non-Aligned  
 Movement there are some other organisations such as  
 Group of 77 and the United Nations which have played  
 important role in bringing closeness not only between

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58 Asian Recorder, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 42, October 14-  
 20, 1992, p. 22642.

59 Ibid., p. 22643.

60 Ibid., p. 22646.

India and Pakistan but among other countries also. But it is the Group of 77, non-aligned movement and particularly the SAARC which have provided a global forum for the South to come together and develop a collective perspective on global affairs. With the wide range of meetings of foreign secretaries, foreign minister, specialised working groups and heads of state or government at various regional and international forums, India and Pakistan, and other countries have come to realise that the major responsibility for their development lies with themselves and they must try to achieve this goal through mutual cooperation.

For promoting bilateral cooperation between India and Pakistan, many bilateral talks, meetings, and agreements have been arranged. By and large, they have also been fruitful.

### Conclusion

The Joint Commission is certainly step forward in promoting cooperation between the two countries for mutual benefit in economic, trade, industrial, education, cultural, consular, tourism, travel, information, scientific and technological fields. The Commission also suggested for the exchange of academicians from

each other country. Another important point is the division of commission into four sub-commissions each dealing with specified fields, which have provided an opportunities to both Indian and Pakistani leaders to have a meeting for discussing some particular matters entrusted to a particular sub-cimmission. The neighbourly relations and promoting cooperation in the agreement were maintained with the exception of political and military questions. The rigid attitude adopted by India and Pakistan and having the trade relations with some other countries had disturbed the normal functioning of the agreement.

The formation of SAARC of which India and Pakistan are the two major partners, and some other regional and international organisations held out some hope of not only multilateral cooperation but also bilateral improvement between India and Pakistan.

## **PART III**

### **LOOKING AHEAD**

## C H A P T E R   V I I I

### THE STALEMATE AND PROSPECTIVE TRENDS

From the above discussion, it becomes clear that the conflict between India and Pakistan has arisen particularly in the ways of political and strategic issues, on the Kashmir issue and in the trade and economic relations. In fact, the major elements in the conflict over the above issues are the images, inviting external powers in the region and improving economic and trade relations with others rather than between themselves. No doubt, the external role is there in creating the above problems between India and Pakistan but these two countries are also themselves responsible for the creation of the problems. The problems of conflicts between the two countries are not new but their origins could be traced back to the days before the division of the sub-continent, at the time of division and after partition. In order to avoid from the net of conflict, both India and Pakistan should take following steps:

#### 1. Ways of Building Political and Strategic Consensus

After Partition both India and Pakistan have improved a lot in armaments and nuclear fields either by purchasing from someone or by making themselves. Thus, the situation in South Asia especially between India and



Pakistan can be identified more as a post-proliferation state rather than a non-proliferation state. Both the countries now face nuclear threat to their national and security interests from each other. Here, it must be noted that fundamentally a non-nuclear environment would serve the strategic and national interests of both India and Pakistan. The current period of the major powers especially by U.S. have presented the world with a unique opportunity not to move towards nuclear field. The time has come to start the same process on the Indian sub-continent especially between India and Pakistan. If the East Germany and West Germany can reunite, U.S. and USSR can come to the negotiating table and other major powers can talk about peace, then why India and Pakistan can not do the same process. Both the nations share certain common concerns. On the foundations of these it can be built an edifice of security which will in the long run bring peace and prosperity not only to India and Pakistan but the entire South Asia. In the process, it will strengthen the global security system which is gradually acquiring discernible contours. So, both the countries should opt the following steps for the improvements of relations;

(a) The Avoidance of War: Recent reports indicate that the threat of nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan exists. Prof. Gary Milhollin, Director of the Wisconsin nuclear arms control, said if fighting did erupt between India and Pakistan, each side must assume that the other would deploy and possible use an atom bomb.<sup>1</sup> These atom bomb will not only destroy each other population, properties but it will destroy the ecological balance also. Thus, it is in the interest of both India and Pakistan that they should not avoid only nuclear war but conventional war also. Because it is an accepted and obvious fact that any nuclear armed nation on the verge of losing a conventional war will most likely resort to the use of nuclear weapons to avert defeat. This being a distinct possibility in the case of India and Pakistan, it is imperative that both should avoid a conventional exchange to avoid escalation and also outside interference.

(b) Prevention of Nuclear and Chemical Weapons Proliferation: The proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons between India and Pakistan, no doubt, will be a danger for each other and both countries will have a doubt about the strength of each other. The agrandizement of nuclear and chemical weapon will also affect the other

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1 Indian Express, June 11, 1990.

countries of the region. Other countries of the region which are comparatively small in size, vulnerable militarily, relatively less advanced in terms of resources and economic well being, would thought to opt for nuclear/chemical weapons to meet the challenges offered by India and Pakistan. For them, it would be cheaper to acquire a bomb or two to deter than to enter into an expensive arms race with India and Pakistan. The acquisition of such armaments by small nations of the region is likely to create problems and further compound already existing problems for India and Pakistan. There is also the possibility of terrorist groups acquiring such arms clandestinely. With the terrorist activity rising in the region, it is important that both India and Pakistan should avoid escalation of hostilities.

(c) Reduction in Defence Budget: Both India and Pakistan are economically poor and are depend on some other countries in one or the other way. Both the countries are over burdened with debt, supporting one-sixth of the world's population. Thus, both the countries need to drastically reduce spending on armaments and war machine in order to invigorate their ailing economies. The funds, thus, released can be used for not only reducing the debt burden but also for providing essential resources for new and

urgent undertakings, for education, housing, health, alleviation of poverty and for the environment.

(d) Combating Drug Trafficking, Terrorism and Weapons Culture: These activities together have assumed menacing proportions and have spread their insidious tentacles all over the world. Prevailing conditions in India and Pakistan provide the ideal breeding ground for subversive activities which derive strength and sustenance from the above mentioned elements. Both the countries need to tackle the problem together.

The long term goal of both India and Pakistan are almost same which are security and stability in the sub-continent, economic advancement, freedom from outside intervention, uninterrupted peace and prosperity, end of drug menace, terrorism and weapons culture. These goals can be translated into reality only when both India and Pakistan choose to confront the issues together instead of confronting each other. However, no amount of peace-keeping and implementation of various forms of confidence-building measures and crisis management techniques can form a substitute for conflict resolution and settlement. It is important not to loose sight of these longer-term objectives, when addressing the immediate problems of ending hostilities. It is necessary, nevertheless, to first tackle the main sources of conflict between India and

Pakistan.

(e) Combating Communalism: Communalism has acquired a special place in both India and Pakistan against the positive forces which stands for the world freedom, democracy, unity and tolerance. It must be realised that modern civilisation, because of the advancement in technology and means of communication, has acquired a peculiar character which is marked by great intermingling of religions, cultures and diverse ethnic societies. Theocratic states are a vestige of the past and are not relevant any more. Instead of working as a cementing force, religion has acquired divisive tendencies over the years. It is high time states identifying themselves with religion came out of their antiquated mindsets and discarded what is irrelevant in the present context, and forged ahead taking into account human rights which are more relevant. So India and Pakistan should also use religion only for beneficial purpose and should discard which are irrelevant.

(f) Non-interference: Both India and Pakistan should take interest in settling their domestic matters rather than taking interest in each other. Both countries should come together and agreed not to interfere in each other's affairs by way of providing military and material assistance to individuals or groups attempting to stabilise

the other. India also must stop blaming Pakistan for everything. The mismanagement of Kashmir and Punjab by successive governments is not the responsibility of Pakistan. It is responsible only for fishing in troubled waters.

It is the time for Indian government to take stock of the situation in Kashmir especially and start from the very beginning. The moment is also full of opportunity and hope for India. The prevailing conditions in Pakistan proved to the people of J & K that they have no future in Pakistan.<sup>2</sup> Those who can't look after their own Muslim brethren and continue to discriminate will do precious little for them if Kashmiris choose to join Pakistan where the ethnic and sectarian conflict is on the increase. With passions and determination, India will be able to bring home to the people of J & K the fact that their legitimate rights and aspirations will be met within the framework of the Indian state. Even if these outstanding issues are not resolved, major irritants will be removed if the status quo is maintained. Simple agreements arrived at in that respect could form the nucleus of an overall flexible pattern of security.

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2 Economic and Political Weekly, March 31, 1990.

(g) Non-Provocative Defence (N.F.D.): Non-provocative defence is also termed as defensive defence, non-offensive defence and just defence. Non-provocative Defence gained a lot of importance during the 1980s. As the term suggests, strategists and defence theorists all over the world have designed a number of military and non-military strategies which are weak in their offensive potential and exceptionally strong in their defensive strength. A number of countries have used this concept to devise a defence oriented model of security for themselves. The outstanding ones being Switzerland, Sweden and Yugoslavia. Their N.F.D. (Non Provocative Defence) systems are briefly<sup>3</sup> explained below:

(i) Switzerland: It has for centuries practiced and perfected a policy of armed neutrality. The weapons maintained by the Swiss are essentially of a defensive nature.

(ii) Sweden: Unlike Switzerland, Sweden maintains a large standing defensive army. Their strategy is termed as "marginal cost deterrence" in which defence need not be powerful enough to defeat any aggressors but simply sufficiently resist them for giving a lesson to the

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3 Strategic Analysis, Vol. XIII, No. 6, September 1990 pp. 654-655.

aggressor. Sweden supplements its defensive capabilities with an active peace policy, consistently promoting disarmament and development at the U.N. and other international force.

(iii) Yugoslavia: Yugoslavia's defensive defence strategy called the General People's Defence combines a sizeable standing Army, a fall back capacity for partisan and guerilla warfare, a people's resistance taking many forms and involving the entire population in a variety of tasks and a no-surrender clause in its constitution. The Yugoslavs have developed a broad range of non-military forms of resistance, including moral, political and psychological resistance techniques and economic and cultural resistance.

In order to arrive at an integrated defence plan or model suited to meet India and Pakistan's security concerns, inspiration could be drawn from the models mentioned above. Therefore both India and Pakistan, in order to bring peace and prosperity, should decide to:

- i) non first use of nuclear weapons;
- ii) move forces away from the border.
- iii) initiate development and exploitation of defensive weapons technology while discarding offence oriented weapons system;
- iv) discourage interference in each other's territory
- v) impede war-making capability of both the countries to a great extent,



- vi) Induce expenses on weapons thereby releasing funds for development.
- vii) induce arms control in the region;
- viii) discourage terrorist activity;
- ix) contribute to an overall global security;
- x) bring economic advancement.

(h) Denuclearization: Nuclear disarmament, no doubt, is the reliable and viable non proliferation regime. But there should be denuclearization of whole region including that of China and the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the region by the U.S. and other nuclear powers countries. This option would require especially U.S. to take away her naval ships fitted with nuclear weapons from these parts of Indian ocean adjoining the region.

For global disarmament, interim steps could be considered to remove the threat of nuclear weapons between India and Pakistan as well as from Asia. A search for regional (as distinguished from global) solution will need to meet two essential criteria:

- i) First, it must meet the legitimate interests of all countries of the region;
- ii) Second, it must form an integral interim element of the larger universal nuclear disarmament process.

For formulating workable solutions to the threat of nuclear weapons and proliferation in the region, a continental approach based on the principles and norms of disarmament already accepted (in the INF Treaty) should be adopted. In this context, a Triple Zero Option for Asia offers the greatest potential for attaining the ultimate objective of global nuclear disarmament, and in the interim, achieving substantive denuclearisation of Asia as well as meeting the legitimate security concerns of all states at least of Asia. The Zero Option for India<sup>4</sup> and Pakistan as well as for Asia would imply.

- i) elimination of all medium to shorter range (5500 to 500 km. range).
- ii) Corresponding commitment by the nations of Asia not to develop or acquire nuclear weapons of the non-strategic category.
- iii) Strategic nuclear weapons in Asia and elsewhere to be brought within the framework of negotiations to reduce the strategic weapons.
- iv) Multilateral verification and inspection mechanism to ensure compliance with non-deployment and non-development of nuclear weapons by every state.

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4 Jasjit Singh, "Nuclear Weapon Proliferation in Asia", Strategic Analysis, Vol. XIV, No. 12, March 1992, P. 1357.

In the beginning, no doubt, many difficulties will come in reaching such an agreement between India and Pakistan as well as among other countries. However, the fundamental strength of an Asian Zero Option lies in the fact that, unlike other multilateral/bilateral proposals (including the N.P.T. and NWFZs) and short of universal and complete nuclear disarmament, it is the way in which the essential legitimate security concerns of all countries can be adequately met while moving towards the ultimate objective of global nuclear disarmament. At the sub-regional level, it would meet the parameters of Pakistan's proposals on nuclear issues related to this part of the world and Pakistan, particularly if it is sincere about its own proposals, should welcome the Zero Option and support it. Adoption of an Asian Zero Option is perhaps the beneficial option left open for India before going to choose the nuclear weapon option.

At the same time, there is need to institute specific measures to support and reinforce strategic stability between India and Pakistan as well as in the whole region. These would have to be constructed around confidence building measures - both in relation to nuclear issue as well as conventional forces. With this, bilateral steps between India and Pakistan could be progressed.

## 2. Towards A Settlement of Kashmir Problem.

Kashmir had been the problem between India and Pakistan since partition, and it created problems between the two in many shapes. In the first place, Pakistan claimed that the religious affinity of the people of Kashmir made it potentially a Pakistani province, because the partition of India was based on the recognition of the separate nationhood of the Indian Muslims. This was the opinion of Pakistani leaders and peoples. But on the other hand, the Indian leaders did not agree that Kashmir would inevitably become a part of Pakistan, just because the State's population was overwhelmingly Muslim, because Indian leaders believed that India's nationhood was based on secular criteria and all the religion, castes and communities can integrate with India and it would be fatal for India to accept religion as the fundamental element of politics. Pakistan should note this thing in her mind that the people of all the communities and of all the religions are living in India. Another matter is that India had put no pressure upon the Kashmir ruler to accede to India, notwithstanding its keen interest in the matter. Nehru said "we did not encourage any rapid decision".<sup>5</sup> Having this background,

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5 Sisir Gupta, Kashmir: A Study in India-Pakistan Relations (New Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1966), P. 445.

Pakistan should not think about Kashmiri and Kashmir problems.

(a) Control of Terrorism: After the Bangladesh war of 1971, Pakistan realised that Kashmir or any part of India can't be separated from India and Pakistan herself also can't fight with India. Thus Pakistan opted the tactics of supporting terrorists of different provinces of India. Some of the developments that have caused the present situation of Jammu and Kashmir in general and of the valley in particular have already explained in previous chapters. The full throttled support by Pakistan to militancy and terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir led a so-called revolution in Indian province. So Pakistan must be accredited full capability to fight a long drawn war in the shape of insurgency and engage in a full flaged confrontation. Pakistan supported Kashmiri militants with two reasons. One is that Whenever the Pakistani leaders are facing any domestic problems from the side of public then they are trying to divert the public mind from the main domestic issues to such type issues as Pakistan raised against India. Other reason is that Pakistan tries to internationalise the Kashmir issue and tries to show herself that she is the follower and supporters of human rights by showing the sympathy towards

Kashmiri and tries to jeopardise India's image in the eye of the world.

So in order to bring the closeness between India and Pakistan, Pakistan should not raise this issue and should not support terrorists of Kashmir. The Pakistani leaders should also not play with neighbouring country like India for their domestic gain. On the other hand India should not only see the on going situation in Kashmir silently that is killing selectively unarmed, unprotected government employees, pulverise the administration, terrorise the population of Jammu and Kashmir, controlling the media by terrorists, boycott of Indian norms such as Friday being the weekly holiday as against Sunday etc., but India should make the plans and projects that must take the full dimension of the threat into account and evolve strategies and plans to handle the problems on a war footing. The fundamental requirement for the government, therefore, is to improve the ground situation by resorting normalcy in administration, law and order, the militants have to be tamed by strong counteractions, flow of trained armed infiltrators have to be controlled.

(b) Organisation of Special Forces: The Government of India should organise Special Forces to handle the situation in the Valley, to face the large number of Pakistan trained infiltrators with arms and fairly large number of mines, rockets and explosives so that Indian forces in such a way can give defeat to militants, infiltrators trained by Pakistan. With this, both militants and Pakistani will receive a jolt in their aim and peace can be brought in Jammu and Kashmir, and in the Valley. This peace will also improve the relations between India and Pakistan.

(c) More Autonomy to Kashmiris: India consists of many regions, ethnically and culturally different to one another. It has many languages and customs differing from region to region. Its religious practices vary even under the all-embracing umbrella of Hinduism. Likewise Jammu and Kashmir has different language and culture and the Kashmiri also want to maintain it. The Central Government of India, in order to divert Kashmiri from Pakistan and make them busy in their own culture, should give greater freedom to choose their system, control being exercised only over major matters such as defence, foreign policy and finance. It should be asked them to utilise the Article 370, because with this the Kashmiri will think

that they have been given more autonomy so that they will try to maintain their own states and will segregate themselves from the false promises of Pakistan that she is giving from time to time. Perhaps Kashmiri might themselves ask for its abrogation.

(d) Controls of Communal Factors: Controlling communal factors is also one of the important matter for both India and Pakistan. The fundamentalists groups and parties in both the countries are prevalent today who are creating disturbance in their respective countries as well as in each other countries, and playing a unique role in creating a gap between India and Pakistan. So, the government of both the countries should stop the activities of such fundamentalists forces. Particularly India should take much interest in this field because of its secular character.

(e) Not Allowing Separation: The other solution for Kashmir problem is that Indian government should not allow the situations that favour separation. Because the separation of Jammu and Kashmir from India and its accession to Pakistan will further make the situation tense between India and Pakistan. The key to a possible solution in Kashmir lies in the split between Kashmir Islamic



fundamentalist groups favouring accession to Kashmir, and the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, which represents the longstanding aspirations of Kashmir valley Muslims for autonomy and advocates full independence. This split between the two groups, no doubt, was burst into the open in mid-1990.<sup>6</sup> India should try more and more to create a gap between these two groups in order to weaken them.

On the other hand, Pakistan should not think to take Jammu and Kashmir on her own side and should not think to make it an independent state. First thing is that Pakistan is standing nowhere before India in any field and if war would take place, Pakistan will be the sufferer and most probably will lose the war. Second thing is that if Jammu and Kashmir becomes an independent state then only India will not be loser but Pakistan also because Kashmiris are having affinity with all the Kashmiris and major portion of their majority is living in Azad Kashmir situated in Pakistan.

Pakistan will not get any support from major powers particularly from U.S. because after the Soviet disintegration many Soviet Republics have become independent Muslim countries and some of them are also

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6 Selig S. Harrison, "South Asia and the United States: A Chance for a Fresh Start", Strategic Digest, Vol. XXII, No. 12 December 1992, p. 1610.

having nuclear power. So, America at present has more threat from Muslim countries than Communists or any other bloc. Therefore America herself by making Kashmir an independent state did not want to create any other fundamentalist Muslim country. Thus Pakistan must forget the idea of making Kashmir an independent State.

(f) Psychological Reorientation: The Pakistanis were able to project the darker side of the so-called anti-Indian Kashmiri rebellion. Their media put out distorted fallacious and orchestrated stories that inflamed the Kashmiri Muslims. India should not set herself only about correcting the impression created by pro-Pakistan militant elements amongst the people of the valley, but should try to search the answers of the factors such as Pakistani intransigence and exploitative opportunism, administrative deficiencies and the alienation of the people. Solutions have to be finely tuned and harmoniously blended to offset the estrangement of the people and neutralise the militancy of a cross-section of the pro-Pakistani elements. Much of the psychological effort would, therefore, have to be directed at winning the euphemistic "hearts and minds" of the people. Two basic issues that seem to have hurt the Kashmiris i.e. Izzat (dignity) and Islam, need to be reassured. India's publicity based on truthful expositions should be more convincing. Some of the truths that the

people of Kashmir need to know are:

- i) The purpose of Pakistani propaganda and support to the Kashmiri militants is to divert their people's attention from the domestic problems of Pakistan.
- ii) The problems in Punjab and Kashmir are created by Pakistanis; they are 'nonetheless, temporary, and would be settled.
- iii) The world has understood the foolhardiness of Pakistan's efforts to foment militancy and an uprising in Kashmir. Thus Pakistan has failed in receiving moral, material and diplomatic assurances on the Kashmir issue from these countries who were siding her earlier.

In spite of the above points India should not allow the militants and extremists supported by Pakistan to shout political slogans from across the Line of Control for so-called Azadi; should not allow to organise preposterous organisations such as "World Kashmir Freedom Movement". The present situation of Kashmir needs to be handled on a war footing by enforcing effective media control measures, by reorganising paramilitary forces to undertake law and order and combat the growing militancy;

by restoring faith through good, clean administration and by introducing social services among the people, by mobilising Indian Muslims in the cause of " Saving Kashmir."

### 3. Expanding Indo-Pakistani Economic Cooperation

The history of blocking factors in India - Pakistan economic cooperation as well as political relations make it clear that many times, their relations have received a big jolt by their bilateral disputes as well as by external involvement. In order to give careful consideration to the future prospects for economic expansion between India and Pakistan, there are some points which are necessary to keep in mind:

(a) The Imperative of Interdependence: A careful study of many factors involved in social, political and economic relationship between India and Pakistan shows that their best interest can be achieved by expanding the areas of cooperation and acknowledging the importance of interdependence. So, it is necessary for both the countries that they should forget their past experiences of wars and of some other irritant factors. Whatever the trials of strength have taken place between the two countries have not given any thing to any side except

loss of lives, properties and time. So, there is need to improve mutual cooperation in every fields.

(b) Leadership Crisis in India and Pakistan: Both the countries have been suffering from the fundamentalist leaders and these leaders for their prestige and parties interests, have issued many slogans against each other (Pakistani, against India and Indian, against Pakistan). So, these leaders have to change their attitude against each other's countries and the politics should be based on mutual cooperation rather than fratricidal struggle and fundamentalist approach. The leaders of both the countries should plan to take those measures and initiatives which can transform even dedicate and complicated question, through a new political basis, for constructive, responsible, and reciprocal relationship. For reducing vulnerability to economic exploitation, the "new politics" of Indian and Pakistani leaders should be related to the economic cooperation and economic development.

(c) Economic Compulsions: An initiative for reduction of trade barriers emanating from India might make it suspect in the eyes of Pakistan, because Pakistan cannot countenance any loss of revenues resulting from a reduction of traffis. Nor can it remove quantitative

restriction on imports, if that is the only or most effective way of protecting its balance of payment. The best course, therefore, is to let trade grow at its natural pace in response to the free play of the forces of demand and supply. India and Pakistan are likely to trade only in those items, which they can buy at relatively cheaper prices consistent with minimum standards of quality, especially as this involves expenditure of scarce foreign exchange. Under such a dispensation, neither country could legitimately complain either of exploitation or unnecessary sacrifices.

(d) Information Flow: Except for traditional items of trade, the business and industrial communities of the two countries are not aware of what the other can offer in quantity value and quality terms. There are thousands of item in which India and Pakistan can have trade with each other but adequate information is not available regarding these items. Some steps should be taken to improve the information system through delegation, exhibition, fares, exporters-importers, directories, news letters, product catalogues etc. A study of the roles being played by the government agencies, chamber of commerce, industry and trade, specific associations, consultants, economists and freelance individuals, banks,

industrial agencies like UNIDO etc. in the area of bilateral trade are necessary. Steps taken by such agencies will sharpen areas of business cooperation and Indo-Pak trade could be expanded over the next few years.

Despite major items of imports and exports of India and Pakistan being identical, there are still scores of items in which the countries can trade with each other. If the respective governments take steps to facilitate intra-regional trade, the trade between the two countries would surely expand and reach a higher level.

(e) Development of Trading Organisation: India and Pakistan both should develop trading organisations. The channels of trade should be strengthened both in public and private sectors, so as to effectively promote trade and evolve various forms of trading activities. These organisations should have regular flow of informations.

(f) Maximum Imports and Exports: For the economic expansion between India and Pakistan, both countries should import goods from each other rather than from distant countries because the import from distant

countries will raise the cost of freight and insurance for India and Pakistan, which will constitute a significant proportion of each other's total import bill. Greater bilateral trade cooperation would reduce the foreign exchange payment on account of these two items (freight and insurance) and thereby produce some beneficial effects on balance of payments position of each other.

(g) Improving Integrated Bilateral Trade: Both India and Pakistan are facing unforeseen pressures on balance of payments caused frequently by draught or untimely rainfall which raises the cost of production due to shortage of raw materials, intermediate goods and fertilizers. These can be largely overcome by an integrated bilateral trade practices. This would not only allow domestic industries to realize their growth targets but also achieve greater economies of scale.

(h) The Imperative of Balanced Trade: Since any form of cooperation involves close understanding of the situation, it may be kept in mind that difficulties will be formidable. One of the most important problem will be in terms of trade balances. While both countries will have to examine business opportunities it should be kept within the framework of the countries economic priorities



and politics and in the spirit of equality. This will build mutual trust and credibility which is a pre-condition for economic cooperation.

(i) Need for Research: The coordination of research services can play another possible area of cooperation between the two countries. For widening the field of experiment, both the countries should establish common research institutes and the results obtained through research could be utilised for the benefit of the people of both the countries. But, it is necessary that the equality in the distribution of benefits should also be ensured through location of the institutes and their field stations in the two countries in an almost equal proportion. Priority should be given to the establishment of the following institutes.

1. Agricultural and forestry Research Organisation.
2. Leprosy Research Centre.
3. Virus, Research Institute.
4. Institute of Malaria and
5. Tuberculosis Research Centre.

(j) Coordination of Educational and Training Programmes:

We know that both the countries have invested a large sums of money in the creation of Universities and other educational institutions, but they have not developed

upto mark. So, both the countries should agree to co-ordinate their educational and training facilities in the fields of administration, management, agriculture, engineering and medicine, and forestry etc.

One thing should be kept in mind that both India and Pakistan must learn to do every thing step-by-step with time bound and coordinated action-programmes. They should follow the way of Mao Tse Tung who used to say that "in a long journey of a thousand miles, one must take the first step."

### Conclusion

From the above discussion, it becomes clear that both India and Pakistan after partition improved a lot in armaments and nuclear field, so the situation between India and Pakistan can be identified as a post-proliferation state rather than non-proliferated state. Now both the countries face the nuclear threat for their national interests and security from each other. In bringing a consensus between India and Pakistan, there is need for some reorientation of policies to take into account in this changed circumstances of South Asia. At present it is difficult to visualise

any meaningful process which could lead to a reversal and denuclearisation. So early consultations to work for strategic stability in the post nuclearisation state are necessary.

In the ultimate analysis, proliferation dangers do not emanate from the mere existence or possession of nuclear weapons, but essentially from the belief in their use and usability which would influence intensions. It would be unrealistic to expect a dramatic change in the political context of Indo-Pakistan relations, or to ignore the post-proliferation state of the nuclear environment around India. Thus, it is necessary to rapidly move towards stabilising the situation in a manner that lowers the risk factors and reduces the dangers of threat or use of nuclear weapons.

The situations that has been developed in Kashmir are needed to be reversed not by force and sentimental attitudes but through multidirectional approach such a political, economic, psychological and diplomatic. The measures of control need to conform to a strategy which would imply tough measures against the militants and varying degrees of pressure on others. Jammu and Kashmir can not be allowed to drift away from India because Kashmir separation from India

will further escalate the conflict between India and Pakistan. Pakistan should not opt suicidal path about Kashmir issue again and again.

As far as economic relations is concerned, it received a jolt by bilateral disputes and by external involvement both. Hence, one thing should be kept in mind that the bilateral cooperation of India and Pakistan received a jolt whenever political relations became strained. Thus the economic expansion between the two countries are possible only when their political relations are normal and are improved.

## CHAPTER IX

### CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS

This study leads us to the conclusion that the India-Pakistan relations have been the victim of psychological malaise, and both the countries have been suspecting about each other's motives since 1947. So, Pakistan's foreign policy has been India-oriented and India's foreign policy, Pakistan-oriented. Pakistan always feared that India would destroy its very existence either directly or through internal subversion in Pakistan. This kind of psyche was the result of historical, domestic various complexes and deficiencies, and external factors. In order to secure herself against the supposed Indian threat, Pakistan tried to seek friendship of China, West Asian countries and had been the satellite of the United States upto October 1990. And when United States withdrew her hand from supporting Pakistan then Pakistan searched other one to have a close alliance in order to strengthen herself in each and every field. The purpose of the Pakistan's friendship with these countries was to shift the balance of power in her own favour. As Liaquat Ali Khan, the first Prime Minister of Pakistan, remarked:

"In fact one of the main objectives of the Muslim League which brought Pakistan into existence, was to cement and strengthen fraternal ties between Muslim of the sub-continent and those of the other parts of

the world. The underlying idea of the movement for the achievement of Pakistan was not just to add one more country to the conglomeration of countries in the world, or to add one more path of colour to multi-coloured global map. Pakistan came into being as a result of the urge felt by the Muslims of this sub-continent to secure a territory, however limited, where the Islamic ideology and way of life could be practiced and demonstrated to the world". 1

Pakistan's policy of total alignment with the western bloc during 1954-58 gave a chance to the United States to have a foothold in South Asia. United State tooks benefits of Pakistan's initial weaknesses, and helped Pakistan's view of aggression. United States through alliance with Pakistan and military supplies not only disturbed the normal relations of India and Pakistan but also brought cold war to South Asia region. So, did China during the sixties in order to settle its scores with India.

Thus, it is apparent that Pakistan had all along adversarial relationship with India. There had been different irritants of many occasions. In the initial stages, the question of minorities, evacue properties, division of military stores, currency problems, border

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1 Cited by Surendra Chopra, "Evaluation of Pakistan's Foreign Policy and its Relations with India", V.D. Chopra, ed., Studies in Indo-Pak Relations ( New-Delhi: Patriot, 1984), P. 232.

problem and future of Indian states plagued its relations with India and worked as a blocking factors in the relations of the two countries. It is apparent that the close complementarity between the two countries (India and Pakistan) meant that both the countries had suffered a loss during the period of crisis.

Till 1965, both India and Pakistan had gained substantial combat experience, the Pakistanis in fighting the Indians and the Indian fighting both the Pakistanis and the Chinese. Additionally, the armed forces of both sides had acquired substantial amounts of military hardware, some of it very sophisticated. The arms build up, coupled with Pakistan's membership in CENTO and SEATO, had drawn both superpowers into the sub-continent. Finally the Chinese invasion of 1962 on India had led to a major infusion of U.S. arms into India and had strained U.S.-Pakistani relations.

By 1965 the respective foreign policy stands and attitudes of the two countries had hardened. India had firmly embarked on the secular path while Pakistan followed the road to an ideal Islamic State that would incorporate all Muslims on the sub-continent. Thus, it was necessary for the Pakistani regime to keep alive its claim on Kashmir, its "lost" territory with a pre-

dominantly Muslim population. Inevitably, this aroused anti-irredentist sentiments in India with its strong commitment to hold on to Kashmir. Indian anti irredentism by 1965 stemmed from more complex factors than it had in 1947. Now, in addition to defending the notion of Indian secularism, the defence of Kashmir had come to symbolize the government's commitment to preserving the nation's territorial integrity and national security. Thus the 1965 war had important consequences for Pakistan because this war demonstrated that Pakistan was not having any ground to support its claim on Kashmir amongst the Muslim population of the State. This war also showed that, much to Pakistan's dismay the Indian armed forces were able to fend off a Pakistani attack. Thus the Pakistani leaders learned that the Indian armed forces could not be easily routed and had become a long way from the Chinese debacle of 1962.

A new hope of mutual improvements between the two countries was seen when Tashkent Agreement was signed through the mediation of Soviet Union. But as far as permanent settlement of India-Pakistani problems are concerned, Tashkent Declaration achieved nothing new at all. It brought a temporary respite to India-Pakistan hostilities. India and Pakistan remained suspicious



and unyielding towards each other, and the Kashmir remained as unresolved as ever.

Further, the war of 1971 disrupted the relations between India and Pakistan. In this war, Pakistan was more sufferer because she lost her Eastern wing. The break up of Pakistan and India's unquestioned military might established India's superiority not only over Pakistan but in the whole South Asia region. Recognising its inferiority in conventional war, Pakistan felt the threat for her security in the sub-continent. So, it made a sense for Pakistan to develop some nuclear capability and the programme of nuclear armaments of Pakistan after 1971 received a considerable impetus after the Indian nuclear explosion of 1974 at Pokhran.

As Pakistan came apart, its claim on Kashmir also eroded in a major way. The inability of the West Pakistan to convince their brethren in the East to remain in the same polity, made it exceedingly difficult for the Pakistani leadership to lay a claim on Kashmir on the basis of its religious composition. Naturally, India took advantage of the discrepancy between fact and theory.

With the signing of the Simla Pact, a new era in bilateral relations began. The greatest merit of the Simla Pact was that the two countries decided to renounce the use or threat of use of force against each other, to put an end to the era of conflict and confrontation, and commit themselves to standing cooperation and peaceful coexistence. Further, the coming of Janata Party in power in New Delhi generated new hopes of cooperation between the two countries. The Janata Government and its policy created a climate of confidence and goodwill between India and Pakistan. The leaders of both countries, through the exchange of visits between India and Pakistan, dispelled the apprehensions of the fundamentalist organizations in both countries. Many outstanding disputes were also resolved between the two countries and the areas of mutual cooperation in various fields were expanded.

But the above hopes and spirit of cooperation received a jolt when the Soviet Union occupied Afghanistan. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan produced a crisis not simply for Afghan people but for the South Asian region as a whole. It confronted the main regional actors - Pakistan and India with a new political and strategic situation to which they reacted in distinctive

ways. For India and Pakistan, the Soviet invasion seriously changed the regional balance of power, and put them in the unevitable situation of having to respond to this new development and cope with its consequences in their own ways. Their responses, however, came to be formulated not solely on the basis of the needs and aspirations of the Afghan people but they took into account their own interests. Their responses differed from each other. Pakistan chose to pursue active opposition to the Soviet invasion, and India made no public condemnation of the Soviet invasion.

Pakistan also showed a number of reasons to become very fearful of the implications of Soviet occupation of Afghanistan for her national integrity and security as well as regional stability. The whole development of the Afghan crisis generated international sympathy for Mujahideen and provided international assistance which began to pour into Pakistan for the Afghan refugees and Mujahideen. From this, Pakistan benefitted a lot. It was Zia-ul Haq who made Pakistan very important to U.S. overnight when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, and Pakistan became a frontline State in the U.S. perception. Through this tactics, Pakistan received a lot of arms and economic aid from America and other countries and built up her defence system more

strong. This was a danger for India's security. In this way, India opposed more to the supply of arms to the Pakistan from U.S. and China than that of Soviet invasion. On the other way, India wanted to make the Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971, alive for continuing her relations with Soviet Union. India with an alliance of Soviet Union had to face Pakistan + U.S. and China in this region. Pakistan was important to the U.S. as a strategic ally in the context of America's cold war against the Soviet Union. But with the withdrawal of Soviet forces and finally with the disintegration of Soviet Union, the cold war ended. Thus, Pakistan's usefulness to U.S. policy calculations was changed. The U.S., which was believing blindly in Pakistan's nuclear programme during Afghan crisis and cold war, quickly changed its policy and suspended its military and economic assistance to Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment, U.S. not only suspended her economic and military aid to Pakistan but also shifted her priorities towards India in place of Pakistan. Thus, whatever the burden India was facing during Afghan crisis and cold war from the side of Pakistan helped by U.S. was reduced and this burden is shifted to Pakistan. Thus in order to bring balance of power in her own favour, Pakistan tried to improve her relations more with China, France and others.

Further, the Kashmir, Punjab and Siachin glacier issues have been major irritants in India-Pakistan relations. Kashmir remains the one unresolved problem since Partition. Before 1971, Pakistan tried to take Kashmir through military efforts but after the defeat in Bangladesh war of 1971, realised that no military action could separate Kashmir from India or could make Kashmir an independent State. Thus, Pakistan changed her strategy to one of creating a climate of unlawful activities, insurrection by giving support to extremists and militants of Kashmir and Punjab. This attitude of Pakistan has created tension between the two countries.

Our analysis leads to somewhat pessimistic assessment of possibilities of conflict-avoidance between India and Pakistan. Since Partition, both India and Pakistan have been at loggerheads in all fields, particularly in arms build up and acquisition of nuclear technology. At present, both India and Pakistan have larger forces and more sophisticated weapons than in the past. So, the cost of a new war will be substantially greater than that of the previous three wars.

All in all, an analysis of the events and happenings of the period under review shows that the prospects of a *Modus vivendi* in the sub-continent are

bleak indeed. The Indo-Pak Cold War is continuing with increasing ferocity. There can be no hope of normalization of relations or resumption of normal cooperation without the resolution of the outstanding bilateral disputes and eventual political-strategic consensus.

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### III. PERIODICALS:

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